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A Taxonomy of Attacks on Quantum Key Distribution

Muhammad Mubashir

Published Oct 8, 2011• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a new way of sharing secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security by means of encoding of secret bits in quantum particles like photons. There are various potential security holes in the practical implementations of QKD, which may be exploited by the adversary to attack the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the scheme. This paper is an attempt to present various constraints, possible attacks and countermeasures on practical QKD systems. The paper classifies the already known attacks strategies and shows how these attacks may compromise the security QKD, while utilizing it as part of secure communication scheme in practice.

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Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.

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Toward standardization of Quantum Key Distribution

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Information security becomes an inseparable part of our everyday life. An encryption \nmethod widely used today is public-key encryption. The security of this method is based on \na hard to solve mathematical problems against an adversary with limited computational \npower. Such an assumption could be broken as our understanding of the mathematics \nbeing improved or new computation tools being developed. One such tool that poses a \nthreat to the public key encryption is a quantum computer. As a result, a new encryption \nmethod with a new security assumption is required. \nQuantum key distribution is a point-to-point symmetric key distribution method with \nsecurity based on the law of physics. In theory, the key generated by QKD is informationtheoretic secured. However, in practice, physical devices could have flaws or possess some \nbehaviors deviated from the theoretical model. These imperfections could open security \nloopholes for an adversary to exploit, compromising the security. Thus the security verification and system characterization of practical implementation of QKD are necessary. \nThe necessity of this verification is further emphasized as several QKD systems are being \ncommercialized and used in several discrete communication links today. \nTo extend this new encryption system’s practical implementation on a wider network \nscale requires a set of standards or common practices for developers and service providers \nto follow. This set of rules is set to ensure the compatibility of different device models in \nthe network and ensure the security of each component in the system, which would affect \nthe security of the system as a whole. \nTo fulfill standardization and certification criteria, a record of best practice on security \nanalysis, system design, device characterization, and security verification of QKD implementation is required. The research projects throughout my Ph.D. study contribute toward \nthis practice. These studies also address some issues and provide possible solutions to the \ndevelopment of a standard for QKD. This thesis is a collection of six experimental studies \non performance evaluation and security verification of different components of practical \nquantum key distribution systems. \nThe first study is a comparison between the performance of the QKD system with \nquantum dot (QD) as a single-photon source and the performance of QKD with weakcoherent pulsed (WCP) source. The result shows that the QKD with QD could generate \nthe key at higher channel loss than WCP QKD using the same laser source. This result \nshows the potential of QKD with a single-photon source as a candidate for secret key \ndistribution over high channel loss, such as up-link satellite-based QKD. \nThe second study is a theoretical study on the method to characterize the QKD system \nagainst the Trojan-horse attack being considered as a standard for the QKD system. The \nresult shows a possible loophole of this method against a more powerful adversary than \nassumed in the previously proposed model. An improved version of characterization against \na more general form of Trojan-horse attack has been proposed. \nThe third experiment is on the information leakage from a free-space QKD receiver due \nto detector backflash, a photon produced by the detector upon detection. The result shows \nthat the backflash photons carry the information of the ’clicked’ detector that could be \ntransmitted back to the channel and discriminated by Eve. An experimental demonstration \nof this attack has been performed. Countermeasure both in theory and practical setup has \nbeen proposed. \nThe next experiment is on the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial-mode \ndetection efficiency mismatch attack on the free-space QKD system. We show that, by \nusing a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and hologram created by Zernike polynomials, atmospheric turbulence with various strength covered from sea level to upper \natmosphere can be experimentally emulated in the lab environment. We then use that \nsetup to show the limit of the distance that Eve’s attack is successful. The theoretical \nlimit of the attack distance also shown. \nIn the fifth study, we use the SLM and Zernike polynomial holograms to characterize a \nfree-space QKD system against spatial mode attack. The result shows that, with higherorder spatial modes and finer control of wavefront intensity distribution, Eve could bypass \nthe countermeasure proposed in our previous study. We proposed a more robust version \nof countermeasure against spatial mode attack. The new countermeasure is verified by the \nSLM setup. \nThe last study is on the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor (TES). The \nresult shows that TES’s voltage response can be deterministically controlled by Eve using \nbright laser through the input channel. It also shows that the photon number result from \nTES can be controlled by Eve. An attack model exploiting this imperfection has been \nshown. \nIn addition to the contribution to the standardization of the QKD system, I hope that \nthe result of this thesis would emphasize the necessity of security verification of the QKD \nsystem and the verification of countermeasure and characterization method against more \ngeneral attack model. Although the unconditional security, promised in theory, could not \nyet be achieved, this loop of hacking and patching should provide us information and insight \non which security level could be claimed from the practical QKD devices implementing \ntoday.

