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Modular design of practical and provably secure cryptographic protocols

Ronald Cramer

Published Jan 1, 1997• 0 citations
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We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being

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The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides provable security guaranties for harsh application environment, where we want to construct protocols which keep security guarantees even when they are concurrently composed with arbitrary number of arbitrary (even hostile) protocols.This is a very strong guarantee.The UC-framework inherently supports the modular design, which allows secure composition of arbitrary number of UC-secure components with an arbitrary protocol.In contrast, traditional analysis and design is a stand alone analysis where security of a single instance is considered, i.e. an instance which is not in potential interaction with any concurrent instances.Furthermore, a typical traditional analysis is informal, i.e. without a formal proof.In spite of these facts, beyond the task of key-exchange this technology have not really took the attention of the community of applied cryptography.From practitioner's point of view the UC-world may seem more or less an academic interest of theoretical cryptographers.Accordingly we take a pragmatic approach, where we concentrate on meaningful compromises between the assumed adversarial strength, ideality wishes and realization complexity while keeping provable security guarantees within the UC-framework.We believe that even modest but provable goals (especially, if tunable to application scenarios) are interesting if a wider penetration of the UC-technology is desired into the daily-practice of protocol applications.
We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being