arXiv:2610.01609 · IEEE Access
Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment
Mikio Fujiwara, Katsumi Fujii, Fumie Ono, Masakazu Ono, Akihisa Tomita
Abstract
Actual quantum key distribution network nodes may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as electromagnetic leakage. In this study, we measured electromagnetic emissions from a prototype quantum key distribution device implementing a time-bin decoy-state BB84 protocol with Y and Z bases. We measured the electromagnetic spectra and waveforms at distances of 0 m and 3 m from the transmitter and receiver inside an anechoic chamber. The results showed that the transmitter was the primary source of electromagnetic leakage, and distinct differences were observed between the quantum states generated at the third harmonic of the 1241.6 MHz clock.
AI Summary
The paper investigates whether electromagnetic emissions from quantum key distribution (QKD) equipment reveal information about the quantum states being prepared or measured. It examines a prototype implementing time-bin, decoy-state BB84 with $Y$ and $Z$ bases, focusing on unintended emissions from both the transmitter and receiver rather than the optical quantum channel. Electromagnetic spectra and time-domain waveforms were measured in an anechoic chamber at reported distances of $0\,\mathrm{m}$ and $3\,\mathrm{m}$ from the equipment. The transmitter was identified as the primary source of electromagnetic leakage. The measurements also showed distinct differences between generated quantum states at the third harmonic of the device’s $1241.6\,\mathrm{MHz}$ clock, corresponding to $3724.8\,\mathrm{MHz}$. These observations indicate state-dependent electromagnetic signatures that could be relevant to a side-channel attack. Only the abstract is available, and it states no explicit limitations. It does not quantify state-discrimination accuracy, information leakage, or the resulting impact on secret-key security, nor does it specify whether state-dependent signatures were distinguishable at both measurement distances. Consequently, the reported result establishes a measured emission signature in this prototype, but the available description does not establish a practical key-recovery attack or its performance outside the anechoic-chamber setting.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the abstract only. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Journal reference
- Published in IEEE Access 148897 - 148904 (2026)
- DOI
- 10.1109/ACCESS.2026.3737227
- Comments
- 8 pages, 6 figures