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arXiv:2601.17662 · Foundations of Physics

From Joint to Single-System Psi-Onticity Without Preparation Independence

Shan Gao

quant-phSubmitted Jan 25, 2026• Announced Jan 27, 2026• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem establishes $ψ$-onticity for individual quantum systems, but its standard formulation relies on the Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP). This has led to a prevalent view that rejecting PIP leaves open the possibility of $ψ$-epistemic models for individual systems. In this work, we show that this understanding is incomplete: once the PBR theorem establishes $ψ$-onticity for composite systems prepared in product states, the $ψ$-onticity of the individual subsystems follows directly from the tensor-product structure of quantum mechanics, without invoking PIP or any further auxiliary assumptions. This result removes a key auxiliary assumption from the PBR theorem, closes a persistent loophole for preserving $ψ$-epistemic models, and strengthens the conceptual foundations of $ψ$-ontology.

Journal reference
Found Phys 56, 7 (2026)
DOI
10.1007/s10701-025-00910-w
Comments
12 pages, no figures

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The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem establishes ψψψ-onticity for individual quantum systems, but its standard formulation relies on the Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP). This has led to a prevalent view that rejecting PIP leaves open the possibility of ψψψ-epistemic models for individual systems. In this work, we show that this understanding is incomplete: once the PBR theorem establishes ψψψ-onticity for composite systems prepared in product states, the ψψψ-onticity of the individual subsystems follows directly from the tensor-product structure of quantum mechanics, without invoking PIP or any further auxiliary assumptions. This result removes a key auxiliary assumption from the PBR theorem, closes a persistent loophole for preserving ψψψ-epistemic models, and strengthens the conceptual foundations of ψψψ-ontology.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem proves that the joint wave function ψ1 ⊗ψ2 of a composite quantum system is ψ-ontic, representing the system’s physical reality. We present a minimalist proof showing that this result, combined with the tensor product structure assigning ψ1 to subsystem 1 and ψ2 to subsystem 2, directly implies that ψ1 and ψ2 are ψ-ontic for their respective subsystems. This establishes ψ-ontology for single quantum systems without requiring preparation independence or other assumptions. Our proof challenges the widely held view that joint ψ-onticity permits subsystem ψ-epistemicity via correlations, providing a simpler, more direct understanding of the wave function’s ontological status in quantum mechanics.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state by ruling out $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of superluminal causal influences in the preparation process. The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological model that the argument of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step, we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of $\ensuremath{\psi}$ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem constrains ontological models in which distinct pure quantum states correspond to overlapping ontic preparation distributions and independently prepared systems satisfy preparation independence. Applying that result to Constraint-Surface Dynamics (CSD) requires care because CSD calls the projective quantum state epistemic in a different sense: the ray [ψ] is an incomplete, many-to-one image of an underlying ontic state x ∈ Σ. This paper separates these notions at the level of preparation measures. A general CSD preparation is a Borel probability measure on the ontic space Σ. We first prove the general measure-theoretic result that mutual singularity of two pushforward measures under a measurable map implies mutual singularity of the original measures. Hence distinct exact sharp preparations are mutually singular. The canonical exact CSD preparation interface is therefore ψ-ontic in the technical Harrigan–Spekkens sense and already satisfies the disjointness conclusion associated with the PBR theorem. We then distinguish this exact interface from finite-resolution region preparations. A region of positive Liouville measure has a conditional preparation law absolutely continuous with respect to Liouville measure, whose projective pushforward admits a Radon–Nikodym density with respect to Fubini–Study measure. On the concrete Kähler witness, individual projective fibres are Liouville-null while an exact sharp preparation assigns unit probability to its own fibre. Exact sharp measures are consequently singular with respect to Liouville measure, and no positive-volume region-conditioned preparation law can equal an exact sharp preparation law. Suitable finite-resolution region preparations may nevertheless overlap. These results explain how CSD can regard the quantum state as epistemic in the sense of being ontically incomplete while remaining ψ-ontic under the Harrigan–Spekkens classification of exact preparations. They also remove the need for the earlier claim that global symplectic non-factorisation obstructs PBR preparation independence; that inference is withdrawn. Preparation independence remains a separate compositional question. The preparation results used here are machine-checked in Lean 4. Programme background: https://www.constraintsurfacedynamics.com — Glossary: https://glossary.constraintsurfacedynamics.com
This paper contains initial work on attempting to bring recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wavefunction within the scope of more logical and structural methods. A first step involves dualising a criterion for the reality of the wavefunction proposed by Harrigan & Spekkens, which was central to the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem. The resulting criterion has several advantages, including the avoidance of certain technical difficulties relating to sets of measure zero. By considering the 'reality' not of the wavefunction but of the observable properties of any ontological physical theory a new characterisation of non-locality and contextuality is found. Secondly, a careful analysis of preparation independence, one of the key assumptions of the PBR theorem, leads to a precise analogy with the kind of locality prohibited by Bell's theorem. Motivated by this, we propose a weakening of the assumption to something analogous to no-signalling. This amounts to allowing global or non-local correlations in the joint ontic state, which nevertheless do not allow for superluminal signalling. This is, at least, consistent with the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems. We find a counter-example to the PBR argument, which violates preparation independence, but does satisfy this physically motivated assumption. The question of whether the PBR result can be strengthened to hold under the relaxed assumption is therefore posed.
Building on the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem, we derive a no-go theorem for a vast class of deterministic hidden-variables theories, including those consistent on their targeted domain. The strength of this result throws doubt on seemingly natural assumptions (like the "preparation independence" of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem) about how "real states" of subsystems compose for joint systems in nonentangled states. This points to constraints in modeling tensor-product states, similar to constraints demonstrated for more complex states by the Bell and Bell-Kochen-Specker theorems.
The Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph (PBR) theorem is commonly taken to establish that a pure quantum state represents a physical property of the system to which it is assigned, rather than merely encoding knowledge. In this work, I distinguish between state-first and dynamics-first physical theories, and argue that this reading presupposes the former. These two types of theories support different approaches to causal explanation, and one of PBR's stated assumptions depends on the state-first approach. Using a recent interpretation of quantum theory as a concrete example, I show how a dynamics-first theory can explain the PBR correlations while maintaining a broadly epistemic reading of quantum states. I conclude that the PBR theorem supports a dilemma: either the quantum state is part of reality, or reality is not fundamentally built out of states.