arXiv:2609.24269
On the Born rule in a new quantum approach
Inge S. Helland
Abstract
In the context of a new approach towards quantum foundation, the Born rule is proved under weak conditions through several steps. Some of the steps turn out to have connections to statistical theory. One step gives a generalized likelihood principle, a result of independent interest. The sole additional assumption behind the Born rule is a consequence of the likelihood principle of statistics. This principle is discussed from several points of view. The whole approach towards quantum foundation advocated here, leads to a simpler and more intuitive pure state concept than the traditional one in quantum mechanics. It also provides links to statistical theory and to Andrei Khrennikov's macroscopical quantum-like models, in particular, models connected to cognition and decisions. Finally, the approach has connections to relativity theory and to quantum field theory. It is a hope that this approach now can be seen as a good alternative to the traditional formal foundation of quantum theory. The approach is here discussed in the case of finite-values parameters, but continuous parameters and parameters taking a countable set of values can be included in the theory by approximating them with finite-valued ones.
AI Summary
The paper addresses whether the Born rule can be derived within a foundation of quantum mechanics based on “accessible” and “inaccessible” theoretical variables, using an additional assumption motivated by the statistical likelihood principle. It works primarily with finite-valued variables. A previously established representation theorem assigns self-adjoint operators on an $r$-dimensional Hilbert space to accessible variables when two complementary maximal accessible variables each have $r$ values. Pure states are represented by statements $X=d$ for maximal accessible $X$. The central additional assumption is the existence of a maximal accessible response $Z=h(X,U)$, depending on experimental data and a parameter, whose probability under a fixed preparation is determined by the likelihoods. The paper defines likelihood effects $F=\sum_j P(X=d\mid U=b_j)P_j$ and establishes an equivalence criterion using their spectral decompositions. It then uses randomized experiments to argue that response probabilities define an additive, normalized measure on effects. Applying Busch’s extension of Gleason’s theorem, which includes dimension two, gives $\mu(F)=\operatorname{tr}(\sigma F)$. A subsequent limiting argument identifies the preparation state and obtains $P(Y=e\mid X=d)=|\langle v(Y,e),v(X,d)\rangle|^2$, followed by mixed-state and expectation-value formulations. The physical interpretation of the additional likelihood assumption is explicitly left for further exploration. General superpositions are restricted to states associated with meaningful accessible observables, with further postulates deferred to future work. Continuous and countably valued variables are proposed to be treated through finite-valued approximations.
Central claim may not hold: The abstract's sole-extra-assumption claim is unsupported because Consequence 2 adds structural existence and maximality requirements, and Theorem 5 introduces further unproved probabilistic and approximation assumptions. The application of Busch's theorem lacks a demonstration that every effect is available and that equal effects define the same response probability across experimental realizations. Proposition 2 does not establish μ(I)=1, because deterministic data do not make a response h(d,U) constant in the parameter. Theorem 5 uses invalid selected-value conditional-probability convergence inferences from almost-sure convergence and additionally assumes unsupported convergence of spectral projections. The final identification of the response probability with P(Y=e | X=d) relies on bijectivity claims that do not follow from maximal accessibility.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- 18 pages