What are the physical requirements for agency? We investigate whether a purely quantum system (one evolving unitarily in a coherent regime without decoherence or collapse) can satisfy three minimal conditions for agency: an agent must be able to create a world-model, use it to evaluate the likely consequences of alternative actions, and reliably perform the action that maximizes expected utility. We show that the first two conditions conflict with the no-cloning theorem, which forbids copying unknown quantum states: world-model construction requires copying information from the environment, and deliberation requires copying the world-model to assess multiple actions. Approximate cloning strategies do not permit sufficient fidelity or generality for agency to be viable in purely quantum systems. The third agency condition also fails due to the linearity of quantum dynamics. These results imply four key consequences. First, agency requires significant classical resources, placing clear constraints on its physical basis. Second, they provide insight into how classical agents emerge within a quantum universe. Third, they show that quantum computers cannot straightforwardly simulate agential behavior without significant classical components. Finally, they challenge quantum theories of agency, free will, and consciousness.
What are the physical requirements for agency? We investigate whether a purely quantum system (one evolving unitarily in a coherent regime without decoherence or collapse) can satisfy three minimal conditions for agency: an agent must be able to create a world-model, use it to evaluate the likely consequences of alternative actions, and reliably perform the action that maximizes expected utility. We show that the first two conditions conflict with the no-cloning theorem, which forbids copying unknown quantum states: world-model construction requires copying information from the environment, and deliberation requires copying the world-model to assess multiple actions. Approximate cloning strategies do not permit sufficient fidelity or generality for agency to be viable in purely quantum systems. The third agency condition also fails due to the linearity of quantum dynamics. These results imply four key consequences. First, agency requires significant classical resources, placing clear constraints on its physical basis. Second, they provide insight into how classical agents emerge within a quantum universe. Third, they show that quantum computers cannot straightforwardly simulate agential behavior without significant classical components. Finally, they challenge quantum theories of agency, free will, and consciousness.
What are the physical conditions required for agency? Recent work has rigorously shown that purely unitary, coherence-preserving quantum dynamics are insufficient to support deliberation, comparison of counterfactual actions, and reliable action selection. These results establish a genuine no-go theorem for agency in a strictly quantum-coherent regime. This paper provides a structural completion of that no-go result. Rather than challenging its correctness, the analysis identifies the underlying assumption on which it rests: that unitarity alone is sufficient as an admissibility criterion for decision endpoints. We show that this assumption is incomplete. Working within the Tier-0 closure framework, physical lawfulness is characterized by closure-stable fixed points selected by structural constraints rather than by unconstrained dynamical evolution. Within this framework, coherent quantum states may function as intermediate computational or representational states but are excluded as lawful endpoints for records, decisions, and control. Applying closure stability to quantum systems yields a classical decision subspace without introducing new dynamics, observer-dependent postulates, or interpretation-specific assumptions. The paper further shows that agency requires a closure-stable internal selection process capable of consistent expected-utility comparison. Imposing closure compatibility rigidly fixes the standard quadratic Born probability rule as the only weighting compatible with stability, representation-independence, and admissibility-preserving re-expression. Together, these results integrate agency into the same structural framework that accounts for quantum measurement and probability. The absence of agency in purely quantum-coherent models is shown to reflect an under-constrained admissibility regime rather than a fundamental limitation of quantum theory. Lawful agency emerges as a closure-stable property of coupled agent–world dynamics, fully consistent with standard quantum mechanics. This work clarifies the physical limits of purely quantum models of decision, sharpens existing no-go arguments, and provides a mathematically explicit foundation for agency grounded in structural admissibility rather than interpretation.
In a recent analysis, Adlam, McQueen, and Waegell (arXiv:2510.13247) argue that agency cannot be a purely quantum phenomenon, demonstrating that world-model construction, deliberation over alternative actions, and reliable action selection require classical resources to circumvent the quantum no-cloning theorem and the linearity of unitary dynamics. In this note, we compare their decision-theoretic conditions for agency against the operator-algebraic architecture of the "It from I" framework. While we concur with their primary conclusion that agency requires a classical resource, we suggest that such a resource—and its associated preferred basis—need not emerge via external environmental decoherence (einselection) or state collapse. Within the "It from I" framework, every active Observer (O = M ⊗ B) equipped with an internal utility architecture acts as an Agent across two complementary levels: first, the Body (B) autogenously establishes a preferred orthogonal measurement basis via its metabolically funded collective mode (the Handle), while the unitary Cerf-Adami perceptual chain (W ↔ B ↔ M) generates a diagonal reduced Mind-Body density matrix ρ_MB that provides the classical resource required for decision-theoretic agency; second, the joint Mind-Body (M ⊗ B) Anti-Zeno state purification (𝒫 → 1) elevates those Body-prepared deliberative states into conscious awareness, explaining why the quantum mechanics is not redundant and how an agent consciously experiences its decisions within a globally unitary block universe.
