arXiv:2610.25518
Randomness Certification from Statistically Hiding Commitments
Ilya Merkulov, Rotem Arnon
Abstract
Randomness certification aims to guarantee that the output of an untrusted quantum device contains genuine randomness that remains unpredictable even given quantum side information held by an adversary. For a classical verifier interacting with a single quantum device, such a guarantee cannot rely on the physical separation underlying standard Bell tests and must instead follow from computational restrictions on the prover. Building on the framework of Computational Bell Inequalities, we distinguish classical and quantum virtual-input hiding, showing that the former suffices for proofs of quantumness, whereas the latter enables randomness certification against quantum side information. Our main technical contribution is to establish quantum virtual-input hiding for a commitment-based protocol derived from the proof of quantumness from one-way-functions by Morimae and Yamakawa. We show that statistical hiding together with ordinary computational binding against quantum polynomial-time senders suffices, without requiring stronger quantum binding notions such as sum-binding or collapse-binding. This yields a randomness-certification protocol from post-quantum statistically hiding bit commitments. In particular, existing constructions of such commitments from post-quantum one-way permutations imply that post-quantum one-way permutations suffice for randomness certification. We further instantiate our construction using quantum-secure trapdoor claw-free functions, obtaining an efficient classical verifier, and in the quantum random oracle model, obtaining randomness certification without additional computational assumptions but with an inefficient verifier. These instantiations separate the cryptographic properties sufficient for randomness certification from the additional structure required for efficient verification within our commitment-based framework.
AI Summary
The paper asks which cryptographic properties suffice for a classical verifier interacting with one quantum device to certify randomness against entangled quantum side information. Within the computational Bell-inequality framework, it distinguishes classical virtual-input hiding, sufficient for proofs of quantumness, from quantum virtual-input hiding, which supports entropy certification. It modifies a commitment-based proof of quantumness by combining coherent commitment execution, hashing that isolates one opening per bit, and hidden-BB84-state preparation. The main reduction shows that statistical hiding and ordinary computational binding against quantum polynomial-time senders suffice; sum-binding and collapse-binding are not required. A predictor for the virtual input, an inner product with the concatenated openings, is converted through quantum Goldreich–Levin extraction into an algorithm producing both openings. Conditioned on continuation with probability $p$, CHSH acceptance $\cos^2(\pi/8)-\varepsilon$ implies $H(B\mid T,Y,E)\geq c-O(\sqrt{\varepsilon})-\operatorname{negl}(\lambda)/p$ for a universal $c>0$. Honest continuation is inverse-polynomial. A direct proof uses approximate measurement anticommutation and entropic uncertainty; sequential repetition is analyzed using entropy accumulation. Post-quantum one-way permutations instantiate the required commitments, yielding randomness certification, generally with inefficient verification. Trapdoor claw-free functions provide efficient verification; a quantum-random-oracle instantiation requires exhaustive unique-opening search. Neither instantiation improves existing verification efficiency. Arbitrary post-quantum one-way functions remain insufficiently understood for the required commitment construction. The sequential guarantee keeps Phase-A transcripts private rather than releasing them; public release requires an additional leakage analysis.
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