Problem statement. Classical methods of cryptographic protection are vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers and algorithms. One solution to this problem is the deployment of quantum key distribution systems, in which key secrecy is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum physics. However, imperfections in the technical implementation of such systems can lead to key compromise. The aim of this work is to analyze the influence of the parameters of real single-photon sources and detectors on the rate and range of key distribution in a system operating under the BB84 protocol. Results. The influence of losses in the quantum channel, quantum efficiency, and dark count rate of single-photon detectors on the key generation rate and range is analyzed. It is shown that the use of a laser diode as a source opens up the possibility of a photon-number-splitting attack, reducing the key generation rate and range. Methods are presented for calculating the key distribution rate and range taking into account the real parameters of detectors, the probability of multi-photon pulse generation when using a laser diode, and the feasibility of a photon-number-splitting attack. Practical significance. The presented methods for calculating the key distribution rate and range with allowance for the real characteristics of the equipment can be used in the design of quantum key distribution systems.
Problem statement. Classical methods of cryptographic protection are vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers and algorithms. One solution to this problem is the deployment of quantum key distribution systems, in which key secrecy is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum physics. However, imperfections in the technical implementation of such systems can lead to key compromise. The aim of this work is to analyze the influence of the parameters of real single-photon sources and detectors on the rate and range of key distribution in a system operating under the BB84 protocol. Results. The influence of losses in the quantum channel, quantum efficiency, and dark count rate of single-photon detectors on the key generation rate and range is analyzed. It is shown that the use of a laser diode as a source opens up the possibility of a photon-number-splitting attack, reducing the key generation rate and range. Methods are presented for calculating the key distribution rate and range taking into account the real parameters of detectors, the probability of multi-photon pulse generation when using a laser diode, and the feasibility of a photon-number-splitting attack. Practical significance. The presented methods for calculating the key distribution rate and range with allowance for the real characteristics of the equipment can be used in the design of quantum key distribution systems.
In real fiber-optic quantum cryptography systems, the avalanche photodiodes are not perfect, the source of quantum states is not a single-photon one, and the communication channel is lossy. For these reasons, key distribution is impossible under certain conditions for the system parameters. A simple analysis is performed to find relations between the parameters of real cryptography systems and the length of the quantum channel that guarantee secure quantum key distribution when the eavesdropper’s capabilities are limited only by fundamental laws of quantum mechanics while the devices employed by the legitimate users are based on current technologies. Critical values are determined for the rate of secure real-time key generation that can be reached under the current technology level. Calculations show that the upper bound on channel length can be as high as 300 km for imperfect photodetectors (avalanche photodiodes) with present-day quantum efficiency (η ≈ 20%) and dark count probability (p dark ∼ 10−7).
The absence of real single-photon sources is a significant limitation to the experimental implementation of the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. When substantially attenuated laser pulses are substituted for ideal sources in practical systems, the outcome is weak coherent states where each pulse has a nonzero probability of having multiple photons rather than pure single-photon emission. To evaluate quantum bit error rate (QBER), key generation rate and overall system security it is essential to describe the exact impact of the optical and physical system on such pulses. This practical tradeoff presents additional issues. It is crucial to understand how QBER is impacted by attenuation, loss, dispersion, depolarisation and detector properties particularly in adversarial scenarios such as photon number splitting (PNS) and beam-splitting attacks. Although a significant amount of research has been conducted on algorithmic simulations of BB84, there are few complete frameworks that can physically explain these effects and their impact on QBER. This work models the BB84 protocol at the physical level by developing a Python-based simulation platform that takes into account all significant channel impairments and system inefficiencies. The framework supports both theoretical and practical optimisation of QKD systems by further isolating the effects of different optical losses and eavesdropping techniques on QBER and secure key generation.
