Quantum computers pose a fundamental threat to widely deployed public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, by enabling efficient integer factorization using Shor's algorithm. Theoretical resource estimates suggest that 2048-bit RSA keys could be broken using Shor's algorithm with fewer than a million noisy qubits. Although such machines do not yet exist, the availability of smaller, cloud-accessible quantum processors and open-source implementations of Shor's algorithm raises the question of what key sizes can realistically be factored with today's platforms. In this work, we experimentally investigate Shor's algorithm on several cloud-based quantum computers using publicly available implementations. Our results reveal a substantial gap between the capabilities of current quantum hardware and the requirements for factoring cryptographically relevant integers. In particular, we observe that circuit constructions still need to be highly specific for each modulus, and that machine fidelities are unstable, with high and fluctuating error rates.
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v3: corrected minor typographical errors; no change to results
Quantum computers pose a fundamental threat to widely deployed public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, by enabling efficient integer factorization using Shor's algorithm. Theoretical resource estimates suggest that 2048-bit RSA keys could be broken using Shor's algorithm with fewer than a million noisy qubits. Although such machines do not yet exist, the availability of smaller, cloud-accessible quantum processors and open-source implementations of Shor's algorithm raises the question of what key sizes can realistically be factored with today's platforms. In this work, we experimentally investigate Shor's algorithm on several cloud-based quantum computers using publicly available implementations. Our results reveal a substantial gap between the capabilities of current quantum hardware and the requirements for factoring cryptographically relevant integers. In particular, we observe that circuit constructions still need to be highly specific for each modulus, and that machine fidelities are unstable, with high and fluctuating error rates.
The ongoing development of Quantum Computing (QC) is a breakthrough paradigm that holds the power to revolutionize the way we process information and solve complex problems today. Quantum Computation works on the fundamental principles of Superposition and Entanglement, enabling Quantum Computers to Leverage the power of Physics in Computing. QC has the potential to revolutionize fields such as Drug Development, Financial Modeling, Optimization, and Cryptography. Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm used to factorize large numbers, poses significant threats to RSA, a widely used public key cryptosystem. RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring large semi-primes to keep its security. Shor's algorithm's ability to factorize quickly on a quantum computer undermines RSA's security assumptions, necessitating the exploration of post-quantum cryptographic solutions to ensure secure communication in the quantum era. The goal of this paper is to assess the present state of Shor's algorithm implementation and efficiency, specifically its application in the context of compromising public key cryptosystems like RSA.
The ongoing development of Quantum Computing (QC) is a breakthrough paradigm that holds the power to revolutionize the way we process information and solve complex problems today. Quantum Computation works on the fundamental principles of Superposition and Entanglement, enabling Quantum Computers to Leverage the power of Physics in Computing. QC has the potential to revolutionize fields such as Drug Development, Financial Modeling, Optimization, and Cryptography. Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm used to factorize large numbers, poses significant threats to RSA, a widely used public key cryptosystem. RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring large semi-primes to keep its security. Shor's algorithm's ability to factorize quickly on a quantum computer undermines RSA's security assumptions, necessitating the exploration of post-quantum cryptographic solutions to ensure secure communication in the quantum era. The goal of this paper is to assess the present state of Shor's algorithm implementation and efficiency, specifically its application in the context of compromising public key cryptosystems like RSA.
Quantum computers have the potential to perform computational tasks beyond the reach of classical machines. A prominent example is Shor's algorithm for integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which is of both fundamental importance and practical relevance to cryptography. However, due to the high overhead of quantum error correction, optimized resource estimates for cryptographically relevant instances of Shor's algorithm require millions of physical qubits. Here, by leveraging advances in high-rate quantum error-correcting codes, efficient logical instruction sets, and circuit design, we show that Shor's algorithm can be executed at cryptographically relevant scales with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits. Increasing the number of physical qubits improves time efficiency by enabling greater parallelism; under plausible assumptions, the runtime for discrete logarithms on the P-256 elliptic curve could be just a few days for a system with 26,000 physical qubits, while the runtime for factoring RSA-2048 integers is one to two orders of magnitude longer. Recent neutral-atom experiments have demonstrated universal fault-tolerant operations below the error-correction threshold, computation on arrays of hundreds of qubits, and trapping arrays with more than 6,000 highly coherent qubits. Although substantial engineering challenges remain, our theoretical analysis indicates that an appropriately designed neutral-atom architecture could support quantum computation at cryptographically relevant scales. More broadly, these results highlight the capability of neutral atoms for fault-tolerant quantum computing with wide-ranging scientific and technological applications.
