arXiv:2610.03593
Quantum Fire with Delegated Cloning
Rohit Chatterjee, Ananta Mukherjee, Vir Pathak, Supartha Podder
Abstract
Quantum fire is a recently introduced cryptographic primitive consisting of efficiently preparable quantum states, called \emph{flames}, that admit efficient cloning but resist efficient telegraphing, namely reconstruction via classical communication without preshared entanglement. In all prior constructions of quantum fire, cloning is a public operation that requires no separate key and every holder of a flame state can clone it. For applications to access control, however, an issuer may wish to delegate cloning to designated quantum servers while withholding this capability from other flame holders. To address this, we introduce \emph{delegatable quantum fire}, in which cloning requires a separate key. We give two constructions in the classical-oracle model. Our first construction uses a classical secret key which enables cloning, and any user with the entire key may clone successfully. Our second construction, which we call \emph{torch-fire}, uses quantum cloning keys, called \emph{torches}, which enable cloning while remaining unaffected in the process but cannot otherwise be split or delegated to enable additional cloning. An efficient adversary given $m$ torches cannot, except with negligible probability, enable more than $m$ noncommunicating parties to each clone a fresh, independently issued challenge flame. The adversary may jointly process its resources before separating the parties and distribute arbitrarily entangled registers among them. Both constructions are in the oracle model, relying on public classical oracles that allow queries in quantum superposition.
AI Summary
Quantum fire consists of efficiently preparable quantum states that can be cloned efficiently but cannot be reconstructed through classical communication without preshared entanglement. This paper asks whether cloning can instead be restricted to designated credential holders, while retaining untelegraphability and functional uncloneability for unauthorized holders. Two constructions are given relative to sampled classical oracles accessible in quantum superposition. The first uses a classical secret cloning key, also required for verification, and supports $O(\log\lambda)$ cloning generations. It adapts a signature-chain construction of quantum fire, withholding the dual oracle needed for signing. Unauthorized uncloneability follows from delayed collapsing and one-shot-signature security. The second construction, “torch-fire,” combines publicly verifiable flames with reusable quantum cloning credentials called torches. A torch supports polynomially many successive cloning operations while remaining negligibly disturbed. Its global non-proliferation guarantee states that an efficient adversary given $m$ torches cannot enable more than $m$ among any polynomial number $N$ of noncommunicating parties to each clone an independently issued challenge flame, except with negligible probability, even after joint preprocessing and entangled resource distribution. Flames combine existing quantum fire with one-shot-signature anchors; torches coherently authorize anchor preparation through a gated oracle. Security uses a threshold extraction lemma for separated computations on entangled inputs, reducing excess cloning locations to one-shot-signature forgery. The constructions are oracle-model results, not standard-model instantiations. Stated open directions include public verification and unbounded cloning depth for classical keys, stronger untelegraphability covering arbitrary LOCC protocols, and delegatable quantum key-fire.
Generative AI assistants (Claude Fable 5.1 and ChatGPT Astra 6) were used extensively for writing and editorial changes.
Error found: The formal classical-key construction omits the history-depth check explicitly required in its overview, so its supplied untelegraphability proof covers the intended bounded-depth scheme rather than the algorithm as written.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.