Classically, it is well-known that several fundamental cryptographic primitives, including one-way functions, pseudorandom number generators, commitments, and signatures, characterize the same cryptographic world, which is known as "Minicrypt". In this paper, we investigate to what extent this picture persists in the quantum-computation classical-communication (QCCC) setting, where parties may perform quantum local computation, but communicate through only classical messages.
We demonstrate that the classical Minicrypt landscape breaks down in the QCCC model by oracle separations. We construct two oracle worlds where efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles (EV-OWPuzz) exist. By a known equivalence, QCCC one-time signatures also exist in both worlds. In the first, one-way functions do not exist, even if we allow quantum pseudodeterministic evaluation. In the second, QCCC bit commitments do not exist. Thus, the classical Minicrypt reductions from signatures to one-way functions and bit commitments have no fully black-box counterparts in the QCCC setting. Our proofs develop techniques for analyzing the random phase states, including a concentration theorem and an LOCC decoupling theorem.
As a separate result, we establish quantum sum-binding for the NOVY protocol, settling the question of its post-quantum security. We also generalize it to a fully black-box construction of a QCCC commitment from EV-OWPuzz with nearly uniform puzzle distribution, complementing our oracle separation results.
We show that if quantum commitments exist, then either there is no polynomial-time solution to the unitary synthesis problem, or
BPP=NEXP. Thus, showing unconditionally that quantum commitments exist would require answering at least one of two longstanding open questions in complexity theory. We prove our main result as a consequence of a more general lemma, which shows that every unitary in
unitaryPSPACE either cannot be synthesized efficiently relative to any classical oracle, or can be synthesized efficiently with an oracle for
NEXP search problems. Our lemma has other noteworthy consequences, including that certain oracle separations involving
unitaryPSPACE would imply breakthrough classical lower bounds such as
NC=NP.
Along the way, we propose new definitions for the unitary complexity classes
unitaryP and
unitaryPSPACE. Our changes address the biggest conceptual issues with definitions suggested in prior work, and lead to elegant proofs. We study both implementations that erase garbage and implementations that allow it, because we cannot rule out the possibility that the two definitions differ. Nevertheless, we show that both definitions can be viewed as special cases of each other. We also showcase many other ways in which our definitions are robust. For example, we show that
unitaryPSPACE has an equivalent characterization as the set of unitary transformations whose entries can be computed to arbitrary precision in polynomial space. Consequently, we deduce that
unitaryPSPACE can generically erase garbage, a result that provably fails relative to unitary oracles.
Randomness certification aims to guarantee that the output of an untrusted quantum device contains genuine randomness that remains unpredictable even given quantum side information held by an adversary. For a classical verifier interacting with a single quantum device, such a guarantee cannot rely on the physical separation underlying standard Bell tests and must instead follow from computational restrictions on the prover. Building on the framework of Computational Bell Inequalities, we distinguish classical and quantum virtual-input hiding, showing that the former suffices for proofs of quantumness, whereas the latter enables randomness certification against quantum side information.
Our main technical contribution is to establish quantum virtual-input hiding for a commitment-based protocol derived from the proof of quantumness from one-way-functions by Morimae and Yamakawa. We show that statistical hiding together with ordinary computational binding against quantum polynomial-time senders suffices, without requiring stronger quantum binding notions such as sum-binding or collapse-binding. This yields a randomness-certification protocol from post-quantum statistically hiding bit commitments. In particular, existing constructions of such commitments from post-quantum one-way permutations imply that post-quantum one-way permutations suffice for randomness certification.
We further instantiate our construction using quantum-secure trapdoor claw-free functions, obtaining an efficient classical verifier, and in the quantum random oracle model, obtaining randomness certification without additional computational assumptions but with an inefficient verifier. These instantiations separate the cryptographic properties sufficient for randomness certification from the additional structure required for efficient verification within our commitment-based framework.