We comment on the fact that certain mathematical models that have been proposed in the quantum gravity literature, may not be subject to experimental checks, even if they turn out to be mathematically well defined. This means that they would be indistinguishable from other models, with a smaller number of quantum states. These considerations follow from very general properties of quantum measurement theory and classical gravity.
We comment on the fact that certain mathematical models that have been proposed in the quantum gravity literature, may not be subject to experimental checks, even if they turn out to be mathematically well defined. This means that they would be indistinguishable from other models, with a smaller number of quantum states. These considerations follow from very general properties of quantum measurement theory and classical gravity.
The concept of physical object in twentieth century's physical theories (relativity and quanta) turns from intuitive-substantial to formal-functional, that is to a relatively invariable properties system well beyond the intuitive properties “carrier” typical of classical physics (CP). Anyway, the autonomous heuristic fecundity of this formal mathematical model neither was fully shown before the twentieth century nor, moreover, is independent of the properties it correlates. In quantum mechanics (QM) the turn to such purely functional correlation, which is nevertheless irreducible to mere information related to measurements, is historically evidenced by the fact that the formalization of the theory as an operator calculus in Hilbert space came before its physical interpretation. Dirac, moreover, asserted the irreducibility of quantum properties to mere measurements, just because this simply pragmatic reduction is poor and ambiguous in front of a mathematical formulation of linguistically expressible (even though not always experimentally decidable) properties. Neither a falsificationist interpretation of scientific theories, which makes them empirically decidable even though irreducible to mere instrumental theories, fits the purpose. It is then safer, and in better agreement with historical testimony, to admit not only the existence of properties which are measurable and reducible to instrumental operations, or at least falsifiable, but also the existence of properties which are physically inaccessible or empirically untestable, since properties of this kind are described and fruitfully implied by the mathematical model.
Some notes about quantum physics, an interpretation if one wishes, are put forward, insisting on `closely following the mathematics/formalism, the `nuts and bolts of what quantum physics says'. These, basically well-known, issues seem to highlight some rather bold points about the `logic' aspect in quantum physics, necessarily restricting when and which logic may be admissible. And one may understand why that path is hardly followed in the literature. The mathematics/formalism of quantum, compared with classical, physics, may be fairly basically characterized by non-commutative algebras replacing commutative. These classically appearing, in fact, in dealing with systems of possibilities (say, all possible planetary motions under gravity of which one is the actual one). In particular, contrary to too common usage, the quantum non-commutativity should make it impossible to simply `transcend' the `system of possibilities' aspect into a `yes-no' logic essential for an `actual world'. One may have the latter only in a `haven' of approximately commutative algebras of `quasi-classical macroscopic observables', and moreover that `yes-no actual world' would plainly be an `extra ingredient' to the base quantum theory itself.
A formal system of science is presented as a more powerful basis for fundamental physics. Rather than starting with an axiomatic theory of physics as is typically done (quantum mechanics, general relativity, classical mechanics, etc), we instead had the idea to start at the level of science by designing a formal system of science. Our goal was then to attempt, as a challenge, to derive fundamental physics from the system. This exercise turned out surprisingly productive; correcting definitions and resolving open problems spawning philosophy, mathematics, science (philosophy of) and physics. Some of our notable results include a definition of experimental data (done purely mathematically), a definition of the observer (again done purely mathematically), and a derivation of fundamental physics as the product of the scientific method (and thus, we allege, done uncontroversially). This group of results constitutes the primary items of modern theoretical physics currently missing mathematical formalization. The first part of the paper consists of constructing an experimental basis that is purely mathematical. For this we employ the set of all halting programs and we leverage modern notions of undecidability to produce a system that never runs out of new knowledge to discover, supporting a perpetual application of the scientific method. The system culminates in a definition for the observer in terms of a measure space over halting programs, such that maximizing its entropy produces a quantum-computation model of physics able to support, remarkably, up to quantum gravity. Finally, testable predictions are proposed.
About twenty years ago, we proposed the mathematical formulation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and further, we concluded that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and EPR-paradox are not contradictory. This is true, however we now think that we should have argued about it under a certain firm interpretation of quantum mechanics. Recently we proposed the linguistic quantum interpretation (called quantum and classical measurement theory), which was characterized as a kind of metaphysical and linguistic turn of the Copenhagen interpretation. This turn from physics to language does not only extend quantum theory to classical systems but also yield the quantum mechanical world view (i.e., the philosophy of quantum mechanics, in other words, quantum philosophy). In fact, we can consider that traditional philosophies have progressed toward quantum philosophy. In this paper, we first review the linguistic quantum interpretation, and further, clarify the relation between EPR-paradox and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. That is, the linguistic interpretation says that EPR-paradox is closely related to the fact that syllogism does not generally hold in quantum physics. This fact should be compared to the non-locality of Bell's inequality.