Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2512.14759

Quantum Resource Analysis of Low-Round Keccak/SHA-3 Preimage Attack: From Classical 2^57.8 to Quantum 2^28.9 using Qiskit Modeling

Ramin Rezvani Gilkolae

quant-phcs.CRSubmitted Dec 15, 2025• Announced Dec 16, 2025• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This paper presents a hardware-conscious analysis of the quantum acceleration of the classical 3-round Keccak-256 preimage attack using Grover's Algorithm. While the theoretical quantum speed-up from T_cl=2^{57.8} (classical) to T_qu = 2^{28.9} (quantum) is mathematically sound, the practical implementation overhead is so extreme that attacks remain wholly infeasible in both resource and runtime dimensions. Using Qiskit-based circuit synthesis, we derive that a 3-round Keccak quantum oracle requires: 9,600 Toffoli gates (with uncomputation for reversibility); 3,200 logical qubits (1,600 state + 1,600 auxiliary); 7.47 * 10^{13} total 2-qubit gates (full Grover search); 3.2 million physical qubits (with quantum error correction)PROHIBITIVE; 0.12 years (43 days) to 2,365+ years execution time, depending on machine assumptions. These barriers -- particularly the physical qubit requirements, circuit depth, and error accumulation -- render the quantum attack infeasible for any foreseeable quantum computer. Consequently, SHA-3 security is not threatened by quantum computers for preimage attacks. We emphasize the critical importance of hardware-aware complexity analysis in quantum cryptanalysis: the elegant asymptotic theory of Grover's Algorithm hides an engineering overhead so prohibitive that the quantum approach becomes infeasible from both resource and implementation perspectives.

Related papers

Applying Grover's Algorithm to Hash Functions: A Software Perspective

Richard H. Preston

Quantum software frameworks provide software engineers with the tools to study quantum algorithms as applied to practical problems. We implement classical hash functions MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 as quantum oracles to study the computational resource requirements of conducting a preimage attack with Grover's Algorithm. We introduce an improvement to the SHA-3 oracle that reduces the number of logical qubits required in the Keccak block permutation by 40%. The source code is available athttps://github.com/rhpreston/grovers-hash-functions.

arXiv:2202.10982•IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering•Jan 1, 2022•46 citations

Evaluating the Theoretical Quantum Resilience of SHAKE-256 via Complexity Modeling on WebSRC Data

Shreya Sivakumar, J Mahalakshmi, I. R. Sumathi +3 more

Fault-tolerant quantum computing poses known theoretical risks to symmetric cryptography. Specifically, Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic advantage in unstructured search scenarios, effectively halving the security margin of hash functions against preimage attacks. This study mathematically models the theoretical preimage resistance of the SHAKE-256 extendable-output function. Using a constrained keyspace derived from the WebSRC dataset (6,400 HTML structures), ]classical O(N) brute-force requirements with the $O(\sqrt N )$ bound of quantum amplitude amplification are compared. For this specific bounds-testing scenario, the theoretical model demonstrates a 103-fold reduction in target acquisition queries. Current literature on quantum resource requirements, including logical qubit and T-gate depth estimates, noting the significant engineering obstacles that remain for implementing Keccak-f [1600] on near-term hardware is reviewed. The analysis confirms the established necessity of selecting adequate output lengths in SHA-3 constructions to ensure post-quantum resilience.

