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Springer eBooks

Modern Space-Time and Undecidability

Rodolfo Gambini, Jorge A. Pullin

Published Nov 21, 2009• 24 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-90-481-3475-5_6

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Modern space-time and undecidability

Rodolfo Gambini, Jorge A. Pullin

The picture of space-time that Minkowski created in 1907 has been followed by two important developments in physics not contained in the original picture: general relativity and quantum mechanics. We will argue that the use of concepts of those theories to construct space-time implies conceptual modifications in quantum mechanics. In particular one can construct a viable picture of quantum mechanics without a reduction process that has outcomes equivalent to a picture with a reduction process. One therefore has two theories that are entirely equivalent experimentally but profoundly different in the description of reality they give. This introduces a fundamental level of undecidability in physics of a kind that has not been present before. We discuss some of the implications.

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A Relative Church-Turing-Deutsch Thesis from Special Relativity and Undecidability

Wilson, Blake, Ethan Dickey, Vaishnavi Iyer +1 more

Beginning with Turing's seminal work in 1950, artificial intelligence proposes that consciousness can be simulated by a Turing machine. This implies a potential theory of everything where the universe is a simulation on a computer, which begs the question of whether we can prove we exist in a simulation. In this work, we construct a relative model of computation where a computable \textit{local} machine is simulated by a \textit{global}, classical Turing machine. We show that the problem of the local machine computing \textbf{simulation properties} of its global simulator is undecidable in the same sense as the Halting problem. Then, we show that computing the time, space, or error accumulated by the global simulator are simulation properties and therefore are undecidable. These simulation properties give rise to special relativistic effects in the relative model which we use to construct a relative Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis where a global, classical Turing machine computes quantum mechanics for a local machine with the same constant-time local computational complexity as experienced in our universe.

arXiv:2206.06419•Jun 13, 2022•0 citations
The picture of space-time that Minkowski created in 1907 has been followed by two important developments in physics not contained in the original picture: general relativity and quantum mechanics. We will argue that the use of concepts of those theories to construct space-time implies conceptual modifications in quantum mechanics. In particular one can construct a viable picture of quantum mechanics without a reduction process that has outcomes equivalent to a picture with a reduction process. One therefore has two theories that are entirely equivalent experimentally but profoundly different in the description of reality they give. This introduces a fundamental level of undecidability in physics of a kind that has not been present before. We discuss some of the implications.
Beginning with Turing's seminal work in 1950, artificial intelligence proposes that consciousness can be simulated by a Turing machine. This implies a potential theory of everything where the universe is a simulation on a computer, which begs the question of whether we can prove we exist in a simulation. In this work, we construct a relative model of computation where a computable \textit{local} machine is simulated by a \textit{global}, classical Turing machine. We show that the problem of the local machine computing \textbf{simulation properties} of its global simulator is undecidable in the same sense as the Halting problem. Then, we show that computing the time, space, or error accumulated by the global simulator are simulation properties and therefore are undecidable. These simulation properties give rise to special relativistic effects in the relative model which we use to construct a relative Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis where a global, classical Turing machine computes quantum mechanics for a local machine with the same constant-time local computational complexity as experienced in our universe.