arXiv:2610.37948
Ontology without states: PBR as an argument for dynamics-first realism
Nick Ormrod
Abstract
The Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph (PBR) theorem is commonly taken to establish that a pure quantum state represents a physical property of the system to which it is assigned, rather than merely encoding knowledge. In this work, I distinguish between state-first and dynamics-first physical theories, and argue that this reading presupposes the former. These two types of theories support different approaches to causal explanation, and one of PBR's stated assumptions depends on the state-first approach. Using a recent interpretation of quantum theory as a concrete example, I show how a dynamics-first theory can explain the PBR correlations while maintaining a broadly epistemic reading of quantum states. I conclude that the PBR theorem supports a dilemma: either the quantum state is part of reality, or reality is not fundamentally built out of states.
AI Summary
The paper asks whether the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem requires realism about pure quantum states when physical ontology is not built from states. It distinguishes “state-first” theories, where dynamics reduce to counterfactual relations between states, from “dynamics-first” theories, where primitive interactions can transmit influences without systems possessing nontrivial physical states. Using the previously introduced Dynamics-First Quantum Theory (DFQT), it constructs a unitary-circuit model of the two-qubit PBR experiment, including preparation and measurement. Decohered and time-reversed (“dual decohered”) operator algebras select event projectors from the dynamics without specifying an input quantum state. Event probabilities follow $P(h^\uparrow,h^\downarrow)=d^{-1}\operatorname{Tr}(\epsilon^{h^\downarrow}\pi^{h^\uparrow})$. Conditioning on successful preparation reproduces the PBR Born probabilities exactly, including the four excluded outcomes. The prepared qubits have only trivial event variables in the chosen relational description, so their physical states neither determine the assigned quantum states nor screen off preparation–measurement correlations. The model therefore rejects screening-off rather than contradicting PBR’s conditional conclusion. The proposed alternative causal explanation is intervention-based: breaking the mediating circuit wires removes the preparation–outcome correlations. A corresponding argument is given for arbitrary individual source, mediator and target systems, with extensions to certain sets of systems. The paper notes that DFQT currently assumes independence between events defined relative to different system sets; allowing cross-set correlations remains open. A fully general causal-explanation framework is deferred. Its quantum states are epistemic predictors of events, not probability distributions over underlying system properties in the usual ontological-model sense.
Central claim may not hold: The abstract's dilemma between quantum-state realism and an ontology not fundamentally built out of states is supported only conditionally, because the paper does not rule out state-first theories that avoid PBR by rejecting preparation independence or another premise.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
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- 18 pages