International Conference on Intelligent and Sustainable AI Systems (ICOSAAS)•Jul 1, 2026•0 citations

A framework for reducing the overhead of the quantum oracle for use with Grover’s algorithm with applications to cryptanalysis of SIKE

Jean‐François Biasse, Benjamin Pring

Abstract In this paper we provide a framework for applying classical search and preprocessing to quantum oracles for use with Grover’s quantum search algorithm in order to lower the quantum circuit-complexity of Grover’s algorithm for single-target search problems. This has the effect (for certain problems) of reducing a portion of the polynomial overhead contributed by the implementation cost of quantum oracles and can be used to provide either strict improvements or advantageous trade-offs in circuit-complexity. Our results indicate that it is possible for quantum oracles for certain single-target preimage search problems to reduce the quantum circuit-size from O 2 n / 2 ⋅ m C $O\left(2^{n/2}\cdot mC\right)$ (where C originates from the cost of implementing the quantum oracle) to O ( 2 n / 2 ⋅ m C ) $O(2^{n/2} \cdot m\sqrt{C})$ without the use of quantum ram, whilst also slightly reducing the number of required qubits. This framework captures a previous optimisation of Grover’s algorithm using preprocessing [21] applied to cryptanalysis, providing new asymptotic analysis. We additionally provide insights and asymptotic improvements on recent cryptanalysis [16] of SIKE [14] via Grover’s algorithm, demonstrating that the speedup applies to this attack and impacting upon quantum security estimates [16] incorporated into the SIKE specification [14].

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology•Nov 17, 2020•9 citations

Resource-Efficient Reversible Quantum Circuit for Theta Function in SHA-3

Yeonsong Suh, Younghoon Park

With the advancement of quantum computing, traditional hash based security structures are increasingly exposed to threats posed by quantum algorithms. In particular, Grover's algorithm enables significantly faster pre-image attacks on hash functions than classical approaches, highlighting the need for circuit-level quantum countermeasures. To break with quantum computer, implementation of quantum circuit for the hash function is essential. However, the existing approaches require too many gates or discard ancilla qubits. In this paper, we propose a reversible quantum circuit for the$\theta$operation in the Keccak algorithm a core component of SHA-3, by explicitly implementing the inverse function$\theta^{-1}$. The proposed circuit allows for ancilla qubit reuse and achieves a substantial reduction in number of CNOT gates and qubits compare to previous researches. While the depth of our circuit slightly exceeds that of some existing approaches, the compact and modular design of the$\theta$operation provides a solid foundation for further enhancement.

International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks•Jul 8, 2025•0 citations

Improved Quantum Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA-1

Kyungbae Jang, Hwajeong Seo, Anupam Chattopadhyay

MD5 and SHA-1 are widely studied hash functions in cryptanalysis, owing to their well-structured round functions and historical significance in cryptography. This paper presents improved quantum circuit implementations of MD5 and SHA-1 specifically optimized for quantum cryptanalysis. We reduce the quantum implementation cost of auxiliary functions and eliminate the use of ancilla qubits, while reducing circuit depth (the number of sequential gate layers) by parallelizing multiple additions in the round operations of MD5 and SHA-1. Additionally, the quantum implementations of MD5 and SHA-1 are optimized by considering a fixed input size under the attack scenario. The proposed implementations achieve a 63% improvement in the depth - qubit count metric for MD5 and a 27% improvement for SHA-1 compared to previous works. By providing reduced quantum resources, this work establishes an improved baseline for the quantum cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA-1. We analyze quantum attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, showing that the preimage attacks require a full depth of 279 and 296 for MD5 and SHA-1, respectively, while the collision attacks require a full depth of 254 and 264. For a realistic evaluation, we also estimate the quantum resources for fault-tolerant quantum computation, including the number of physical qubits and the runtime, to break MD5 and SHA-1.

