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Lecture notes in computer science

Efficient and Mutually Authenticated Key Exchange for Low Power Computing Devices

Duncan S. Wong, Agnes Hui Chan

Published Jan 1, 2001• 79 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-45682-1_17

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Due to the constrained computational and communication capabilities of Power Internet of Things (PIoT) devices, existing authentication and key agreement protocols often incur non-negligible online cryptographic and communication overhead, while inter-device communication remains vulnerable to security threats. To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol based on the SM9 identity-based cryptographic framework. Rather than directly applying the standard SM9 key exchange procedure, the proposed scheme uses the SM9 identity-based key infrastructure and bilinear-pairing operations as cryptographic building blocks and introduces a PIoT-oriented protocol structure. Specifically, pseudonymous identities and device-specific auxiliary parameters are generated during registration, mutual authentication is completed through two transmitted messages forming one request-response round, and the authenticated intermediate parameters are reused to derive the session key without an additional key-exchange message. By moving part of the identity-related processing to the registration phase and reusing the authenticated parameters during session-key derivation, the proposed protocol reduces the online computational and interaction overhead of resource-constrained devices. Meanwhile, the scheme supports device anonymity, pseudonym-based unlinkability, and forward/backward secrecy of session keys. Security analysis under the Dolev–Yao model shows that the proposed scheme can resist the network attacks considered in the adopted threat model. Comparative evaluation demonstrates that a complete mutual authentication and key agreement process requires only 24.68 ms of computational cost and 1,408 bits of communication overhead, outperforming several representative lightweight and low-overhead authentication schemes in both computational and communication efficiency. These results indicate the potential of the proposed scheme for large-scale, heterogeneous, and resource-constrained PIoT deployments.
Device authentication and key exchange protocol are essential front line of access controls in IoT security, and physical unclonable function (PUF) is a key enabler to lightweight, low-power and secure authentication of internet enabled endpoint devices in IoT. Current PUF-enabled authentication protocol requires the verifier to store a sufficiently large number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of each of its interlocutors, which makes the protocol impractical in application scenarios where the verifier is a resource-constrained device, especially when the verifier needs to communicate with multiple PUF- embedded endpoints. To solve this problem, a new lightweight PUF-based mutual authentication and key-exchange protocol is proposed in this paper to allow two resource-constrained PUF embedded endpoint devices to authenticate each other without the need to store the CRPs locally, and simultaneously establish the session key for secure data exchange without resorting to public-key algorithm. The PUF response reliability is mitigated by the use of reverse fuzzy extractor to offload the compute- intensive error decoding to the server during the initialization phase of the protocol. The proposed protocol is evaluated using ProVerif to corroborate its secrecy, mutual authenticity as well as resistance against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.