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The design and analysis of real-world cryptographic protocols

Samuel M. Scott

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
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The Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols.

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The analysis of real-world protocols, in particular key exchange protocols and protocols building on these protocols, is a very complex, error-prone, and tedious task. Besides the complexity of the protocols itself, one important reason for this is that the security of the protocols has to be reduced to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives for every protocol time and again. We would therefore like to get rid of reduction proofs for real-world key exchange protocols as much as possible and in many cases altogether, also for higher-level protocols which use the exchanged keys. So far some first steps have been taken in this direction. But existing work is still quite limited, and, for example, does not support Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, a prevalent cryptographic primitive for real-world protocols. In this paper, building on work by Kusters and Tuengerthal, we provide an ideal functionality in the universal composability setting which supports several common cryptographic primitives, including DH key exchange. This functionality helps to avoid reduction proofs in the analysis of real-world protocols and often eliminates them completely. We also propose a new general ideal key exchange functionality which allows higherlevel protocols to use exchanged keys in an ideal way. As a proof of concept, we apply our framework to three practical DH key exchange protocols, namely ISO 9798-3, SIGMA, and OPTLS.

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Migrating to Hybrid Cryptography in Practice: The TutaCrypt Protocol and Its Security

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In this work, we study the hybrid key establishment protocol TutaCrypt as a concrete case of post-quantum cryptographic migration in practice. The protocol was developed by the end-to-end encrypted email provider Tuta and has been deployed to more than ten million users worldwide. We present the protocol in a form that enables rigorous cryptographic analysis and define two Bellare–Rogaway-style security models that precisely characterize the provided security guarantees. The two models capture that the security properties achieved in the pre-quantum setting are slightly stronger than in the post-quantum setting. We then give reduction-based security proofs that clarify under which assumptions the construction achieves security, and how its guarantees degrade if either the classical or the post-quantum component is compromised. Our results illustrate how formally grounded cryptographic models can capture real-world migration strategies and hybrid deployments. Such analyses help to understand the security properties of deployed cryptographic systems and help move cryptographic migration from best practice toward principled, verifiable design.

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Towards advanced cryptographic protocols for real-world applications

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This thesis aims to facilitate the deployment of advanced cryptographic primitives in the real world. It does so by designing and implementing post-quantum algorithms on electronic travel documents, and multi-party computation (MPC) on smart meters. We also introduce a novel pairing-based key-and-message-homomorphic (KMHE) scheme for more efficient outsourced MPC. First, we present PQ-EAC, a post-quantum secure replacement for the Extended Access Control protocol used in electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs). By substituting Diffie-Hellman key exchange with post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, we design eight protocol variants offering different trade-offs between security and efficiency. Our implementation on an ARM SC300 chip demonstrates runtimes of under two seconds at typical data rates, confirming the practical feasibility of migrating eMRTDs to post-quantum security. Second, we develop the first fully privacy-preserving power flow analysis (PFA) based on MPC. By adopting a Cartesian formulation of Newton's method and exploiting sparsity, we create an efficient MPC implementation that enables smart grid operations without compromising prosumer privacy. Our benchmarks show that for small grids with low network latency, online computation completes in under 30 seconds, demonstrating that MPC-based PFA is practical for preventive smart grid applications.Third, we present a new KMHE scheme based on bilinear pairings that enables practical rerandomizable garbling schemes (RGS). Our construction reduces garbled gate size by 98.99% (from 133.43 MB to 1.35 MB) and garbling time by 99.998% (from 33 minutes to 0.04 seconds) compared to previous BHHO-based approaches. This four-order-of-magnitude improvement makes the SCALES protocol practically feasible for the first time, enabling constant-round outsourced computation with security against adaptive adversaries.Together, these contributions demonstrate that advanced cryptographic techniques can be made practical through careful protocol design, algorithmic optimization, and implementation strategies tailored to specific application constraints.

•Oct 24, 2025•0 citations

More realistic analyses of cryptographic protocols

裕俊 竹部

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations
The analysis of real-world protocols, in particular key exchange protocols and protocols building on these protocols, is a very complex, error-prone, and tedious task. Besides the complexity of the protocols itself, one important reason for this is that the security of the protocols has to be reduced to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives for every protocol time and again. We would therefore like to get rid of reduction proofs for real-world key exchange protocols as much as possible and in many cases altogether, also for higher-level protocols which use the exchanged keys. So far some first steps have been taken in this direction. But existing work is still quite limited, and, for example, does not support Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, a prevalent cryptographic primitive for real-world protocols. In this paper, building on work by Kusters and Tuengerthal, we provide an ideal functionality in the universal composability setting which supports several common cryptographic primitives, including DH key exchange. This functionality helps to avoid reduction proofs in the analysis of real-world protocols and often eliminates them completely. We also propose a new general ideal key exchange functionality which allows higherlevel protocols to use exchanged keys in an ideal way. As a proof of concept, we apply our framework to three practical DH key exchange protocols, namely ISO 9798-3, SIGMA, and OPTLS.
In this work, we study the hybrid key establishment protocol TutaCrypt as a concrete case of post-quantum cryptographic migration in practice. The protocol was developed by the end-to-end encrypted email provider Tuta and has been deployed to more than ten million users worldwide. We present the protocol in a form that enables rigorous cryptographic analysis and define two Bellare–Rogaway-style security models that precisely characterize the provided security guarantees. The two models capture that the security properties achieved in the pre-quantum setting are slightly stronger than in the post-quantum setting. We then give reduction-based security proofs that clarify under which assumptions the construction achieves security, and how its guarantees degrade if either the classical or the post-quantum component is compromised. Our results illustrate how formally grounded cryptographic models can capture real-world migration strategies and hybrid deployments. Such analyses help to understand the security properties of deployed cryptographic systems and help move cryptographic migration from best practice toward principled, verifiable design.
This thesis aims to facilitate the deployment of advanced cryptographic primitives in the real world. It does so by designing and implementing post-quantum algorithms on electronic travel documents, and multi-party computation (MPC) on smart meters. We also introduce a novel pairing-based key-and-message-homomorphic (KMHE) scheme for more efficient outsourced MPC. First, we present PQ-EAC, a post-quantum secure replacement for the Extended Access Control protocol used in electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs). By substituting Diffie-Hellman key exchange with post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, we design eight protocol variants offering different trade-offs between security and efficiency. Our implementation on an ARM SC300 chip demonstrates runtimes of under two seconds at typical data rates, confirming the practical feasibility of migrating eMRTDs to post-quantum security. Second, we develop the first fully privacy-preserving power flow analysis (PFA) based on MPC. By adopting a Cartesian formulation of Newton's method and exploiting sparsity, we create an efficient MPC implementation that enables smart grid operations without compromising prosumer privacy. Our benchmarks show that for small grids with low network latency, online computation completes in under 30 seconds, demonstrating that MPC-based PFA is practical for preventive smart grid applications.Third, we present a new KMHE scheme based on bilinear pairings that enables practical rerandomizable garbling schemes (RGS). Our construction reduces garbled gate size by 98.99% (from 133.43 MB to 1.35 MB) and garbling time by 99.998% (from 33 minutes to 0.04 seconds) compared to previous BHHO-based approaches. This four-order-of-magnitude improvement makes the SCALES protocol practically feasible for the first time, enabling constant-round outsourced computation with security against adaptive adversaries.Together, these contributions demonstrate that advanced cryptographic techniques can be made practical through careful protocol design, algorithmic optimization, and implementation strategies tailored to specific application constraints.