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Theoretical Computer Science

An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices

Robert W. Zhu, Guomin Yang, Duncan S. Wong

Published Feb 16, 2007• 70 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.tcs.2007.02.021

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Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1

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A Lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for PIoT Devices Based on the SM9 Algorithm

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Due to the constrained computational and communication capabilities of Power Internet of Things (PIoT) devices, existing authentication and key agreement protocols often incur non-negligible online cryptographic and communication overhead, while inter-device communication remains vulnerable to security threats. To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol based on the SM9 identity-based cryptographic framework. Rather than directly applying the standard SM9 key exchange procedure, the proposed scheme uses the SM9 identity-based key infrastructure and bilinear-pairing operations as cryptographic building blocks and introduces a PIoT-oriented protocol structure. Specifically, pseudonymous identities and device-specific auxiliary parameters are generated during registration, mutual authentication is completed through two transmitted messages forming one request-response round, and the authenticated intermediate parameters are reused to derive the session key without an additional key-exchange message. By moving part of the identity-related processing to the registration phase and reusing the authenticated parameters during session-key derivation, the proposed protocol reduces the online computational and interaction overhead of resource-constrained devices. Meanwhile, the scheme supports device anonymity, pseudonym-based unlinkability, and forward/backward secrecy of session keys. Security analysis under the Dolev–Yao model shows that the proposed scheme can resist the network attacks considered in the adopted threat model. Comparative evaluation demonstrates that a complete mutual authentication and key agreement process requires only 24.68 ms of computational cost and 1,408 bits of communication overhead, outperforming several representative lightweight and low-overhead authentication schemes in both computational and communication efficiency. These results indicate the potential of the proposed scheme for large-scale, heterogeneous, and resource-constrained PIoT deployments.

IEEE Internet of Things Journal•Sep 3, 2026•0 citations
Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1
Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie's modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Due to the constrained computational and communication capabilities of Power Internet of Things (PIoT) devices, existing authentication and key agreement protocols often incur non-negligible online cryptographic and communication overhead, while inter-device communication remains vulnerable to security threats. To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol based on the SM9 identity-based cryptographic framework. Rather than directly applying the standard SM9 key exchange procedure, the proposed scheme uses the SM9 identity-based key infrastructure and bilinear-pairing operations as cryptographic building blocks and introduces a PIoT-oriented protocol structure. Specifically, pseudonymous identities and device-specific auxiliary parameters are generated during registration, mutual authentication is completed through two transmitted messages forming one request-response round, and the authenticated intermediate parameters are reused to derive the session key without an additional key-exchange message. By moving part of the identity-related processing to the registration phase and reusing the authenticated parameters during session-key derivation, the proposed protocol reduces the online computational and interaction overhead of resource-constrained devices. Meanwhile, the scheme supports device anonymity, pseudonym-based unlinkability, and forward/backward secrecy of session keys. Security analysis under the Dolev–Yao model shows that the proposed scheme can resist the network attacks considered in the adopted threat model. Comparative evaluation demonstrates that a complete mutual authentication and key agreement process requires only 24.68 ms of computational cost and 1,408 bits of communication overhead, outperforming several representative lightweight and low-overhead authentication schemes in both computational and communication efficiency. These results indicate the potential of the proposed scheme for large-scale, heterogeneous, and resource-constrained PIoT deployments.