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arXiv:2409.15942 · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

The separability problem in quantum mechanics: insights from research on axiomatics and human language

Diederik Aerts, Jonito Aerts Arguëlles, Lester Beltran, Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi, Sandro Sozzo

Published Dec 18, 2025• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Einstein’s article on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is the most cited of his works, but not many know that it was not fully representative of the way he thought about the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. Indeed, his main worry was not Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which he accepted, but the experimental non-separability of spatially separate systems. The same problem was also recognized, years later, by one of us, as part of an axiomatic analysis of the quantum formalism, which revealed an unexpected structural limitation of the quantum formalism in Hilbert space, preventing the description of separate systems. As we will explain, this limitation does not manifest at the level of the states, but of the projectors describing the properties, in the sense that there are not enough properties in the formalism to describe separate systems. The question remains whether separability is a possibility at the fundamental level and if a formalism should integrate it into its mathematical structure, as a possibility. To aid our intuition, we offer a reflection based on a powerful analogy between physical systems and human conceptual entities, as the question of separability also arises for the latter. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Newton, Principia, Newton Geneva Edition (17th–19th) and modern Newtonian mechanics: heritage, past & present’.

DOI
10.1098/rsta.2023.0284

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The present conference takes place in the same year that celebrates the centenary of Albert Einstein. Hence it is a good occasion to reflect on those problems which have been at the core of Einstein’s intellectual activity. Undoubtedly the foundation of quantum mechanics (QM) is one of these problems. It is known that Einstein was never convinced by the interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted, in his times and still now, by the majority of physicists. The fact that he was sharing this skepticism with people like Schrödinger and, most of all, the fact that no convincing answer, to the doubts of these people, had emerged in a more than half a century old debate, helped in keeping alive the attention of a growing number of people on this problem.The crucial issue is that the standard interpretation of QM has some physical implications which are experimentally verifiable and which, for several years, have been thought to be incompatible with relativity theory (the so‐called “quantum nonlocality”). On the other hand alternative, more intuitive, interpretations (such as the ensemble interpretation) seemed to be ruled out from very well confirmed experimental data.The way out from this impasse has required a deep analysis of the connections between mathematics and physics as well as the emergence of new ideas both in mathematics (non‐Kolmogorovian probabilities) and in physics (the theory of adaptive systems).The Einstein centenary is a good occasion for a short survey of these developments with the goal of answering the intriguing question posed in the title of the present paper.

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Abstract Einstein’s article on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is the most cited of his works, but not many know that it was not fully representative of the way he thought about the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. Indeed, his main worry was not Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which he accepted, but the experimental non-separability of spatially separate systems. The same problem was also recognized, years later, by one of us, as part of an axiomatic analysis of the quantum formalism, which revealed an unexpected structural limitation of the quantum formalism in Hilbert space, preventing the description of separate systems. As we will explain, this limitation does not manifest at the level of the states, but of the projectors describing the properties, in the sense that there are not enough properties in the formalism to describe separate systems. The question remains whether separability is a possibility at the fundamental level and if a formalism should integrate it into its mathematical structure, as a possibility. To aid our intuition, we offer a reflection based on a powerful analogy between physical systems and human conceptual entities, as the question of separability also arises for the latter. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Newton, Principia, Newton Geneva Edition (17th–19th) and modern Newtonian mechanics: heritage, past & present’.
Two problems with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument originate from the difficult-to-explain continual dismissal of Minkowski’s demonstration that the concept of spacetime represents a real four-dimensional world and is not just a mathematical space. The uncritical employment of the traditional three-dimensional language to the description of this argument leads (e.g., in its Bohm's version) to those problems: (1) due to the collapse of the common wavefunction of the constituents 1 and 2 of a disintegrated system, caused by the measurement of 1's spin (event E1E_{1}E1​), and due the conservation of the total spin, 2's spin is \textit{instantaneously} determined (event E2E_{2}E2​), which in three-dimensional language inescapably means that E2E_{2}E2​ is \textit{caused} by E1E_{1}E1​ (using merely a different word -- `correlation' -- does not explain anything in three-dimensional language); (2) events E1E_{1}E1​ and E2E_{2}E2​ are simultaneous \textit{only} for an observer AAA, who was at rest with respect to the disintegrated system, and therefore the total spin is not conserved for arbitrarily large periods of time for all observers in relative motion with respect to AAA and there exists a class of observers BBB for whom event E2E_{2}E2​ occurs \textit{before} E1E_{1}E1​, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the fundamental implicit assumption that the physical world is three-dimensional. When the reality of spacetime is explicitly recognized, (1) the paradoxes of the non-conservation of the total spin and that E2E_{2}E2​ happens before E1E_{1}E1​ for observers BBB do not arise (because there is no `before' and `after' in spacetime) and the statement that there is a correlation between E1E_{1}E1​ and E2E_{2}E2​ makes a perfect sense, and (2) a spacetime model of the quantum object can then be considered (by also taking into account the non-fully-realized experimental fact that the quantum object \textit{actually} exists everywhere where its wavefunction is different from zero) in order to address the fundamental incompleteness of quantum mechanics -- that it deals not with the quantum object itself, but only with its states. The paper ends with a discussion of a prediction by the proposed spacetime model of the electron that can be tested experimentally probably by the quadratic Stark effect.
The difference between the conceptual framework of classical physics and that of quantum physics which is due to the nonseparability property of the latter theory is better understood in specific examples. This chapter uses some specific examples to test the validity, both in classical and in quantum mechanics, of two conceptual principles. First is Reality Principle . The very concept of a reality may be criticized by philosophically minded empiricists. A widespread opinion, however, is that somehow a physical reality does exist, which should not just amount to the talks we give about it. In their search for a criterion that would make it possible to recognize elements of reality, A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen had to take such considerations into account. Second, Principle of the Separability of Mechanically Isolated Systems, one can easily guess that this second principle, which remains somewhat implicit in the work of Einstein and his colleagues may well be the source of insuperable difficulties.
We discuss the question of entanglement versus separability of pure quantum states in direct product Hilbert spaces, and the relevance of this issue to physics. Different types of separability may be possible, depending on the particular factorization of the Hilbert space. A given orthonormal basis set for a Hilbert space is defined to be of type (p,q) if p elements of the basis are entangled and q are separable, relative to a given bi-partite factorization of that space. We conjecture that not all basis types exist for a given Hilbert space. The phenomenon of entanglement is of central importance in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Historically, entanglement was the focus of the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paper [1], which suggested that standard quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory of physical reality. The central argument of the EPR paper was that more information about incompatible variables such as momentum and position could in principle be deduced about an entangled two particle quantum state than quantum mechanics permits, effectively giving information about each particle
The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox and Bell’s theorem sit at the center of one of the most famous unresolved questions in physics: how can distant quantum outcomes remain so perfectly correlated without reducing reality to either hidden variables or some troubling form of nonlocality? For nearly a century, this debate has shaped the foundations of quantum theory, the interpretation of entanglement, and, more recently, the conceptual language surrounding quantum information and quantum computing. Yet one possibility may still be underexplored: what if the puzzle begins from the wrong ontological starting point? This paper asks exactly that question. Standard quantum mechanics already accepts many systems as physically unified wholes described by a single composite wavefunction: atoms, multi-electron states, molecular orbitals, and hadrons. Even increasingly large molecules continue to exhibit interference, showing that quantum oneness is not destroyed simply by size or spatial extension. If such preserved composite oneness is already an accepted part of quantum theory, then why is the EPR–Bell pair so often framed first as two independently sufficient distant objects? The proposal developed here is both simple and provocative: the EPR–Bell pair may, prior to measurement, belong to the same ontological class as other accepted composite quantum systems. On this view, the pair is not first two complete distant realities that must somehow remain coordinated across space, but one preserved composite wavefunction whose support spans separated regions and whose distinct local outcomes emerge only when the whole state is resolved. If that is right, then one of the deepest questions in modern physics changes form. The issue is no longer simply how two distant objects stay correlated. The issue becomes whether the assumption of separability was imposed too early. This paper develops that conjecture step by step, using accepted quantum examples, the original EPR question, Bell’s constraint, and the logic of composite Wavefunction Oneness. The result is a new way of reopening the nonlocality problem—not by denying Bell, and not by proposing hidden variables, but by asking whether the EPR–Bell discussion has been starting from the wrong picture of what the physical system actually is.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
The present conference takes place in the same year that celebrates the centenary of Albert Einstein. Hence it is a good occasion to reflect on those problems which have been at the core of Einstein’s intellectual activity. Undoubtedly the foundation of quantum mechanics (QM) is one of these problems. It is known that Einstein was never convinced by the interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted, in his times and still now, by the majority of physicists. The fact that he was sharing this skepticism with people like Schrödinger and, most of all, the fact that no convincing answer, to the doubts of these people, had emerged in a more than half a century old debate, helped in keeping alive the attention of a growing number of people on this problem.The crucial issue is that the standard interpretation of QM has some physical implications which are experimentally verifiable and which, for several years, have been thought to be incompatible with relativity theory (the so‐called “quantum nonlocality”). On the other hand alternative, more intuitive, interpretations (such as the ensemble interpretation) seemed to be ruled out from very well confirmed experimental data.The way out from this impasse has required a deep analysis of the connections between mathematics and physics as well as the emergence of new ideas both in mathematics (non‐Kolmogorovian probabilities) and in physics (the theory of adaptive systems).The Einstein centenary is a good occasion for a short survey of these developments with the goal of answering the intriguing question posed in the title of the present paper.