arXiv:2610.21469
Limits of adaptive two-way linear postprocessing in six-state quantum key distribution
Toyohiro Tsurumaru
Abstract
Two-way classical communication improves the noise tolerance of quantum key distribution, but the limits of adaptive parity processing remain unclear. For the six-state protocol with equal three-basis error rate $p\in[p_*,1/2]$, where $p_*=(5-\sqrt5)/10\simeq27.64\%$, we construct a single compatible collective attack that defeats a broad class of linear postprocessing. Each public message may be a linear function of the sender's raw key, chosen adaptively from the public history. For every finite input length and every accepted transcript of positive probability, Eve's optimal probability of recovering any linear function of Alice's raw key is at least Bob's. Consequently, reliable agreement on a linear final key is incompatible with secrecy. The same conclusion holds for arbitrary publicly seeded privacy amplification after reliable recovery of a linear candidate. The proof conditions on the complete transcript, which restricts the two raw keys to affine subspaces. A local degradation of Eve's state, a known Rényi-entropy comparison, and a coset-probability inequality then give the recovery comparison. Both inequalities are proved in self-contained appendices. The result allows block splitting, regrouping, nonzero-syndrome selection, and adaptive linear reconciliation.
AI Summary
Can adaptive two-way parity processing raise the six-state QKD noise threshold beyond $p_*=(5-\sqrt5)/10\simeq27.64\%$? This paper establishes a converse for a specified class of linear postprocessing, addressing part of the gap between that achievable threshold and the $1/3$ intercept–resend limit. For equal three-basis QBER $p\in[p_*,1/2]$, it constructs one compatible collective attack, independent of the postprocessing protocol. Public messages may be linear functions of either party’s original raw key, with the sender and matrices chosen adaptively from public history. Alice’s candidate is also a history-dependent linear function; Bob may use his complete raw key and any decoder. For every finite input length and every positive-probability accepted transcript $t$, the result is $p_{\mathrm{guess}}(K\mid E,t)\ge p_{\mathrm{guess}}(K\mid B,t)$. Thus reliable linear-key agreement cannot be secret. For a fixed $\ell$-bit output with conditional agreement error $\epsilon_B$, the conditional secrecy distance satisfies $\Delta_{\mathrm{acc}}\ge1-\epsilon_B-2^{-\ell}$. Arbitrary publicly seeded privacy amplification is also excluded after reliable recovery of a linear candidate. The proof fixes the complete transcript, expressing compatible inputs as affine subspaces. A local degradation gives Eve the error pattern and a pure-state alphabet; a known Rényi-entropy comparison and code-coset weight inequalities then compare recovery probabilities. The converse permits adaptive regrouping and syndrome selection, but does not establish zero unrestricted secret-key capacity or settle the full linear-code threshold conjecture. Secret noisy preprocessing, secret local randomness, and directly shared nonlinear outputs remain outside its scope; rare acceptance also weakens acceptance-weighted secrecy implications.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- 21 pages, no figure. v2: Minor improvements to the exposition; no changes to the technical content