In the last ten years, quantum computing has made substantial progress, presenting a strong challenge to traditional encryption methods that depend on solving discrete algorithmic problems. With the advent of the quantum era, conventional encryption methods are becoming more susceptible to attacks. This paper investigates possible attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in quantum cryptography, specifically investigating weaknesses in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The text thoroughly explores advanced attack strategies of photon number splitting highlight the existing vulnerabilities. The goal is to highlight the need for strong safeguards to protect against these threats, which requires continuous research and development to improve the robustness of quantum cryptography algorithms. The experimental investigation includes analyzing crucial parameters, including quantum channel length, loss, QKD protocol, quantum bit error rate (QBER), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as well as attack parameters such as probability of photon number splitting (PNS), eavesdropper distance, and detection efficiency. The evaluation includes performance indicators such as secure key rate, quantum bit error rate (QBER) vs distance, vulnerability to photon number splitting (PNS) attacks, and the influence on the pace of key generation.
The development of fi ber-optic communication and data transmission systems gives rise to a number of new challenges, among which information protection against unauthorized access is of particular relevance. In response to this need, quantum cryptography has emerged – optical cryptographic systems with quantum key distribution. Such systems protect communication channels by encrypting data with a one-time secret key. The theoretical foundation guaranteeing secure key transmission relies on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem for quantum states of elementary particles. However, real-world quantum cryptography systems exhibit vulnerabilities stemming from imperfections in their components. Single photon detectors and single photon sources are critical elements of quantum key distribution systems. This work analyses the main types of attacks on quantum cryptography equipment and identifi es the key parameters of single photon sources and single photon detectors. Knowledge of their actual values can be crucial for proving a system’s resilience against attacks. Additionally, the paper describes the equipment and methods used to study single-photon sources. The study also describes the method and results of investigating the quantum effi ciency and false trigger probabilities of gated single-photon detectors with fi ber input. The described measurement methods are harmonized with the recommendations of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Together, the described measurement techniques and setups enable the assessment of single photon source and detector parameters during expert evaluation of quantum cryptography system vulnerabilities. The paper concludes with a call for the establishment of a reference database to support metrological assurance of key parameters for single photon sources and receivers, in order to advance quantum cryptography systems
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for provably secure key distribution between two trusted parties. Because the security and performance of QKD protocols rely on devices that behave according to specific assumptions, idealized or inaccurate assumptions about device behavior can introduce security loopholes. Real devices can never be perfectly characterized, and their performance metrics are always subject to certain error margins, which must be accounted for in a rigorous theoretical analysis. Only recently have rigorous finite-size results allowed for imperfect characterizations of devices (where device parameter have uncertainty margins) - an advance yet to be considered in experimental implementations of the BB84 protocol. In this work, we prove the security and analyze the performance of an implementation of the BB84 protocol using single photons generated by a semiconductor quantum dot light source in combination with dynamic polarization-state encoding. We consider the presence of incompletely characterized devices by accounting for imperfections in the single-photon source (in terms of finite g(2)(0)) as well as the receiver (non-ideal beam-splitters, finite detector efficiencies, and dark counts), all with error margins. The resulting protocol implementation shows competitive performance, paving the way towards practical and loop-hole free implementations of QKD.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables the sharing of cryptographic keys secured by quantum mechanics. The BB84 protocol assumes single-photon sources, but practical systems rely on weak coherent pulses vulnerable to Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attacks. The Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) framework addresses these imperfections, deriving secure key rate bounds under limited PNS scenarios. The decoy-state protocol further improves performance by refining single-photon yield estimates, but still considers multi-photon states as insecure, thereby limiting intensities and constraining key rate and distance. More recently, finite-key security bounds for decoy-state QKD have been extended to address general attacks, ensuring security against adversaries capable of exploiting arbitrary strategies. In this work, we focus on a specific class of attacks, the generalized PNS attack, and demonstrate that higher pulse intensities can be securely used by employing Bayesian inference to estimate key parameters directly from observed data. By raising the pulse intensity to 10 photons, we achieve a 50-fold increase in key rate and a 62.2% increase in operational range (about 200 km) compared to the decoy-state protocol. Furthermore, we accurately model after-pulsing using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and reveal inaccuracies in decoy-state calculations that may produce erroneous key-rate estimates. While this methodology does not address all possible attacks, it provides a new approach to security proofs in QKD by shifting from worst-case assumption analysis to observation-dependent inference, advancing the reach and efficiency of discrete-variable QKD protocols.