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arXiv:2603.26907

Information-Theoretic Solutions for Seedless QRNG Bootstrapping and Hybrid PQC-QKD Key Combination

Juan Antonio Vieira Giestinhas, Timothy Spiller

quant-phcs.CRSubmitted Mar 27, 2026• Announced Mar 31, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Aug 11, 2026 (v3)
v1 · Mar 27, 2026v2 · Apr 15, 2026v3 · Aug 11, 2026
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Abstract

This paper considers two challenges faced by practical quantum networks: the bootstrapping of seedless Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) and the resilient combination of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) keys. These issues are addressed using universal hash functions as strong seeded extractors, with security foundations provided by the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma (QLHL). First, the 'randomness loop' in QRNGs -- the requirement of an initial random seed to generate further randomness -- is resolved by proposing a bootstrapping method using raw data from two independent sources of entropy, given by seedless QRNG sources. Second, it is argued that strong seeded extractors are an alternative to XOR-based key combining that presents different characteristics. Unlike XORing, our method ensures that if the combined output and one initial key are compromised, the remaining key material retains quantifiable smooth min-entropy and remains secure in exchange of longer keys. Furthermore, the proposed method allows binding of transcript information with key material in a natural way, providing a tool to replace computationally based combiners to extend ITS security of the initial key material to the final combined output. By modeling PQC keys as having HILL (Hastad, Impagliazzo, Levin and Luby) entropy, the framework is extended to hybrid PQC-QKD systems. This unified approach provides a mathematically rigorous and future-proof mechanism for both randomness generation and secure key management against quantum adversaries.

