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arXiv:2408.13023 · Annalen der Physik

Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Measurements

D. Sokolovski, Daniel Alonso Ramirez, S. Brouard

Published Sep 17, 2023• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Quantum mechanics, in its orthodox version, imposes severe limits on what can be known, or even said, about the condition of a quantum system between two observations. A relatively new approach, based on so‐called “weak measurements”, suggests that such forbidden knowledge can be gained by studying the system's response to an inaccurate weakly perturbing measuring device. It goes further to propose revising the whole concept of physics variables, and offers various examples of counterintuitive quantum behavior. Both views go to the very heart of quantum theory, and yet are rarely compared directly. A new technique must either transcend the orthodox limits, or just prove that these limits are indeed necessary. Both possibilities are studied and orthodoxy is vindicated.

DOI
10.1002/andp.202300261

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Abstract Quantum mechanics, in its orthodox version, imposes severe limits on what can be known, or even said, about the condition of a quantum system between two observations. A relatively new approach, based on so‐called “weak measurements”, suggests that such forbidden knowledge can be gained by studying the system's response to an inaccurate weakly perturbing measuring device. It goes further to propose revising the whole concept of physics variables, and offers various examples of counterintuitive quantum behavior. Both views go to the very heart of quantum theory, and yet are rarely compared directly. A new technique must either transcend the orthodox limits, or just prove that these limits are indeed necessary. Both possibilities are studied and orthodoxy is vindicated.
Abstract This work sets out to answer a single question: what is the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics? However, we adopt a different approach to that normally used. Rather than surveying physicists, or poring over the precise details of the thoughts of Bohr and Heisenberg, we review a collection of 42 textbooks on quantum mechanics, encompassing the most popular and prominent works of this nature. We then gauge their response to 13 propositions to build up a picture of exactly what is believed by an orthodox quantum mechanic. We demonstrate that this orthodoxy has many aspects of Copenhagen-like viewpoints, but also shows some interesting emerging deviations. Moreover, it is more nuanced than some reductive characterisations that condense the orthodoxy down to the ontological primacy of the quantum state. The revealed orthodoxy has three consistent pillars: measurement inherently disturbs quantum states, these states refer to individual instances, not ensembles, and quantum systems do not have definite properties prior to measurement. More fully, it entails that individual particles exist in wave-like super-positions and present particle behaviours only when forced to by outside influences. The act of measuring such a system inherently induces random changes in its state, manifesting as a form of measurement error that corresponds to the uncertainty principle. This implies that measurement does not reveal underlying values of quantum properties.
The notion of weak measurement provides a formalism for extracting information from a quantum system in the limit of vanishing disturbance to its state. Here we extend this formalism to the measurement of sequences of observables. When these observables do not commute, we may obtain information about joint properties of a quantum system that would be forbidden in the usual strong measurement scenario. As an application, we provide a physically compelling characterization of the notion of counterfactual quantum computation.
This chapter is based on a talk given at the Science and Ultimate Reality meeting in March, 2002, in honour of John Archibald Wheeler. In it, I discuss some questions related to what can and cannot be said about the history of a quantum mechanical system. Relying heavily on the weak- measurement formalism of Aharonov and coworkers, I argue that there is much to be learned about a system based both on its preparation and on subsequent postselection. This is illustrated with examples from a number of past, present, and future experiments from our lab, ranging from tests of quantum "paradoxes" to studies of nonlocality to non-deterministic implementations of logic operations on quantum information. The connection between weak measurements and generalized probability theory is discussed, along with some of the counterintuitive features of these "probabilities." Conclusions are for the most part left to the reader.
In Chapter 4, we take a limit where the coupling of the measurement apparatus to the quantum system is very small, and in this limit, discuss weak measurements and weak values. The later involved a sequence of a weak and a strong measurement. Generalizations of these effects are discussed using the concepts in Chapter 3, and we discuss generalized eigenvalues of quantum observables that can exceed the eigenvalue range and reincorporate the concept of observables in generalized measurement theory.
Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory). 1 Introduction 1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge 1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm 4.1 An example in which ψ is known 4.2 Other choices of ψ 4.3 Experiments beginning before t 2 4.4 If ψ is random 4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices 4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWmAppendix