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Lecture notes in computer science

Secure Signatures and Chosen Ciphertext Security in a Quantum Computing World

Dan Boneh, Mark Zhandry

Published Jan 1, 2013• 175 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-40084-1_21

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ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a more efficient chosen‐ciphertext secure proxy re‐encryption scheme in the standard model with less ciphertext size and without any strong unforgeable one‐time signature. Our scheme is unidirectional and single‐hop. The security of our scheme is under the reasonable complexity assumption—the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in bilinear groups. There are no proxy re‐encryption schemes achieving chosen‐ciphertext security in the standard model without a strong unforgeable one‐time signature in the literature. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.