IEEE Access•Jan 1, 2026•1 citation

Applying Grover’s Algorithm to Synergy: Quantum Resource Estimates

Honghan Yan

Synergy is a lightweight block cipher designed for resource-constrained environments, featuring a 1024-bit key, a 64-bit block size, and a 16-round Feistel network structure. This paper presents a complete quantum circuit implementation of the Synergy cipher and evaluates its resistance against quantum key-search attacks within the framework of Grover’s algorithm. The circuit design maps both the XOR128 pseudo-random number generator and the Feistel round function into reversible quantum circuits. By employing time-multiplexed ancilla reuse and uncomputation of intermediate states, the entire Grover oracle is implemented using only CNOT gates, without requiring Toffoli gates or X gates. Furthermore, through register reuse and reversible state restoration techniques, the oracle satisfies the unitary and reversible requirements of Grover search, requiring 2400 qubits and 5376 CNOT gates. The security evaluation shows that the quantum key-search complexity of Synergy with a 1024-bit key is on the order of O(2512) under Grover’s algorithm, which significantly exceeds the practical quantum resource overhead of AES-128 Grover exhaustive search attacks and meets the requirements of NIST Level 1 security, providing substantial post-quantum security margins.

International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Algorithms (CAIBDA)•Jun 1, 2026•0 citations
This paper presents a hardware-conscious analysis of the quantum acceleration of the classical 3-round Keccak-256 preimage attack using Grover's Algorithm. While the theoretical quantum speed-up from T_cl=2^{57.8} (classical) to T_qu = 2^{28.9} (quantum) is mathematically sound, the practical implementation overhead is so extreme that attacks remain wholly infeasible in both resource and runtime dimensions. Using Qiskit-based circuit synthesis, we derive that a 3-round Keccak quantum oracle requires: 9,600 Toffoli gates (with uncomputation for reversibility); 3,200 logical qubits (1,600 state + 1,600 auxiliary); 7.47 * 10^{13} total 2-qubit gates (full Grover search); 3.2 million physical qubits (with quantum error correction)PROHIBITIVE; 0.12 years (43 days) to 2,365+ years execution time, depending on machine assumptions. These barriers -- particularly the physical qubit requirements, circuit depth, and error accumulation -- render the quantum attack infeasible for any foreseeable quantum computer. Consequently, SHA-3 security is not threatened by quantum computers for preimage attacks. We emphasize the critical importance of hardware-aware complexity analysis in quantum cryptanalysis: the elegant asymptotic theory of Grover's Algorithm hides an engineering overhead so prohibitive that the quantum approach becomes infeasible from both resource and implementation perspectives.
Quantum software frameworks provide software engineers with the tools to study quantum algorithms as applied to practical problems. We implement classical hash functions MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 as quantum oracles to study the computational resource requirements of conducting a preimage attack with Grover's Algorithm. We introduce an improvement to the SHA-3 oracle that reduces the number of logical qubits required in the Keccak block permutation by 40%. The source code is available athttps://github.com/rhpreston/grovers-hash-functions.
Fault-tolerant quantum computing poses known theoretical risks to symmetric cryptography. Specifically, Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic advantage in unstructured search scenarios, effectively halving the security margin of hash functions against preimage attacks. This study mathematically models the theoretical preimage resistance of the SHAKE-256 extendable-output function. Using a constrained keyspace derived from the WebSRC dataset (6,400 HTML structures), ]classical O(N) brute-force requirements with the O(N)O(\sqrt N )O(N​) bound of quantum amplitude amplification are compared. For this specific bounds-testing scenario, the theoretical model demonstrates a 103-fold reduction in target acquisition queries. Current literature on quantum resource requirements, including logical qubit and T-gate depth estimates, noting the significant engineering obstacles that remain for implementing Keccak-f [1600] on near-term hardware is reviewed. The analysis confirms the established necessity of selecting adequate output lengths in SHA-3 constructions to ensure post-quantum resilience.