Darwinian evolution requires (i) heritable records, (ii) repeatable copying with variation, and (iii) routine irreversibility. Categorical quantum mechanics (CQM) makes precise why ``copy'' and ``delete'' are not generic quantum operations: they exist only for a realized \emph{classical data} sector (a preferred basis/observable; a commutative structure). Decoherence explains how a pointer basis can be selected dynamically, but it does not by itself select a unique outcome. This motivates a neutral presentation of the main ontological options (unique-history, decohered multiplicity, agent-relative facticity, and a stochastic foundation with variable diffusion). We also note the relevance of the ``agency constraint'' argued by Adlam-McQueen-Waegell: in a strictly coherent, basis-unselected ``purely quantum'' regime, minimal agency fails due to no-cloning and linearity, which sharpens the role of classical resources for record-based processes. Extended Wigner's Friend scenarios then serve as a stress test, since they treat ``friends'' simultaneously as coherent quantum systems and as agents possessing stable records. Finally, a stochastic-mechanics foundation (with variable diffusion) offers a continuous bridge between quantum and classical regimes, and suggests a principled way to implement measurement update as conditioning plus a time-symmetric minimal-change rule.
What are the physical conditions required for agency?Recent work has rigorously shown that purely unitary, coherence-preserving quantum dynamics are insufficient to support deliberation, comparison of counterfactual actions, and reliable action selection. These results establish a genuine no-go theorem for agency in a strictly quantum-coherent regime.This paper provides a structural completion of that no-go result. Rather than challenging its correctness, the analysis identifies the underlying assumption on which it rests: that unitarity alone is sufficient as an admissibility criterion for decision endpoints. We show that this assumption is incomplete.Working within the Tier-0 closure framework, physical lawfulness is characterized by closure-stable fixed points selected by structural constraints rather than by unconstrained dynamical evolution. Within this framework, coherent quantum states may function as intermediate computational or representational states but are excluded as lawful endpoints for records, decisions, and control.Applying closure stability to quantum systems yields a classical decision subspace without introducing new dynamics, observer-dependent postulates, or interpretation-specific assumptions. The paper further shows that agency requires a closure-stable internal selection process capable of consistent expected-utility comparison. Imposing closure compatibility rigidly fixes the standard quadratic Born probability rule as the only weighting compatible with stability, representation-independence, and admissibility-preserving re-expression.Together, these results integrate agency into the same structural framework that accounts for quantum measurement and probability. The absence of agency in purely quantum-coherent models is shown to reflect an under-constrained admissibility regime rather than a fundamental limitation of quantum theory. Lawful agency emerges as a closure-stable property of coupled agent–world dynamics, fully consistent with standard quantum mechanics.This work clarifies the physical limits of purely quantum models of decision, sharpens existing no-go arguments, and provides a mathematically explicit foundation for agency grounded in structural admissibility rather than interpretation. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18028427
Creating machines that are conscious is a long-term objective of research in artificial intelligence. This paper looks at this idea with new arguments from physics and logic. Observers have no place in classical physics, and although they play a role in measurement in quantum physics there is no explanation for their emergence within the framework. There is a suggestion that consciousness, which is implicitly a property of the observer, is a consequence of the complexity of specific brain structures, but this is problematic because one associates free will with consciousness, which goes counter to the causal closure of physics. Considering a nested physical system, we argue that even if the system were assumed to have agency, observers cannot exist within it. Since complex systems can be viewed in nested hierarchies, this constitutes a proof against consciousness as a product of complexity, for then we will have nested system of conscious agents. As the existence of consciousness in cognitive agents cannot be denied, the implication is that consciousness belongs to a dimension that is not physical and machine consciousness is unattainable. These ideas are used to take a fresh look at two well-known paradoxes of quantum theory that are important in quantum information theory.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.