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arXiv:2609.12251

Keyless secrecy against bounded adversaries

Anne Broadbent, Upendra Kapshikar, Denis Rochette

quant-phSubmitted Sep 10, 2026• Announced Sep 14, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Oct 2, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Sep 10, 2026v2 · Oct 2, 2026
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Abstract

We introduce a keyless coding/cryptographic primitive that asks for two guarantees at once: the receiver is never fooled into accepting a message other than the one sent, and the adversary learns nothing about the message unless the receiver aborts. Neither the sender nor the receiver holds a secret key, and no computational hardness is assumed. The only restriction is on the adversary's online computation: the receiver aborts if nothing arrives by a fixed deadline, so the adversary must forward something before it, and her map in that window is computed by a circuit of size (or depth) at most $p$; before and after, she is unbounded. For every polynomial $p$ we construct such an efficient quantum scheme, encoding $k$-bit messages into $n = O(k)$ qubits with circuits of size $\mathrm{poly}(n,p)$. No classical scheme achieves this type of everlasting security, at any choice of parameters. Our techniques also resolve open questions about universal tamper detection against families restricted in cardinality rather than in circuit size. We settle a question of Broadbent, Kapshikar and Rochette on relaxed tamper detection. As a corollary, we obtain the first efficient non-malleable code secure against global quantum tampering, with no split-state restriction, whereas the current constructions in the literature require the codeword to be split into non-communicating shares.

