We propose a new interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence based on a stochastic model for a quantum system developed in terms of amplitude on entities. An entity provides an axiomatic description for the set of tests and states of a physical system and an amplitude density gives a mean for computing probability and pseudo-probability within this framework. The interference and independence of tests relative to an amplitude density are formulated. Various ways of combining entities and amplitudes are presented as superpositions of amplitude. We propose to extend the theory of evidence also to the physical observable experiment in quantum mechanics. So we can use, for quantum mechanics, all the knowledge in the evidence theory. On the contrary the knowledge in the evidence theory can give new insight in the quantum mechanics uncertainty. We give a modal logic interpretation of evidence theory and entity and tests definitions. We establish a bridge between mental approach to uncertainty by evidence theory and the physical phenomena represented by quantum mechanics. When one use the amplitude density in the evidence theory one can generate a new interpretation of joint and conditional definition of the basic probability assignment ( pseudo-probability).
We propose a new interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence based on a stochastic model for a quantum system developed in terms of amplitude on entities. An entity provides an axiomatic description for the set of tests and states of a physical system and an amplitude density gives a mean for computing probability and pseudo-probability within this framework. The interference and independence of tests relative to an amplitude density are formulated. Various ways of combining entities and amplitudes are presented as superpositions of amplitude. We propose to extend the theory of evidence also to the physical observable experiment in quantum mechanics. So we can use, for quantum mechanics, all the knowledge in the evidence theory. On the contrary the knowledge in the evidence theory can give new insight in the quantum mechanics uncertainty. We give a modal logic interpretation of evidence theory and entity and tests definitions. We establish a bridge between mental approach to uncertainty by evidence theory and the physical phenomena represented by quantum mechanics. When one use the amplitude density in the evidence theory one can generate a new interpretation of joint and conditional definition of the basic probability assignment ( pseudo-probability).
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s it was causing interest among physicists that in the formalism of quantum mechanics (complex-valued) ‘probability amplitudes’ obeyed laws similar to the laws obeyed by probabilities in the ordinary probability calculus. But this did not then lead decisively to the claim that probabilities should be represented by complex numbers. It became fashionable instead to regard probability amplitudes as an abstract concept from which actual probabilities could be derived by taking the squared moduli of the amplitudes. In this monograph, however, we make another attempt to show how probability amplitudes might after all be identified with actual probabilities. To do this, probability itself is interpreted in a rational Bayesian manner (i.e. as an extension of logic) and a new (complex-valued) probability theory is formulated that incorporates the uncertainty principle (i.e. that takes account of the fact that acquisition of knowledge of a quantum mechanical process generally interferes with it). Taking this probability theory as the new logic of science, and assuming certain physical laws and properties of matter, an interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is built up. It is consistent with the usual quantum mechanical formalism but allows a clear distinction to be made between the physical world and our knowledge of it.
We propose a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, the core idea of which is that quantum superposition states are not mysterious physical entities, but rather the joint distribution of classical information obtained by local observers in a composite system. We assume that all systems are equivalent, and there is no fundamental distinction between "observer" and "observed". When multiple local observers independently observe the same system, if their observation results agree, the composite observer obtains a classical particle-like fact; if their observation results diverge, the composite observer obtains quantum wave-like behavior (a superposition state). We demonstrate that this "persuasion theory"—namely, that only when local observers reach an agreement can they persuade the composite observer—can naturally derive the formalism of quantum mechanics and perfectly explain the wave-particle duality in the double-slit interference experiment. This theory interprets quantum mechanics as a theory concerning the classical information mutually possessed by physical systems and their compositional relationships, and this description is complete.
Abstract The theoretical results of quantum mechanics (QM) have been verified by experiments, but the probabilistic Copenhagen interpretation is still controversial, and many counterintuitive phenomena are still difficult to understand. To trace the origin of probability in QM, we construct the amplitudes of a space-time position in a multiparticle quantum objective system and find that the probability in QM originates from the particle number distribution rate in a unit volume near position r at time t in the multiparticle quantum objective system. Based on the origin of probability, the quantization conditions of action and the principle of least action for an elementary particle (referred to as particle) , we find that when a particle moves in space-time, it periodically and alternately exhibit particle and wave state. We have derived the formula for the fringe positions in the double-slit experiment with particles, a new certainty relation and the uncertainty relation, obtain the localized and nonlocalized spatiotemporal range of the particle, the apparent trajectory of the particle motion. Based on this, through rigorous mathematical derivation and analysis, we propose new physical interpretations of the quantum superposition state, wave-particle duality, the double-slit experiment, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and the quantum tunnelling effect, and these interpretations are physically logical and not counterintuitive.
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.