•Sep 3, 2020•0 citations

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With the emergence of an information society, the idea of protecting sensitive data is steadily gaining importance. Conventional encryption methods may not be sufficient to guarantee data protection in the future. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging technology that exploits fundamental physical properties to guarantee perfect security in theory. However, it is not easy to ensure in practice that the implementations of QKD systems are exactly in line with the theoretical specifications. Such theory–practice deviations can open loopholes and compromise security. Several such loopholes have been discovered and investigated in the last decade. These activities have motivated the proposal and implementation of appropriate countermeasures, thereby preventing future attacks and enhancing the practical security of QKD. This article introduces the so-called field of quantum hacking by summarising a variety of attacks and their prevention mechanisms.

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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a secret key agreement technique that consists of two parts: quantum transmission and measurement on a quantum channel, and classical post-processing on a public communication channel. It enjoys provable unconditional security provided that the public communication channel is immutable. Otherwise, QKD is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Immutable public communication channels, however, do not exist in practice. So we need to use authentication that implements the properties of an immutable channel as well as possible. One scheme that serves this purpose well is the Wegman-Carter authentication (WCA), which is built upon Almost Strongly Universal2 (ASU2) hashing. This scheme uses a new key in each authentication attempt to select a hash function from an ASU2 family, which is then used to generate the authentication tag for a message. The main focus of this dissertation is on authentication in the context of QKD. We study ASU2 hash functions, security of QKD that employs a computationally secure authentication, and also security of authentication with a partially known key. Specifically, we study the following. First, Universal hash functions and their constructions are reviewed, and as well as a new construction of ASU2 hash functions is presented. Second, security of QKD that employs a specific computationally secure authentication is studied. We present detailed attacks on various practical implementations of QKD that employs this authentication. We also provide countermeasures and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for upgrading the security of the authentication to the level of unconditional security. Third, Universal hash function based multiple authentication is studied. This uses a fixed ASU2 hash function followed by one-time pad encryption, to keep the hash function secret. We show that the one-time pad is necessary in every round for the authentication to be unconditionally secure. Lastly, we study security of the WCA scheme, in the case of a partially known authentication key. Here we prove tight information-theoretic security bounds and also analyse security using witness indistinguishability as used in the Universal Composability framework.

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The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.