With the rise of large-scale quantum computers, it becomes difficult to sustain the security principles of popular public-key encryption systems, including RSA, which is based on the classical problem of integer factorization. Shor’s algorithm suggests that a large enough quantum computer may find factors of an n-bit integer in polynomial time, thus becoming a threat to RSA and similar encryption techniques once the technology of fault-tolerant hardware reaches maturity. However, current implementation is subject to several limitations regarding the number of qubits available, circuit depth, and the vulnerability to decoherence in NISQ computing. The proposed algorithm in this work provides an improved version of Shor’s algorithm that implements classical pre-processing heuristics, adaptive choice of bases, a low-depth circuit for modular exponentiation, and a compressed approximate quantum Fourier transform (AQFT) step to minimize qubit usage and depth while preserving the accuracy of period finding. The simulation results performed for different modulus sizes from 8 to 256 bits show that the suggested approach allows for reducing the number of logical qubits by about 29% and increases the success rate of the algorithm from 41% to 63%. The security considerations of such optimizations concerning the timelines of migrating from existing cryptographic systems to post-quantum systems will be addressed, as well as the possible approaches to hybrid classical and quantum factorization pipelines.
In this world of massive communication networks, data security and confidentiality are of crucial importance for maintaining secured private communication and protecting information against eavesdropping attacks. Existing cryptosystems provide data security and confidentiality by the use of encryption and signature algorithms for secured communication. Classical computers use cryptographic algorithms that use the product of two large prime numbers for generating public and private keys. These classical algorithms are based on the fact that integer factorization is a non-deterministic polynomial-time (NP) problem and requires super-polynomial time making it impossible for large enough integers. Shor’s algorithm is a well-known algorithm for factoring large integers in polynomial time and takes only O(b3) time and O(b) space on b-bit number inputs. Shor’s algorithm poses a potential threat to the current security system with the ongoing advancements of Quantum computers. This paper discusses how Shor’s algorithm will be able to break integer factorization-based cryptographic algorithms, for example, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Rabin Algorithms. As a proof of concept, experimental analysis of Quantum Shor’s algorithm on existing public-key cryptosystems using IBM Quantum Experience is performed for factorizing integers of moderate length (seven bits) due to limitations of thirty-two qubits in present IBM quantum computers. In a nutshell, this work will demonstrate how Shor’s algorithm poses threat to confidentiality and authentication services.
Quantum computing promises revolutionary advances in cryptography, particularly through Shor's algorithm, which can factor large integers in polynomial time and threaten traditional RSA encryption. Through simulation experiments, our research compares Shor's algorithm implementation in ideal versus noisy quantum environments. Under ideal conditions, we factored semiprimes up to N=299 with reasonable resources, but with noise introduction, this ceiling dropped to approximately N=95, beyond which computational costs increased exponentially. The performance gap is striking: ideal simulations factored N=91 in 4 seconds, while noisy simulations required 2,600 seconds—a 650-fold increase. Our hybrid quantum-classical approach showed that noise simulation required modified circuit architectures, reducing gate count growth from 50 to 42.5 gates for comparable test numbers. Qubit requirements followed a step-function pattern in both environments, scaling from 12 qubits for N=15 to 21 qubits for N=91-95, while circuit depth increased from 11 to 17-19 units, with slightly shallower circuits in noisy conditions. In our paper, we propose a hybrid implementation strategy that addresses hardware limitations, present empirical findings on the impact of quantum noise on factoring efficiency, and evaluate the cryptographic security implications under realistic conditions. Our findings underscore the need for fault-tolerant quantum computing and error correction, especially as optimizations suggest factoring 2048-bit RSA keys would require approximately 20 million qubits running for 8 hours. This highlights the urgency in transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms like CRYSTALS-Dilithium and CRYSTALS-Kyber being standardized by NIST.