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Security of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

Rotem Liss

Published Aug 31, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.

DOI
10.31237/osf.io/j6peh

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The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.
Unconditionally secure key distribution is impossible using classical communication only. However, by providing Alice and Bob with quantum capable hardware the task becomes possible. How quantum does a protocol need to be, though, in order to gain this advantage? In 2007, Boyer et al., proposed "semi-quantum key distribution" where only Alice need be quantum while Bob need only limited classical" capabilities. Several protocols were proposed and proven secure in the perfect qubit scenario" but not necessarily against realistic attacks (with one exception being recently published in (PRA 96 062335)). In this paper, we devise a new SQKD protocol and analyze its security against certain practical attacks.
Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to create a shared secret key, even if one of these parties (say, Alice) is classical. However, most SQKD protocols suffer from severe practical security problems when implemented using photons. The recently developed “Mirror protocol” [1] is an experimentally feasible SQKD protocol overcoming those drawbacks. The Mirror protocol was proven robust (namely, it was proven secure against a limited class of attacks including all noiseless attacks), but its security in case some noise is allowed (natural or due to eavesdropping) has not been proved yet. Here we prove security of the Mirror protocol against a wide class of quantum attacks (the “collective attacks”), and we evaluate the allowed noise threshold and the resulting key rate.
In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when combined with a one-time pad, provides information-theoretically secure encryption, provided that the QKD protocol is supported by a rigorous security proof. In the last decades, security proofs robust against a wide range of eavesdropping strategies have established the theoretical soundness of several QKD protocols. However, most proofs are based on idealized models of the physical systems involved in such protocols and often include assumptions that are not satisfied in practical implementations. This mismatch creates a gap between theoretical security guarantees and actual experimental realizations, making QKD protocols vulnerable to attacks. To ensure the security of real-world QKD systems, it is therefore essential to account for imperfections in security analyses. In this article, we present an overview of recent analytical and numerical developments in QKD security proofs, which provide a versatile approach for incorporating imperfections and re-establishing the security of quantum communication protocols under realistic conditions.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two parties to generate a secret shared key. One of the most important QKD protocols, BB84, was suggested by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Various proofs of unconditional security for BB84 have been suggested, but the first security proofs were not composable. Here we improve a security proof of BB84 given by [Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury, J. Cryptology, 19(4):381-439, 2006] to be composable and match the state-of-the-art results for BB84, and we extend it to prove unconditional security of several variants of the BB84 protocol. Our composable security proof for BB84 and its variants is mostly self-contained, algebraic, and relatively simple, and it gives tight finite-key bounds.
Quantum cryptography, or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to expand a previously shared secret key by sending quantum states through a quantum channel. The goal here is for Alice and Bob to communicate securely in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. The most well-known QKD protocol is the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, which has been proved unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main advantage of QKD over conventional cryptography is its absolute security. Thus, it is imperative to evaluate the security and performance of QKD protocols and realistic QKD systems. In this thesis, we study the security and performance aspects of QKD in four parts. In the first part, we study the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol. This protocol differs from the BB84 protocol only in the classical post-processing step and uses the same four quantum states as the BB84 protocol. We compared these two protocols and showed that in typical situations, the classical post-processing software for BB84 should be used in order to have a higher performance. In the second part, we prove the security of a three-state protocol. This protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol in that they share the same three qubit states. In the third part, we consider a practical Trojan horse attack on practical QKD systems implementing the BB84 protocol. The attack works by taking advantage of the finite response time of practical phase modulators to remap the states sent out by the legitimate user, Alice. We showed that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final key shared between them can be compromised in some situations. In the fourth part, we consider another type of Trojan horse attack, which is based on mismatch between detection efficiencies of detectors. Practical detectors in QKD systems usually do not have identical efficiencies and an eavesdropper Eve may be able to exploit this efficiency mismatch to steal information about the final secret key. We analyze the security of the attack and show that it is possible for Eve to acquire some information on the final secret key if Alice and Bob are unaware of this attack.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two quantum parties to generate a secret shared key. Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, such as ``QKD with classical Bob'' and ``QKD with classical Alice'' (that have both been proven robust), achieve this goal even if one of the parties is classical. However, existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible with current technology. Here we suggest a protocol, ``Classical Alice with a controllable mirror,'' that can be experimentally implemented with current technology (using four-level systems instead of qubits), and we prove it to be robust.