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Security and Communication Networks

More efficient CCA‐secure unidirectional proxy re‐encryption schemes without random oracles

Hongbing Wang, Zhenfu Cao

Published Jun 5, 2012• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a more efficient chosen‐ciphertext secure proxy re‐encryption scheme in the standard model with less ciphertext size and without any strong unforgeable one‐time signature. Our scheme is unidirectional and single‐hop. The security of our scheme is under the reasonable complexity assumption—the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in bilinear groups. There are no proxy re‐encryption schemes achieving chosen‐ciphertext security in the standard model without a strong unforgeable one‐time signature in the literature. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DOI
10.1002/sec.552

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IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology•Jul 1, 2010•1 citation
ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a more efficient chosen‐ciphertext secure proxy re‐encryption scheme in the standard model with less ciphertext size and without any strong unforgeable one‐time signature. Our scheme is unidirectional and single‐hop. The security of our scheme is under the reasonable complexity assumption—the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in bilinear groups. There are no proxy re‐encryption schemes achieving chosen‐ciphertext security in the standard model without a strong unforgeable one‐time signature in the literature. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Proxy re-encryption, introduced by Blaze et al. in 1998, allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened under Bob's decryption key. An open problem of constructing (bidirectional or unidirectional) IND-PRE-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption scheme in the standard model yet without pairings was left until now. In this paper, based on Hanaoka's efficient chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we try to solve this open problem by presenting two new bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes, which are restricted IND-PRE-CCA2 secure without pairing nor random oracle.
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption in which a proxy can transform-without seeing the plaintext-a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosen-ciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users' keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as non-interactive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the Canetti-Hohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosen-ciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen.
Abstract Several generic methods exist for achieving chosen‐ciphertext attack (CCA)‐secure public‐key encryption schemes from weakly secure cryptosystems, such as the Fujisaki–Okamoto and REACT transformations. In the context of proxy re‐encryption (PRE), it would be desirable to count on analogous constructions that allow PRE schemes to achieve better security notions. In this paper, we study the adaptation of these transformations to proxy re‐encryption and find both negative and positive results. On the one hand, we show why it is not possible to directly integrate these transformations with weakly secure PRE schemes because of general obstacles coming from both the constructions themselves and the security models, and we identify 12 PRE schemes that exhibit these problems. On the other hand, we propose an extension of the Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation for PRE, which achieves a weak form of CCA security in the random oracle model, and we describe the sufficient conditions for applying it. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Abstract Proxy re‐encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a proxy to turn an Alice's ciphertext into a Bob's ciphertext on the same plaintext. At present, there are many different PRE schemes that have been proposed with different properties. However, all of them are based on the logarithm assumption and the large integer factorization assumption except for a bidirectional PRE scheme over lattices. In this paper, we construct the first multi‐use unidirectional PRE scheme based on lattices. In addition, the generation of the PRE key does not interact with two users, and the scheme can resist collusion attacks. Moreover, it is proved chosen plaintext attack secure in the standard model based on the Learning With Errors assumption. Finally, an identity‐based PRE is obtained from the basic construction. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Blaze et al. in 1998 introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption, which allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened under Bob's decryption key. In CCS'07, Canetti et al. proposed an IND-PRE-CCA2 bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, and later, Libert et al. proposed another IND-PRE-CCA2 secure unidirectional proxy re-encryption. However, both schemes rely on the costly bilinear pairings. In CANS'08, Deng et al. proposed the first IND-PRE-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption without parings. Later, in PKC'09, Shao et al. proposed another IND-PRE-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption without parings. But both of these schemes prove their security in the random oracle. In this paper, based on Hanaoka's efficient chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we present two new interesting bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes, which are restricted IND-PRE-CCA2 secure without pairing nor random oracle.