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This paper considers two challenges faced by practical quantum networks: the bootstrapping of seedless Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) and the resilient combination of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) keys. These issues are addressed using universal hash functions as strong seeded extractors, with security foundations provided by the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma (QLHL). First, the 'randomness loop' in QRNGs -- the requirement of an initial random seed to generate further randomness -- is resolved by proposing a bootstrapping method using raw data from two independent sources of entropy, given by seedless QRNG sources. Second, it is argued that strong seeded extractors are an alternative to XOR-based key combining that presents different characteristics. Unlike XORing, our method ensures that if the combined output and one initial key are compromised, the remaining key material retains quantifiable smooth min-entropy and remains secure in exchange of longer keys. Furthermore, the proposed method allows binding of transcript information with key material in a natural way, providing a tool to replace computationally based combiners to extend ITS security of the initial key material to the final combined output. By modeling PQC keys as having HILL (Hastad, Impagliazzo, Levin and Luby) entropy, the framework is extended to hybrid PQC-QKD systems. This unified approach provides a mathematically rigorous and future-proof mechanism for both randomness generation and secure key management against quantum adversaries.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics, but its practical deployment is limited by its reliance on classical infrastructure and inability to operate as a standalone solution.Recent research emphasizes hybrid approaches that combine QKD with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to achieve practical and robust security.This paper presents a hybrid key distribution model integrating QKD with the postquantum key encapsulation mechanism.The two independently generated keys are combined to derive a unified shared secret, enhancing resilience against both classical and quantum adversaries.The system is implemented using a simulated quantum environment, enabling the emulation of quantum communication over classical networks.The proposed approach is validated through a secure image transmission use case, demonstrating the correctness of the hybrid key exchange.The results highlight the feasibility of hybrid classical-quantum cryptographic systems as a practical step toward secure communication in emerging quantum network infrastructures.
Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which ideally provides information-theoretic security (ITS) using quantum states of photons, but is limited in practice due to device-dependent loopholes and the reliance on classical channel authentication. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks—so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—but its security relies on the unproven assumption of the hardness of mathematical problems. To address the security and performance challenges present in each, here we introduce a key merging framework to combine QKD and PQC key material based on linear-code secret sharing schemes. In particular, we design joint QKD-PQC key distribution schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes, which achieve high performance while ensuring a high security level. Compared to naive XOR-type schemes, our schemes can achieve a security enhancement ofΘ(n)\Theta (n)Θ(n)wherennnis the number of parallel key distribution links when the key distribution performance is similar. Furthermore, we develop schemes where the attacker needs to break both QKD and PQC links to learn the key bit information. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.
Quantum computing is posing a serious risk to classical cryptographic tools such as RSA and ECC as sophisticated quantum algorithms are able to crack their mathematical foundation in a time bound that is a a polynomial in the number of repetitions. In this paper, we will describe the process of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into a hybrid approach to secure communications in the post-quantum world. The suggested methodology is a combination of the computational efficiency and scalability of PQC and the information-theoretic security and eavesdropping detection abilities of QKD. Simulation observations indicate that PQC-only systems are both faster in generating keys and scalable, but do not have a strong eavesdropping detection. On the other hand, non-conditional security is only a feature of systems based on QKD, but it is also highly overhead and slows down key rate. The hybrid PQC-Q KD model provides a balanced performance, high resilience, high authentication, high confidentiality, and realistic deployability. On balance, this discussion demonstrates that the hybrid approach is better than standalone methods and can provide a strong solution to protect against new quantum threats. The large-scale network protocol can be optimized, resources and further integration with other emerging technologies, such as 5G/6G, IoT or cloud computing, can be directed in future research.
We study hashing against quantum adversaries, as used in cryptographic applications, and provide bounds on the probability of failure in practical settings where seeds might be reused and might be non-ideal. Randomness extraction and privacy amplification are key components of quantum cryptographic protocols, such as quantum randomness generation or key distribution, that allow the compression of partially secure raw data into shorter output with high security. To ensure the security of any cryptographic construction that integrates them, it is desirable to establish composable security. This can be done by using methods based on universal hashing and leveraging the general leftover hash lemma, which allows extraction of near-uniform random numbers from an imperfect entropy source by sampling from an almost two-universal family of hash functions using a seed. This approach is taken in many practical implementations, commonly using Toeplitz hashing. The lemma provides an upper bound ε\varepsilonε on the distance of the output to uniform randomness, which holds on average over the choice of seeds. It makes no claim that any particular seed yields near-uniform random numbers. This poses a problem for practical applications where a seed is sampled once and reused for many rounds (blockwise hashing). Here, we study the subset of \textit{bad} seeds yielding far-from-uniform outputs. We show that randomness extraction against quantum side information is guaranteed to produce δδδ-close-to-uniform random numbers except with failure probability (εδ)2\left(\frac{\varepsilon}δ\right)^2(δε​)2. This result is generalised to blockwise hashing providing a guarantee of the security of kkk rounds except with failure probability ((2k−1)εδ)2\big(\frac{(2k-1)\varepsilon}δ\big)^2(δ(2k−1)ε​)2. Moreover, we extend the general leftover hash lemma to blockwise hashing and relax the assumption of almost two-universality.
Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography aims at providing secure cryptography with minimal trust in, or characterisation of, the underlying quantum devices. A key step in DI protocols is randomness extraction (or privacy amplification), which typically requires a seed of additional bits with sufficient entropy and statistical independence from any bits generated during the protocol. In this work, we propose a method for extraction in DI protocols that does not require a seed and is secure against computationally unbounded quantum adversaries. The core idea is to use the Bell violation of the raw data, rather than its min-entropy, as the extractor promise. We present a complete security proof in a model where the experiment uses memoryless measurement devices acting on an arbitrary joint (across all rounds) state. Our results mark a first step in this alternative, seedless, approach to extraction in DI protocols.
As quantum technologies advance, the security of popular cryptographic protocols becomes more threatened by the capabilities of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs). In this scenario, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become a potential solution to prolong the life of existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems. However, PQC protocols depend on high-quality randomness for key generation and encapsulation procedures, with the quality of the entropy source potentially having a profound impact on the security of the overall system. In this work, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept enabling the incorporation of Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG) devices within communication networks using PQC-based Transport Layer Security (TLS).Using open-source cryptographic libraries and commercial QRNG hardware, we demonstrate their use as entropy sources via an Entropy-as-a-Service (EaaS) model. We highlight two particular use cases: a fully virtualized private PKI network and a connection to an external PQC-enabled server. Experimental results show that EaaS QRNG enables real-time entropy monitoring and quality assessment in cryptographic management systems, with negligible impact on TLS handshake time.