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International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Algorithms (CAIBDA)

Applying Grover’s Algorithm to Synergy: Quantum Resource Estimates

Honghan Yan

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Synergy is a lightweight block cipher designed for resource-constrained environments, featuring a 1024-bit key, a 64-bit block size, and a 16-round Feistel network structure. This paper presents a complete quantum circuit implementation of the Synergy cipher and evaluates its resistance against quantum key-search attacks within the framework of Grover’s algorithm. The circuit design maps both the XOR128 pseudo-random number generator and the Feistel round function into reversible quantum circuits. By employing time-multiplexed ancilla reuse and uncomputation of intermediate states, the entire Grover oracle is implemented using only CNOT gates, without requiring Toffoli gates or X gates. Furthermore, through register reuse and reversible state restoration techniques, the oracle satisfies the unitary and reversible requirements of Grover search, requiring 2400 qubits and 5376 CNOT gates. The security evaluation shows that the quantum key-search complexity of Synergy with a 1024-bit key is on the order of O(2512) under Grover’s algorithm, which significantly exceeds the practical quantum resource overhead of AES-128 Grover exhaustive search attacks and meets the requirements of NIST Level 1 security, providing substantial post-quantum security margins.

DOI
10.1109/caibda70336.2026.11621700

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Synergy is a lightweight block cipher designed for resource-constrained environments, featuring a 1024-bit key, a 64-bit block size, and a 16-round Feistel network structure. This paper presents a complete quantum circuit implementation of the Synergy cipher and evaluates its resistance against quantum key-search attacks within the framework of Grover’s algorithm. The circuit design maps both the XOR128 pseudo-random number generator and the Feistel round function into reversible quantum circuits. By employing time-multiplexed ancilla reuse and uncomputation of intermediate states, the entire Grover oracle is implemented using only CNOT gates, without requiring Toffoli gates or X gates. Furthermore, through register reuse and reversible state restoration techniques, the oracle satisfies the unitary and reversible requirements of Grover search, requiring 2400 qubits and 5376 CNOT gates. The security evaluation shows that the quantum key-search complexity of Synergy with a 1024-bit key is on the order of O(2512) under Grover’s algorithm, which significantly exceeds the practical quantum resource overhead of AES-128 Grover exhaustive search attacks and meets the requirements of NIST Level 1 security, providing substantial post-quantum security margins.
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With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum circuit implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are essential for evaluating their resistance to quantum attacks. As an ISO-standardized cipher, the efficient quantum circuit construction of Camellia is of great significance. Focusing on minimizing the DW-cost (qubits × Toffoli-depth) while balancing ancilla qubits and Toffoli-depth, this paper proposes an optimized quantum circuit design for Camellia. Specifically: (1) using a serial-multiplication and out-of-place inversion architecture under composite-field decomposition, combined with hierarchical screening for parallelizing bilinear multiplications, a compact in-place S-box quantum circuit is constructed with a DW-cost of 276, 28% lower than the state of the art; (2) a low-gate-count linear-layer circuit is obtained via heuristic search, and gate-sequence reordering then reduces the full depth from 9 to 7 without increasing the gate count; (3) Camellia-128/192/256 quantum circuits are constructed with DW-costs of 119,168, 257,664, and 257,664, achieving reductions of 48%, 52%, and 52% respectively over prior work. A pipelined Grover oracle is further designed and the total resources required for a full Grover search attacking Camellia are evaluated. For Camellia-128, the complete Grover search requires a T-depth of 2.10 × 2⁷⁶ and a total TDW-cost (qubits × T-depth) of 1.00 × 2⁸⁶, reducing T-depth by 75% and TDW-cost by 84% over prior work. The first full Grover search resource estimates for Camellia-192/256 are also presented, with T-depths of 7.20 × 2¹⁰⁸ and 8.11 × 2¹⁴⁰ and TDW-costs of 2.03 × 2¹²³ and 2.79 × 2¹⁵³, respectively. These results show that Grover's attack on Camellia requires fewer quantum resources than on AES at the 128-bit level, implying comparatively weaker post-quantum security at that key size, while the picture reverses at larger key sizes (Section 4).
In this paper, we propose a quantum circuit for the SPEEDY block cipher for the first time and estimate its security strength based on the post-quantum security strength presented by NIST. The strength of post-quantum security for symmetric key cryptography is estimated at the cost of the Grover key retrieval algorithm. Grover’s algorithm in quantum computers reduces the n-bit security of block ciphers to n2 bits. The implementation of a quantum circuit is required to estimate the Grover’s algorithm cost for the target cipher. We estimate the quantum resource required for Grover’s algorithm by implementing a quantum circuit for SPEEDY in an optimized way and show that SPEEDY provides either 128-bit security (i.e., NIST security level 1) or 192-bit security (i.e., NIST security level 3) depending on the number of rounds. Based on our estimated cost, increasing the number of rounds is insufficient to satisfy the security against quantum attacks on quantum computers.
Quantum search algorithms, such as Grover's algorithm, will soon pose a threat to current encryption standards as quantum computing advances toward practical implementation. These algorithms rely on quantum circuits that map cryptographic algorithms into appropriate Hilbert spaces, thus linking algorithmic inputs and outputs through quantum superposition. However, implementing and testing such circuits on existing quantum simulators, such as Qiskit, encounters significant memory and computational bottlenecks that limit research progress. To address these simulation constraints, we present a resource-optimized quantum circuit implementation of a complete two-round Mini-AES encryption algorithm. Our approach systematically converts the cipher's algebraic structure using algebraic normal form (ANF) equations, mapping XOR operations to CNOT gates and AND operations to Toffoli gates. To reduce memory overhead, we implement an ancilla-reuse strategy utilizing mid-circuit measurements and resets. Additionally, we introduce an automated procedure that generates Qiskitcompatible quantum circuits for arbitrary S-boxes and cryptographic primitives, streamlining the development of quantum cryptanalysis implementations. Our implementation achieves full encryption and decryption in a quantum circuit with modest gate requirements that can be achieved by the current or near-future state of the art quantum computers. In addition, we provide system utilization metrics to validate our resource-constrained implementation. This compact and pedagogically accessible implementation establishes a practical foundation for quantum cryptanalysis research and post-quantum cryptographic analysis.
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.