Abstract In this paper we provide a framework for applying classical search and preprocessing to quantum oracles for use with Grover’s quantum search algorithm in order to lower the quantum circuit-complexity of Grover’s algorithm for single-target search problems. This has the effect (for certain problems) of reducing a portion of the polynomial overhead contributed by the implementation cost of quantum oracles and can be used to provide either strict improvements or advantageous trade-offs in circuit-complexity. Our results indicate that it is possible for quantum oracles for certain single-target preimage search problems to reduce the quantum circuit-size from O 2 n / 2 ⋅ m C O(2n/2⋅mC)O\left(2^{n/2}\cdot mC\right)O(2n/2⋅mC) (where C originates from the cost of implementing the quantum oracle) to O ( 2 n / 2 ⋅ m C ) O(2n/2⋅mC)O(2^{n/2} \cdot m\sqrt{C})O(2n/2⋅mC​) without the use of quantum ram, whilst also slightly reducing the number of required qubits. This framework captures a previous optimisation of Grover’s algorithm using preprocessing [21] applied to cryptanalysis, providing new asymptotic analysis. We additionally provide insights and asymptotic improvements on recent cryptanalysis [16] of SIKE [14] via Grover’s algorithm, demonstrating that the speedup applies to this attack and impacting upon quantum security estimates [16] incorporated into the SIKE specification [14].
With the advancement of quantum computing, traditional hash based security structures are increasingly exposed to threats posed by quantum algorithms. In particular, Grover's algorithm enables significantly faster pre-image attacks on hash functions than classical approaches, highlighting the need for circuit-level quantum countermeasures. To break with quantum computer, implementation of quantum circuit for the hash function is essential. However, the existing approaches require too many gates or discard ancilla qubits. In this paper, we propose a reversible quantum circuit for theθ\thetaθoperation in the Keccak algorithm a core component of SHA-3, by explicitly implementing the inverse functionθ−1\theta^{-1}θ−1. The proposed circuit allows for ancilla qubit reuse and achieves a substantial reduction in number of CNOT gates and qubits compare to previous researches. While the depth of our circuit slightly exceeds that of some existing approaches, the compact and modular design of theθ\thetaθoperation provides a solid foundation for further enhancement.
MD5 and SHA-1 are widely studied hash functions in cryptanalysis, owing to their well-structured round functions and historical significance in cryptography. This paper presents improved quantum circuit implementations of MD5 and SHA-1 specifically optimized for quantum cryptanalysis. We reduce the quantum implementation cost of auxiliary functions and eliminate the use of ancilla qubits, while reducing circuit depth (the number of sequential gate layers) by parallelizing multiple additions in the round operations of MD5 and SHA-1. Additionally, the quantum implementations of MD5 and SHA-1 are optimized by considering a fixed input size under the attack scenario. The proposed implementations achieve a 63% improvement in the depth - qubit count metric for MD5 and a 27% improvement for SHA-1 compared to previous works. By providing reduced quantum resources, this work establishes an improved baseline for the quantum cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA-1. We analyze quantum attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, showing that the preimage attacks require a full depth of 279 and 296 for MD5 and SHA-1, respectively, while the collision attacks require a full depth of 254 and 264. For a realistic evaluation, we also estimate the quantum resources for fault-tolerant quantum computation, including the number of physical qubits and the runtime, to break MD5 and SHA-1.
Synergy is a lightweight block cipher designed for resource-constrained environments, featuring a 1024-bit key, a 64-bit block size, and a 16-round Feistel network structure. This paper presents a complete quantum circuit implementation of the Synergy cipher and evaluates its resistance against quantum key-search attacks within the framework of Grover’s algorithm. The circuit design maps both the XOR128 pseudo-random number generator and the Feistel round function into reversible quantum circuits. By employing time-multiplexed ancilla reuse and uncomputation of intermediate states, the entire Grover oracle is implemented using only CNOT gates, without requiring Toffoli gates or X gates. Furthermore, through register reuse and reversible state restoration techniques, the oracle satisfies the unitary and reversible requirements of Grover search, requiring 2400 qubits and 5376 CNOT gates. The security evaluation shows that the quantum key-search complexity of Synergy with a 1024-bit key is on the order of O(2512) under Grover’s algorithm, which significantly exceeds the practical quantum resource overhead of AES-128 Grover exhaustive search attacks and meets the requirements of NIST Level 1 security, providing substantial post-quantum security margins.