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SBMO/IEEE MTT-S International Microwave and Optoelectronics Conference (IMOC)

Side-Channel Attacks to QKD Systems and Mitigation Techniques

Christiano M. S. Nascimento, Guilherme P. Temporão

Published Nov 9, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations deviate from idealized models and are therefore susceptible to side-channel attacks that exploit physical imperfections rather than theoretical vulnerabilities. Over the past two decades, a wide range of attacks have been demonstrated against QKD systems, including those targeting detectors, sources, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic emissions. This paper addresses a selection of a few side-channel attacks reported in the literature, classifying them according to their underlying physical mechanisms and attack strategies. We analyze their impact on the security of different QKD protocols and platforms, and highlight how experimental demonstrations have shaped the community's understanding of implementation security. In addition, we present and evaluate mitigation techniques proposed to date, such as device-independent and measurement-device-independent QKD, hardware countermeasures, monitoring strategies, and so on. We also identify open challenges and promising directions for enhancing the robustness of future quantum communication systems.

DOI
10.1109/imoc65414.2025.11365812

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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations deviate from idealized models and are therefore susceptible to side-channel attacks that exploit physical imperfections rather than theoretical vulnerabilities. Over the past two decades, a wide range of attacks have been demonstrated against QKD systems, including those targeting detectors, sources, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic emissions. This paper addresses a selection of a few side-channel attacks reported in the literature, classifying them according to their underlying physical mechanisms and attack strategies. We analyze their impact on the security of different QKD protocols and platforms, and highlight how experimental demonstrations have shaped the community's understanding of implementation security. In addition, we present and evaluate mitigation techniques proposed to date, such as device-independent and measurement-device-independent QKD, hardware countermeasures, monitoring strategies, and so on. We also identify open challenges and promising directions for enhancing the robustness of future quantum communication systems.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is revolutionizing cryptography by promising information-theoretic security through the immutable laws of quantum mechanics. Yet, the challenge of transforming these idealized security models into practical, resilient systems remains a pressing issue, especially as quantum computing evolves. In this review, we critically dissect and synthesize the latest advancements in QKD protocols and their security vulnerabilities, with a strong emphasis on rigorous security proofs. We actively categorize contemporary QKD schemes into three key classes: uncertainty principle-based protocols (e.g., BB84), hybrid architectures that enable secure direct communication (eg, three-stage protocol), and continuous-variable frameworks. We further include two modern classes of QKD protocols, namely Twin-field QKD and Device-Independent QKD, both of which were developed to have practical implementations over the last decade. Moreover, we highlight important experimental breakthroughs and innovative mitigation strategies, including the deployment of advanced Quantum Error Correction Codes (QECCs), that significantly enhance channel fidelity and system robustness. By mapping the current landscape, from sophisticated quantum attacks to state-of-the-art error correction methods, this review fills an important gap in the literature. To bring everything together, the relevance of this review concerning quantum augmented networks (QuANets) is also presented. This allows the readers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the security promises of quantum key distribution from theoretical proofs to experimental validations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is widely regarded as a highly secure quantum encryption approach since it applies theoretical principles of quantum mechanics as a medium of security, unlike classical encryption processes that rely on complex mathematics. However, practical QKD systems are vulnerable due to imperfect photon source hardware, communication channel, and detector implementation. These hardware imperfections open side channels that an adversary can exploit without violating principles of quantum mechanics. This review provides a comprehensive overview of the current QKD protocols, quantum hacking strategies and their operating principles, vulnerable hardware components and their mitigation techniques. This paper further investigates how state-of-the-art paradigms based on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), along with key subfields—such as deep learning (DL), deep reinforcement learning (DRL), and quantum machine learning (QML)—are reshaping the domain. In particular, this paper analyzes their dual roles as enablers of sophisticated attacks and as instruments for attack detection and mitigation. By jointly addressing the challenges in quantum communication and adaptive learning, as well as attack and detection architectures, this survey elucidates both the capabilities and the limitations of contemporary attack-detection mechanisms in the field. This survey seeks to establish a unified framework that conceptually integrates physical-layer quantum hacking with AI-/ML-based security, emphasizing their dual function as both an intelligent defensive layer and a potential tool for advanced threats.
Cryptography plays a key role in today's digital society. The most widely used encryption method is the public-key algorithm, but its security relies on unproven computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) is an unbreakable encryption algorithm. QKD has been proven to provide information-theoretic security rigorously based on the laws of physics. Despite the beauty of QKD theory, in practice, QKD still suffers from practical side-channel attacks, due to the imperfections of real-life implementations. Such discrepancy between the theory and the practice is fatal to the security of a QKD system. This thesis addresses a number of the discrepancies in a standard QKD implementation, and it offers efficient countermeasures to resolve these discrepancies. A novel protocol -- measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD - was proposed to remove all detector side-channel attacks. To apply MDI-QKD in real life, I have proposed practical protocols, conducted the first rigorous finite-key security proof, designed methodologies to optimize parameters, and demonstrated MDI-QKD experimentally. These results allow MDI-QKD mature enough to be implemented in real-life. Based on the framework of MDI-QKD, the only security issue left is the source. To solve the loophole due to the imperfect encoder, I have experimentally implemented a recent protocol, which enables QKD loss-tolerant to source flaws. This experiment for the first time shows secure QKD with imperfect state preparations at long distances. Another vulnerable part in the source is the ability to generate true randomness. I have developed a compact and cost-effective quantum random number generator (QRNG) prototype, which has a real-time generation rate of 1 Gbit/s with excellent stability. The simplicity and speed of my prototype prove the feasibility of a robust, low-cost, and fast QRNG. In summary, MDI-QKD enables new scientific developments in the field of quantum cryptography. This thesis solves the major practical issues in the implementation of MDI-QKD. The combination of MDI-QKD, imperfect sources, and QRNG consists of the foundation of a future practical side-channel-free QKD protocol. The success of this protocol can substitute current classical cryptosystems by offering people an unconditionally secure infrastructure, which will be the ultimate dream for researchers in secure communication.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a theoretically secure means of communication through the application of fundamental physical principles, i.e., the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem. However, a significant gap exists between mathematical theory and physical implementation because real-world devices are unable to achieve the “perfect” properties required for mathematical security proofs. Consequently, these physical flaws create exploitable vulnerability surfaces known as side-channels. This thesis presents a structured literature review of 47 sources published between 2016 and 2026 to categorize these threats and their respective countermeasures. The study employs a practical QKD reference model to map threats to specific hardware components on both the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob). Critical vulnerabilities are examined, such as Trojan-horse, reference-beam, laser-seeding, and optical-pumping attacks on the transmitter, alongside detector blinding, efficiency mismatch, APD backflash, and temporal effects on the receiver. The research develops a Comparative Evaluation Matrix to standardize these diverse findings by scoring each threat based on its loophole likelihood, technology requirements, and potential information gain. It identifies several high-risk vulnerabilities across the transmitter and receiver sides, with the receiver side being the highest-risk area in the system. Although localized hardware defenses represent an essential first layer of protection, they are insufficient on their own due to fundamental physical constraints such as spectral holes. Finally, the thesis evaluates architectural shifts and concludes that certified hardware standards and unified security proofs are paramount for future systems to realistically deliver information-theoretic security.
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.