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We introduce a keyless coding/cryptographic primitive that asks for two guarantees at once: the receiver is never fooled into accepting a message other than the one sent, and the adversary learns nothing about the message unless the receiver aborts. Neither the sender nor the receiver holds a secret key, and no computational hardness is assumed. The only restriction is on the adversary's online computation: the receiver aborts if nothing arrives by a fixed deadline, so the adversary must forward something before it, and her map in that window is computed by a circuit of size (or depth) at most ppp; before and after, she is unbounded. For every polynomial ppp we construct such an efficient quantum scheme, encoding kkk-bit messages into n=O(k)n = O(k)n=O(k) qubits with circuits of size poly(n,p)\mathrm{poly}(n,p)poly(n,p). No classical scheme achieves this type of everlasting security, at any choice of parameters.
Our techniques also resolve open questions about universal tamper detection against families restricted in cardinality rather than in circuit size. We settle a question of Broadbent, Kapshikar and Rochette on relaxed tamper detection. As a corollary, we obtain the first efficient non-malleable code secure against global quantum tampering, with no split-state restriction, whereas the current constructions in the literature require the codeword to be split into non-communicating shares.
Non-malleable codes are fundamental objects at the intersection of cryptography and coding theory. These codes provide security guarantees even in settings where error correction and detection are impossible, and have found applications to several other cryptographic tasks. One of the strongest and most well-studied adversarial tampering models is 2-split-state tampering. Here, a codeword is split into two parts which are stored in physically distant servers, and the adversary can then independently tamper with each part using arbitrary functions. This model can be naturally extended to the secret sharing setting with several parties by having the adversary independently tamper with each share. Previous works on non-malleable coding and secret sharing in the split-state tampering model only considered the encoding of classical messages. Furthermore, until recent work by Aggarwal, Boddu, and Jain (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2024 & arXiv 2022), adversaries with quantum capabilities and shared entanglement had not been considered, and it is a priori not clear whether previous schemes remain secure in this model. In this work, we introduce the notions of split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages secure against quantum adversaries with shared entanglement. Then, we present explicit constructions of such schemes that achieve low-error non-malleability. More precisely, for some constantc>0c\gt 0c>0, we construct efficiently encodable and decodable split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages preserving entanglement with external systems and achieving security against quantum adversaries having shared entanglement with codeword length n, any message length at mostncn^{c}nc, and errorε=2−nc\varepsilon =2^{-{n^{c}}}ε=2−nc. In the easier setting of average-case non-malleability, we achieve efficient non-malleable coding with rate close to1/111/111/11.
Tamper-resilient cryptography studies how to protect data against adversaries who can physically manipulate codewords before they are decoded. The notion of tamper detection codes formalizes this goal, requiring that any unauthorized modification be detected with high probability. Classical results, starting from Jafargholi and Wichs (TCC 2015), established the existence of such codes against very large families of tampering functions, subject to structural restrictions ruling out identity and constant maps. Recent works of Boddu and Kapshikar (Quantum, 7) and Bergamaschi (Eurocrypt 2024) have extended these ideas to quantum adversaries, but only consider unitary tampering families. In this work, we give the first general treatment of tamper detection against arbitrary quantum maps. We show that Haar-random encoding schemes achieve exponentially small soundness error against any adversarial family whose size, Kraus rank, and entanglement fidelity obey natural constraints, which are direct quantum analogues of restrictions in the classical setting. Our results unify and extend previous works. Beyond this, we demonstrate a fundamental separation between classical and quantum tamper detection. Classically, relaxed tamper detection which allows either rejection or recovery of the original message cannot protect even against the family of constant functions. This family is of size 2n2^n2n. In contrast, we show that quantum encodings can handle this obstruction, and we conjecture and provide evidence that they may in fact provide relaxed tamper detection and non-malleable security against any family of quantum maps of size up to 22αn2^{2^{αn}}22αn for any constant α<12α<\frac{1}{2}α<21​, leading to a conjecture on the existence of universal quantum tamper detection. Our results provide the first evidence that quantum tamper detection is strictly more powerful than its classical counterpart.
Tamper-detection codes (TDCs) are fundamental objects at the intersection of cryptography and coding theory. A TDC encodes messages in such a manner that tampering the codeword causes the decoder to either output the original message, or reject it. In this work, we study quantum analogs of one of the most well-studied adversarial tampering models: the so-called ttt-split-state tampering model, where the codeword is divided into ttt shares, and each share is tampered with "locally". It is impossible to achieve tamper detection in the split-state model using classical codewords. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the situation changes significantly if the message can be encoded into a multipartite quantum state, entangled across the ttt shares. Concretely, we define a family of quantum TDCs defined on any t≥3t\geq 3t≥3 shares, which can detect arbitrary split-state tampering so long as the adversaries are unentangled, or even limited to a finite amount of pre-shared entanglement. Previously, this was only known in the limit of asymptotically large ttt. As our flagship application, we show how to augment threshold secret sharing schemes with similar tamper-detecting guarantees. We complement our results by establishing connections between quantum TDCs and quantum encryption schemes.
Assuming post-quantum one-way functions, we construct device-independent oblivious transfer and bit commitment that tolerate independent honest faults at a constant rate and adaptive, bidirectional quantum leakage between the laboratories at a constant rate. Honest parties use trusted classical computation to operate untrusted quantum devices, which may share arbitrary entanglement and perform joint measurements without assumptions of independence or identical distribution. Security is simulation-based against quantum polynomial-time adversaries and composes sequentially with efficient simulators. For security parameter λλλ and a prescribed total leakage budget ℓ\ellℓ, one complete one-bit oblivious transfer uses Θ(ℓ+log⁡2λ)Θ(\ell+\log^2λ)Θ(ℓ+log2λ) device coordinates in at most three single-use device windows, including preprocessing, and polynomial classical computation and communication. The leakage budget is shared across these windows. The commitment has efficient simulators against both parties and yields device-independent coin tossing with abort; each uses one window. Completeness of oblivious transfer gives device-independent secure computation with abort for every efficiently computable classical functionality on a fixed number of parties, against static corruption of any proper subset, provided each reached call to oblivious transfer satisfies the device and budget conditions. The construction combines short selectors with code-based choice masking, a global audit, and error correction across field symbols. The commitment extractor changes a classical code coset while leaving the device execution and its leakage unchanged. Sender security uses a global Fourier analysis and a selector-aware Magic Square repetition bound derived from the two-round threshold theorem of Kundu and Tan (2023).
Security of a storage device against a tampering adversary has been a well-studied topic in classical cryptography. Such models give black-box access to an adversary, and the aim is to protect the stored message or abort the protocol if there is any tampering.In this work, we extend the scope of the theory of tamper detection codes against an adversary with quantum capabilities. We consider encoding and decoding schemes that are used to encode a k -qubit quantum message |m⟩ to obtain an n -qubit quantum codeword |ψm⟩ . A quantum codeword |ψm⟩ can be adversarially tampered via a unitary U from some known tampering unitary family UAdv (acting on C2n ).Firstly, we initiate the general study of quantum tamper detection codes , which detect if there is any tampering caused by the action of a unitary operator. In case there was no tampering, we would like to output the original message. We show that quantum tamper detection codes exist for any family of unitary operators UAdv , such that |UAdv|<22αn for some constant α∈(0,1/6) ; provided that unitary operators are not too close to the identity operator. Quantum tamper detection codes that we construct can be considered to be quantum variants of classical tamper detection codes studied by Jafargholi and Wichs ['15], which are also known to exist under similar restrictions.Additionally, we show that when the message set M is classical, such a construction can be realized as a non-malleable code against any UAdv of size up to 22αn .
We give an unconditional construction of information-theoretically secure one-time private-key unclonable encryption for one-bit messages, with efficient encryption and decryption and exponentially small unclonable-indistinguishability advantage. Previous work by Bhattacharyya and Culf (Nature Physics, 2026) and Bhattacharyya, Broadbent, and Culf (arXiv:2603.08916) either only showed inverse-polynomial security loss or required inefficient encryption/decryption operations; we avoid both of these caveats. Our scheme's key is a uniformly random non-identity phase-free Pauli on nnn qubits, and bit aaa is encrypted as a random (−1)a(-1)^a(−1)a eigenstate of that Pauli. We prove that the probability that both receivers recover the bit is at most 1/2+O(2−n/2).1/2 + O\left(2^{-n/2}\right).1/2+O(2−n/2). By a lower bound due to Broadbent, Culf, and Rochette (arXiv:2510.00903), this is the best probability bound achievable with nnn-qubit ciphertexts while ensuring perfect correctness (up to the constant hidden in the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅)).