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arXiv:2206.06419

A Relative Church-Turing-Deutsch Thesis from Special Relativity and Undecidability

Wilson, Blake, Ethan Dickey, Vaishnavi Iyer, Sabre Kais

Published Jun 13, 2022• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Beginning with Turing's seminal work in 1950, artificial intelligence proposes that consciousness can be simulated by a Turing machine. This implies a potential theory of everything where the universe is a simulation on a computer, which begs the question of whether we can prove we exist in a simulation. In this work, we construct a relative model of computation where a computable \textit{local} machine is simulated by a \textit{global}, classical Turing machine. We show that the problem of the local machine computing \textbf{simulation properties} of its global simulator is undecidable in the same sense as the Halting problem. Then, we show that computing the time, space, or error accumulated by the global simulator are simulation properties and therefore are undecidable. These simulation properties give rise to special relativistic effects in the relative model which we use to construct a relative Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis where a global, classical Turing machine computes quantum mechanics for a local machine with the same constant-time local computational complexity as experienced in our universe.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2206.06419

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Beginning with Turing's seminal work in 1950, artificial intelligence proposes that consciousness can be simulated by a Turing machine. This implies a potential theory of everything where the universe is a simulation on a computer, which begs the question of whether we can prove we exist in a simulation. In this work, we construct a relative model of computation where a computable \textit{local} machine is simulated by a \textit{global}, classical Turing machine. We show that the problem of the local machine computing \textbf{simulation properties} of its global simulator is undecidable in the same sense as the Halting problem. Then, we show that computing the time, space, or error accumulated by the global simulator are simulation properties and therefore are undecidable. These simulation properties give rise to special relativistic effects in the relative model which we use to construct a relative Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis where a global, classical Turing machine computes quantum mechanics for a local machine with the same constant-time local computational complexity as experienced in our universe.
The physical laws of the universe dictate what can and what cannot be computed. The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is based on the assumption that the Turing machine is the ultimate computing device and according to the CTT something is computable only if it can be computed by a Turing machine. However, the CTT has not been proved and it can be definitely proved in a universe with specific properties. Whether our universe is such a universe is an open problem as it is an open problem whether the universe behaves like a machine. A broader approach that rejects the CTT and shows that the mechanistic universe and the CTT are incompatible is proposed and discussed thoroughly.
We study the observation of quantum Turing machines by allowing interactions between a quantum machine and its environment during the computation, whereas a quantum Turing machine --original model introduced by Deutsch-- remains isolated. We show that the introduction of observations leads to a weakening of the well formedness conditions of quantum Turing machines such that any (reversible or not) classical Turing machine is a special instance of a quantum machine. Moreover, observation of quantum Turing machines provides a formal solution to the halting process problem: the impossibility to know whether a given quantum Turing machine has actually reached its halting state. It also provides a more realistic abstract architecture of a quantum computer while most of the physical proposals of quantum computers are based on an hybrid classical-quantum architecture. However, we show that a natural formalisation of an observable quantum Turing machines leads to an over-powerful model solving undecidable problems. As a consequence, we introduce a restricted version of observable quantum Turing machines and we show that, under this restriction, any observable quantum Turing machine can be efficiently simulated by a quantum Turing machine. Finally, we discuss the potential application of the observable quantum Turing machine in the quest of a universal quantum Turing machine while recent papers have pointed out that a classical control is a key feature of a universal quantum machine.
In the search for a precise definition of the notion of effective calculability, Turing’s computability has proven to be more convincing than other definitions proposed almost simultaneously. Turing does not define a particular class of “calculable functions”, but which processes can be carried out in computing. His conceptual analysis brings about an intimate and inescapable link between computability and “measurability”, hence between mechanical procedures and physical processes. The full significance of this link is captured in Deutsch’s physical version of the Church-Turing thesis, namely, his claim that every physical system can be simulated by a universal quantum Turing machine. Quantum physics supports more efficient forms of computation, even though quantum computation remains within Turing’s limits. Why? This chapter explores how logical principles and physical processes coalesce into the notion of computation.
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In 1985, David Deutsch challenged the Church-Turing thesis by stating that his quantum model of computation "could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine". While this is thought to be true in general, there is usually no way of knowing that the corresponding classical algorithms are the best possible solutions. Here we provide an efficient classical simulation of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, which was one of the first examples of quantum computational speed-up. Our conclusion is that the Deutsch-Jozsa quantum algorithm owes its speed-up to resources that are not necessarily quantum-mechanical, and when compared with the classical simulation offers no speed-up at all.
Abstract It is argued that underlying the Church–Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory.