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arXiv:2509.11695

Time-Based State-Management of Hash-Based Signature CAs for VPN-Authentication

Daniel Herzinger, Heise, Linus, Daniel Loebenberger, Söllner, Matthias

Published Sep 15, 2025• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Advances in quantum computing necessitate migrating the entire technology stack to post-quantum cryptography. This includes IPsec-based VPN connection authentication. Although there is an RFC draft for post-quantum authentication in this setting, the draft does not consider (stateful) hash-based signatures despite their small signature size and trusted long-term security. We propose a design with time-based state-management that assigns VPN devices a certificate authority (CA) based on the hash-based signature scheme XMSS. The CA then issues leaf certificates which are based on classical cryptography but have a short validity time, e. g., four hours. It is to be expected that even large quantum computers will take significantly longer to break the cryptography, making the design quantum-secure. We propose strategies to make the timekeeping more resilient to faults and tampering, as well as strategies to recognize a wrong system time, minimize its potential damage, and quickly recover. The result is an OpenBSD implementation of a quantum-safe and, regarding the leaf certificates, highly flexible VPN authentication design that requires significantly less bandwidth and computational resources compared to existing alternatives.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2509.11695

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Advances in quantum computing necessitate migrating the entire technology stack to post-quantum cryptography. This includes IPsec-based VPN connection authentication. Although there is an RFC draft for post-quantum authentication in this setting, the draft does not consider (stateful) hash-based signatures despite their small signature size and trusted long-term security. We propose a design with time-based state-management that assigns VPN devices a certificate authority (CA) based on the hash-based signature scheme XMSS. The CA then issues leaf certificates which are based on classical cryptography but have a short validity time, e. g., four hours. It is to be expected that even large quantum computers will take significantly longer to break the cryptography, making the design quantum-secure. We propose strategies to make the timekeeping more resilient to faults and tampering, as well as strategies to recognize a wrong system time, minimize its potential damage, and quickly recover. The result is an OpenBSD implementation of a quantum-safe and, regarding the leaf certificates, highly flexible VPN authentication design that requires significantly less bandwidth and computational resources compared to existing alternatives.
The urgent threat posed by cryptographically significant quantum computers (CRQC) necessitates a global transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Current standardization efforts, notably in IETF drafts, focus predominantly on hybrid constructions, which introduce operational complexity, dual overhead, and retain partial security dependence on quantum-vulnerable primitives. This paper is in effort of StrongVPN, a novel protocol and implementation that achieves end-to-end quantum resistance without hybrid dependencies which is lift and scale model. Our architecture integrates ML-DSA-65 choosen for authentication and ML-KEM-768 for key exchange in a unified, certificate-free** handshake, offering a simplified trust model compared to complex X.509/PKI requirements, reducing overheads. The implementation emphasizes performance through low-level mathematical optimizations, including Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) for efficient polynomial arithmetic, and stringent constant-time operations for side-channel resilience. Empirical evaluation validates its practical feasibility, demonstrating a mean end-to-end handshake latency of only 127ms on commodity infrastructure, despite a necessary 14.1KB cryptographic overhead. StrongVPN establishes a critical, high-performance baseline for pure PQC network security, offering a simplified and accelerated migration path to full quantum safety solution.
The urgent threat posed by cryptographically significant quantum computers (CRQC) necessitates a global transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Current standardization efforts, notably in IETF drafts, focus predominantly on hybrid constructions, which introduce operational complexity, dual overhead, and retain partial security dependence on quantum-vulnerable primitives. This paper is in effort of StrongVPN, a novel protocol and implementation that achieves end-to-end quantum resistance without hybrid dependencies which is lift and scale model. Our architecture integrates ML-DSA-65 choosen for authentication and ML-KEM-768 for key exchange in a unified, certificate-free** handshake, offering a simplified trust model compared to complex X.509/PKI requirements, reducing overheads. The implementation emphasizes performance through low-level mathematical optimizations, including Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) for efficient polynomial arithmetic, and stringent constant-time operations for side-channel resilience. Empirical evaluation validates its practical feasibility, demonstrating a mean end-to-end handshake latency of only 127ms on commodity infrastructure, despite a necessary 14.1KB cryptographic overhead. StrongVPN establishes a critical, high-performance baseline for pure PQC network security, offering a simplified and accelerated migration path to full quantum safety solution.
The fast development of quantum computing presents a great threat to the security of classical cryptographic algorithms that support secure communication systems like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). RSA and ECC algorithms that are commonly employed in key exchange and digital authentication can fall victim to quantum attacks from Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. This study introduces the design and deployment of a post-quantum-resistant VPN protocol using post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives, i.e., Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures. The suggested structure is incorporated into OpenVPN via the Open Quantum Safe (OQS) framework for uninterrupted post-quantum compatibility. The protocol is also capable of supporting hybrid cryptography for smooth transition from classical to post-quantum systems. Performance benchmarks are performed over metrics like handshake latency, tunnel throughput, CPU usage, and certificate overhead. The findings illustrate that post-quantum secure VPNs are not only achievable but also feasible for near-future deployment. This work adds a future-proof framework to improve the resilience of secure communications in the post-quantum era with a focus on scalability, crypto-agility, and real-world implementation readiness.
With the rapid development of quantum technologies, quantum-safe cryptography has found significant attention. Hash-based signature schemes have been in particular of interest because of (i) the importance of digital signature as the main source of trust on the Internet, (ii) the fact that the security of these signatures relies on existence of one-way functions, which is the minimal assumption for signature schemes, and (iii) they can be efficiently implemented. Basic hash-based signatures are for a single message, but have been extended for signing multiple messages. In this paper we design a Multi-message Signature Scheme (MSS) based on an existing One-Time Signature (OTS) that we refer to as KSN-OTS. KSN uses SWIFFT, an additive homomorphic lattice-based hash function family with provable one-wayness property, as the one-way-function and achieves a short signature. We prove security of our proposed signature scheme in a new strengthened security model (multi-target multi-function) of MSS, determine the system parameters for 512 bit classical (256 bit quantum) security, and compare parameter sizes of our scheme against XMSS, a widely studied hash based MSS that has been a candidate for NIST standardization of post-quantum signature scheme. We give an efficient implementation of our scheme using Intel SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) instruction set. For this, we first implement SWIFFT computation using a SIMD parallelization of Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) of elements of the ring Zp[X]/(Xn+1), that can support different levels of parallelization. We compare efficiency of this implementation with a comparable (security level) implementation of XMSS and show its superior performance on a number of efficiency parameters.
The emergence of quantum computing threatens the security assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems across modern digital infrastructures. This challenge has accelerated the development of post-quantum cryptographic primitives capable of resisting quantum-capable adversaries. Among these, hash-based signature schemes are widely recognized as strong post-quantum candidates because their security relies solely on cryptographic hash functions. However, existing multi-time hash-based signature schemes, such as XMSS, rely on Merkle-tree structures to manage one-time signature keys, resulting in additional computational, communication, and verification overhead due to authentication-path construction and traversal.
We are surrounded by many smart applications that make human life efficient. The general concept of IoT applications involves communication between devices. To make our smart environment secure, authentication is the most important requirement to be achieved to avoid unwanted attacks. Cryptographic schemes used currently in such IoT devices are public-key cryptographic primitives that are vulnerable to future quantum attacks. Quantum approaches derived by Shor and Grover will break the public-key primitives with square root and cube root speedups. Hence, there is a need to develop a successful and efficient signature scheme to authenticate such devices. Post-quantum cryptographic approaches are based on hard mathematical problems which are difficult to break by future attacks. Amongst all these post-quantum signature approaches, hash-based post-quantum signatures incorporate existing hash algorithms to achieve the required security level. This paper summarises stateful hash-based post-quantum signature schemes that can be implemented on constrained devices for IoT applications.