•Aug 31, 2022•0 citations
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a new way of sharing secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security by means of encoding of secret bits in quantum particles like photons. There are various potential security holes in the practical implementations of QKD, which may be exploited by the adversary to attack the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the scheme. This paper is an attempt to present various constraints, possible attacks and countermeasures on practical QKD systems. The paper classifies the already known attacks strategies and shows how these attacks may compromise the security QKD, while utilizing it as part of secure communication scheme in practice.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises secure communication by leveraging quantum principles. Although there has been significant theoretical research conducted in the field of QKD. However, it is still an emerging frontier in the realm of practical implementation. The absence of standardization exposes several vulnerabilities in both quantum and classical spectrums. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review of the Q KD vulnerabilities and attack models published from the past decade and classify them within a taxonomy. By bridging theory and practice, we aim to improve the practical security of Q KD against threats and pave the way for robust quantum communication.
Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.
Information security becomes an inseparable part of our everyday life. An encryption \nmethod widely used today is public-key encryption. The security of this method is based on \na hard to solve mathematical problems against an adversary with limited computational \npower. Such an assumption could be broken as our understanding of the mathematics \nbeing improved or new computation tools being developed. One such tool that poses a \nthreat to the public key encryption is a quantum computer. As a result, a new encryption \nmethod with a new security assumption is required. \nQuantum key distribution is a point-to-point symmetric key distribution method with \nsecurity based on the law of physics. In theory, the key generated by QKD is informationtheoretic secured. However, in practice, physical devices could have flaws or possess some \nbehaviors deviated from the theoretical model. These imperfections could open security \nloopholes for an adversary to exploit, compromising the security. Thus the security verification and system characterization of practical implementation of QKD are necessary. \nThe necessity of this verification is further emphasized as several QKD systems are being \ncommercialized and used in several discrete communication links today. \nTo extend this new encryption system’s practical implementation on a wider network \nscale requires a set of standards or common practices for developers and service providers \nto follow. This set of rules is set to ensure the compatibility of different device models in \nthe network and ensure the security of each component in the system, which would affect \nthe security of the system as a whole. \nTo fulfill standardization and certification criteria, a record of best practice on security \nanalysis, system design, device characterization, and security verification of QKD implementation is required. The research projects throughout my Ph.D. study contribute toward \nthis practice. These studies also address some issues and provide possible solutions to the \ndevelopment of a standard for QKD. This thesis is a collection of six experimental studies \non performance evaluation and security verification of different components of practical \nquantum key distribution systems. \nThe first study is a comparison between the performance of the QKD system with \nquantum dot (QD) as a single-photon source and the performance of QKD with weakcoherent pulsed (WCP) source. The result shows that the QKD with QD could generate \nthe key at higher channel loss than WCP QKD using the same laser source. This result \nshows the potential of QKD with a single-photon source as a candidate for secret key \ndistribution over high channel loss, such as up-link satellite-based QKD. \nThe second study is a theoretical study on the method to characterize the QKD system \nagainst the Trojan-horse attack being considered as a standard for the QKD system. The \nresult shows a possible loophole of this method against a more powerful adversary than \nassumed in the previously proposed model. An improved version of characterization against \na more general form of Trojan-horse attack has been proposed. \nThe third experiment is on the information leakage from a free-space QKD receiver due \nto detector backflash, a photon produced by the detector upon detection. The result shows \nthat the backflash photons carry the information of the ’clicked’ detector that could be \ntransmitted back to the channel and discriminated by Eve. An experimental demonstration \nof this attack has been performed. Countermeasure both in theory and practical setup has \nbeen proposed. \nThe next experiment is on the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial-mode \ndetection efficiency mismatch attack on the free-space QKD system. We show that, by \nusing a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and hologram created by Zernike polynomials, atmospheric turbulence with various strength covered from sea level to upper \natmosphere can be experimentally emulated in the lab environment. We then use that \nsetup to show the limit of the distance that Eve’s attack is successful. The theoretical \nlimit of the attack distance also shown. \nIn the fifth study, we use the SLM and Zernike polynomial holograms to characterize a \nfree-space QKD system against spatial mode attack. The result shows that, with higherorder spatial modes and finer control of wavefront intensity distribution, Eve could bypass \nthe countermeasure proposed in our previous study. We proposed a more robust version \nof countermeasure against spatial mode attack. The new countermeasure is verified by the \nSLM setup. \nThe last study is on the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor (TES). The \nresult shows that TES’s voltage response can be deterministically controlled by Eve using \nbright laser through the input channel. It also shows that the photon number result from \nTES can be controlled by Eve. An attack model exploiting this imperfection has been \nshown. \nIn addition to the contribution to the standardization of the QKD system, I hope that \nthe result of this thesis would emphasize the necessity of security verification of the QKD \nsystem and the verification of countermeasure and characterization method against more \ngeneral attack model. Although the unconditional security, promised in theory, could not \nyet be achieved, this loop of hacking and patching should provide us information and insight \non which security level could be claimed from the practical QKD devices implementing \ntoday.
With the emergence of an information society, the idea of protecting sensitive data is steadily gaining importance. Conventional encryption methods may not be sufficient to guarantee data protection in the future. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging technology that exploits fundamental physical properties to guarantee perfect security in theory. However, it is not easy to ensure in practice that the implementations of QKD systems are exactly in line with the theoretical specifications. Such theory–practice deviations can open loopholes and compromise security. Several such loopholes have been discovered and investigated in the last decade. These activities have motivated the proposal and implementation of appropriate countermeasures, thereby preventing future attacks and enhancing the practical security of QKD. This article introduces the so-called field of quantum hacking by summarising a variety of attacks and their prevention mechanisms.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a secret key agreement technique that consists of two parts: quantum transmission and measurement on a quantum channel, and classical post-processing on a public communication channel. It enjoys provable unconditional security provided that the public communication channel is immutable. Otherwise, QKD is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Immutable public communication channels, however, do not exist in practice. So we need to use authentication that implements the properties of an immutable channel as well as possible. One scheme that serves this purpose well is the Wegman-Carter authentication (WCA), which is built upon Almost Strongly Universal2 (ASU2) hashing. This scheme uses a new key in each authentication attempt to select a hash function from an ASU2 family, which is then used to generate the authentication tag for a message. The main focus of this dissertation is on authentication in the context of QKD. We study ASU2 hash functions, security of QKD that employs a computationally secure authentication, and also security of authentication with a partially known key. Specifically, we study the following. First, Universal hash functions and their constructions are reviewed, and as well as a new construction of ASU2 hash functions is presented. Second, security of QKD that employs a specific computationally secure authentication is studied. We present detailed attacks on various practical implementations of QKD that employs this authentication. We also provide countermeasures and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for upgrading the security of the authentication to the level of unconditional security. Third, Universal hash function based multiple authentication is studied. This uses a fixed ASU2 hash function followed by one-time pad encryption, to keep the hash function secret. We show that the one-time pad is necessary in every round for the authentication to be unconditionally secure. Lastly, we study security of the WCA scheme, in the case of a partially known authentication key. Here we prove tight information-theoretic security bounds and also analyse security using witness indistinguishability as used in the Universal Composability framework.
The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.