We construct protocols for classically verifiable quantum advantage and classical verification of
BQP computations using \emph{quantum indistinguishability obfuscation} (qiO). Specifically, given qiO and assuming a slightly stronger version of
BQP=BPP, we construct a two-message quantum-advantage protocol that is efficiently and publicly verifiable. Our result can be viewed as a rigorous cryptographic foundation for the heuristic quantum advantage proposals based on \emph{peaked random circuit sampling} of Aaronson and Zhang (arXiv:2404.14493).
We also construct two simple protocols for classically verifying arbitrary
BQP computations. The first protocol is privately verifiable and assumes only the existence of qiO. This gives a rare example of a nontrivial cryptographic application of (quantum) iO that does not make additional computational hardness assumptions. The second protocol additionally assumes post-quantum one-way functions and is \emph{publicly verifiable}. To our knowledge, this is the first publicly verifiable protocol for classical verification of
BQP computations under computational assumptions in the standard model.
As qiO is the basis for our results, we propose an approach to constructing qiO by adapting the local-mixing framework of Canetti--Chamon--Mucciolo--Ruckenstein.
Peaked quantum circuits, whose output distribution is sharply concentrated on a single bitstring, have emerged as a promising candidate for verifiable quantum advantage, as the correctness of the quantum output can be checked by simply comparing against the known peak. Recent work by Gharibyan et al. arXiv:2510.25838 claimed heuristic quantum advantage using peaked circuits executed on Quantinuum's 56-qubit H2 processor. These peaked circuits concentrate their output on a single hidden bitstring by training a shallow simulable circuit variationally and inserting an obfuscated permutation to increase the depth to a level that makes classical simulation intractable, with estimated runtimes of years for the largest instances. We show that these circuits can be efficiently simulated classically. We describe a method that efficiently performs a full tensor network contraction, allowing near-exact sampling and extraction of the peaked bitstring. The method exploits the mirrored structure of the circuit and iteratively cancels both halves into a Matrix Product Operator (MPO), and avoids the obfuscated permutation by greedily reducing the MPO bond dimension through a process we call unswapping. The method can fully contract and extract the peak of the largest circuit in approximately one hour on a single GPU, around half the time it took to run on the quantum hardware.
Recently, quantum computing experiments have for the first time exceeded the capability of classical computers to perform certain computations – a milestone termed "quantum computational advantage." However, verifying the output of the quantum device in these experiments required extremely large classical computations. An exciting next step for demonstrating quantum capability would be to implement tests of quantum computational advantage with efficient classical verification, such that larger system sizes can be tested and verified. One of the first proposals for an efficiently-verifiable test of quantumness consists of hiding a secret classical bitstring inside a circuit of the class IQP, in such a way that samples from the circuit's output distribution are correlated with the secret. The classical hardness of this protocol has been supported by evidence that directly simulating IQP circuits is hard, but the security of the protocol against other (non-simulating) classical attacks has remained an open question. In this work we demonstrate that the protocol is not secure against classical forgery. We describe a classical algorithm that can not only convince the verifier that the (classical) prover is quantum, but can in fact can extract the secret key underlying a given protocol instance. Furthermore, we show that the key extraction algorithm is efficient in practice for problem sizes of hundreds of qubits. Finally, we provide an implementation of the algorithm, and give the secret vector underlying the "$25 challenge" posted online by the authors of the original paper.
A classical obfuscator for quantum circuits is a classical program that, given the classical description of a quantum circuit
Q, outputs the classical description of a functionally equivalent quantum circuit
Q^ that hides as much as possible about
Q. Previously, the only known feasibility result for classical obfuscation of quantum circuits (Bartusek and Malavolta, ITCS 2022) was limited to circuits that always reject. On the other hand, if the obfuscator is allowed to compile the quantum circuit
Q into a quantum state
∣Q^⟩, there exist feasibility results for obfuscating all pseudo-deterministic quantum circuits (Bartusek, Kitagawa, Nishimaki and Yamakawa, STOC 2023, Bartusek, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan, STOC 2024), and all unitaries (Huang and Tang, FOCS 2025). We show that (relative to a classical oracle) there exists a classical obfuscator for all pseudo-deterministic quantum circuits. We do this by giving the first construction of a compact quantum fully-homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme that supports public verification of (pseudo-deterministic) quantum evaluation, relative to a classical oracle. To construct our QFHE scheme, we improve on the approach of Bartusek, Kitagawa, Nishimaki and Yamakawa (STOC 2023), which required ciphertexts that are both quantum and non-compact due to the use of quantum coset states and their publicly-verifiable properties. We introduce new techniques for analyzing coset states that can be generated ''on the fly'', by proving new cryptographic properties of the one-shot signature scheme of Shmueli and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2025). Our techniques allow us to produce QFHE ciphertexts that are purely classical, compact, and publicly-verifiable. This also yields the first classical verification of quantum computation protocol for BQP that simultaneously satisfies blindness and public-verifiability.
Program obfuscation aims to hide the inner workings of a program while preserving its functionality. In the quantum setting, recent works have obtained obfuscation schemes for specialized classes of quantum circuits. For instance, Bartusek, Brakerski, and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2024) constructed a quantum state obfuscation scheme, which supports the obfuscation of quantum programs represented as quantum states for pseudo-deterministic quantum programs with classical inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. In this work, we improve upon existing results by constructing the first quantum state obfuscation scheme for unitary (or approximately unitary) quantum programs supporting quantum inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. At the core of our obfuscation scheme are two novel ingredients: a functional quantum authentication scheme that allows key holders to learn specific functions of the authenticated quantum state with simulationbased security, and a compiler that represents an arbitrary quantum circuit as a projective linear-plus-measurement quantum program described by a sequence of non-adaptive Clifford gates interleaved with adaptive and compatible measurements.
A central question in the theory of quantum advantage is whether there are quantum advantage protocols with similar resource requirements as random circuit sampling that are also verifiable just from the classical outputs of the quantum computation. Here, we develop the idea of simulation secrets for verifiable advantage. A verifier can use a simulation secret to evaluate a cross-entropy test faster than it would take a classical adversary to pass the test. We instantiate this idea using IQP circuits described by cubic polynomials with planted independent spaces. These correspond to the largest independent set in the orbit of a polynomial under the general linear group and yield a low-rank stabilizer decomposition of the corresponding state. We conjecture that large independent spaces are invisible to a computationally bounded adversary, and therefore they cannot exploit them to pass the protocol. A second conjecture regards the fine-grained complexity of producing samples that pass the cross-entropy test for uniformly random polynomials. Under these conjectures, our scheme results in a polynomial gap between the verification time and the time a classical adversary would need to pass the protocol---both are exponential. It has a potential application to generating classically certifiable randomness, since the output distributions have high min-entropy. We estimate that the planted polynomial scheme is implementable using 100 logical qubits at logical error rates around
10−6.