In recent years, achieving verifiable quantum advantage on a NISQ device has emerged as an important open problem in quantum information. The sampling-based quantum advantages are not known to have efficient verification methods. This article investigates the verification of quantum advantage from a cryptographic perspective. We establish a strong connection between the verifiability of quantum advantage and cryptographic and complexity primitives, including efficiently samplable, statistically far but computationally indistinguishable pairs of (mixed) quantum states ( EFI ), pseudorandom states ( PRS ), and variants of minimum circuit size problems ( MCSP ). Specifically, we prove that a) a sampling-based quantum advantage is either verifiable or can be used to build EFI and even PRS and b) polynomial-time algorithms for a variant of MCSP would imply efficient verification of quantum advantages. Our work shows that the quest for verifiable quantum advantages may lead to applications of quantum cryptography, and the construction of quantum primitives can provide new insights into the verifiability of quantum advantages.
In recent years, achieving verifiable quantum advantage on a NISQ device has emerged as an important open problem in quantum information. The sampling-based quantum advantages are not known to have efficient verification methods. This article investigates the verification of quantum advantage from a cryptographic perspective. We establish a strong connection between the verifiability of quantum advantage and cryptographic and complexity primitives, including efficiently samplable, statistically far but computationally indistinguishable pairs of (mixed) quantum states ( EFI ), pseudorandom states ( PRS ), and variants of minimum circuit size problems ( MCSP ). Specifically, we prove that a) a sampling-based quantum advantage is either verifiable or can be used to build EFI and even PRS and b) polynomial-time algorithms for a variant of MCSP would imply efficient verification of quantum advantages. Our work shows that the quest for verifiable quantum advantages may lead to applications of quantum cryptography, and the construction of quantum primitives can provide new insights into the verifiability of quantum advantages.
We construct protocols for classically verifiable quantum advantage and classical verification of BQP computations using \emph{quantum indistinguishability obfuscation} (qiO). Specifically, given qiO and assuming a slightly stronger version of BQP=BPP, we construct a two-message quantum-advantage protocol that is efficiently and publicly verifiable. Our result can be viewed as a rigorous cryptographic foundation for the heuristic quantum advantage proposals based on \emph{peaked random circuit sampling} of Aaronson and Zhang (arXiv:2404.14493).
We also construct two simple protocols for classically verifying arbitrary BQP computations. The first protocol is privately verifiable and assumes only the existence of qiO. This gives a rare example of a nontrivial cryptographic application of (quantum) iO that does not make additional computational hardness assumptions. The second protocol additionally assumes post-quantum one-way functions and is \emph{publicly verifiable}. To our knowledge, this is the first publicly verifiable protocol for classical verification of BQP computations under computational assumptions in the standard model.
As qiO is the basis for our results, we propose an approach to constructing qiO by adapting the local-mixing framework of Canetti--Chamon--Mucciolo--Ruckenstein.
Quantum computational advantage was claimed for the first time in 2019 and several experiments since then have reinforced and strengthened the claim. At the same time, a new generation of quantum computing devices with 100 logical qubits is being built. This raises two questions: Has quantum advantage actually been achieved? And what should our next milestones be for the upcoming 100-logical-qubit era? In this perspective, I argue that, in fact, quantum advantage has been achieved. The status today is analogous to Bell-inequality violations in the 1980s where some loopholes remain open, specifically, scalability and verifiability. I then outline three milestones for the 100-logical-qubit era aiming to close those loopholes: demonstrate fault-tolerant quantum advantage, perform efficiently verifiable advantage using random circuits with symmetries, and eventually demonstrate classically verifiable advantage with applications to certified randomness. These milestones are also natural stepping stones towards running algorithms with cryptographic applications.
Quantum computational advantage refers to an existence of computational tasks that are easy for quantum computing but hard for classical one. Unconditionally showing quantum advantage is beyond our current understanding of complexity theory, and therefore some computational assumptions are needed. Which complexity assumption is necessary and sufficient for quantum advantage? In this paper, we show that inefficient-verifier proofs of quantumness (IV-PoQ) exist if and only if classically-secure one-way puzzles (OWPuzzs) exist. As far as we know, this is the first time that a complete cryptographic characterization of quantum advantage is obtained. IV-PoQ capture various types of quantum advantage previously studied, such as sampling-based quantum advantage and searching-based one. Previous work [Morimae and Yamakawa, Crypto 2024] showed that IV-PoQ can be constructed from OWFs, but a construction of IV-PoQ from weaker assumptions was left open. Our result solves the open problem. OWPuzzs are one of the most fundamental quantum cryptographic primitives implied by many quantum cryptographic primitives weaker than one-way functions (OWFs). The equivalence between IV-PoQ and classically-secure OWPuzzs therefore highlights that if there is no quantum advantage, then these fundamental primitives do not exist. The equivalence also means that quantum advantage is an example of the applications of OWPuzzs. Except for commitments, no application of OWPuzzs was known before. Our result shows that quantum advantage is another application of OWPuzzs, which solves the open question of [Chung, Goldin, and Gray, Crypto 2024]. Moreover, it is the first quantum-computation-classical-communication (QCCC) application of OWPuzzs.
Recent oracle separations [Kretschmer, TQC'21, Kretschmer et. al., STOC'23] have raised the tantalizing possibility of building quantum cryptography from sources of hardness that persist even if the polynomial hierarchy collapses. We realize this possibility by building quantum bit commitments and secure computation from unrelativized, well-studied mathematical problems that are conjectured to be hard for P#P -- such as approximating the permanents of complex Gaussian matrices, or approximating the output probabilities of random quantum circuits. Indeed, we show that as long as any one of the conjectures underlying sampling-based quantum advantage (e.g., BosonSampling, Random Circuit Sampling, IQP, etc.) is true, quantum cryptography can be based on the extremely mild assumption that P#P⊆(io)BQP/qpoly. We prove that the following hardness assumptions are equivalent. (1) The hardness of approximating the probability assigned to a randomly chosen string in the support of certain efficiently sampleable distributions (upto inverse polynomial multiplicative error).(2) The existence of one-way puzzles, where a quantum sampler outputs a pair of classical strings -- a puzzle and its key -- and where the hardness lies in finding the key corresponding to a random puzzle. These are known to imply quantum bit commitments [Khurana and Tomer, STOC'24]. (3) The existence of state puzzles, or one-way state synthesis, where it is hard to synthesize a secret quantum state given a public classical identifier. These capture the hardness of search problems with quantum inputs (secrets) and classical outputs (challenges). These are the first constructions of quantum cryptographic primitives (one-way puzzles, quantum bit commitments, state puzzles) from concrete, well-founded mathematical assumptions that do not imply the existence of classical cryptography.
Quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution remain a less well understood area of research. In classical cryptography, one-way functions underpin nearly all standard cryptographic protocols, motivating the search for meaningful quantum analogues and for a clear understanding of the physical and computational mechanisms that could enforce one-wayness. In this article, we review quantum one-way functions and a range of closely related quantum-state primitives, including one-way state generators, pseudorandom quantum states, and efficiently indistinguishable pairs of states. We discuss both computational and information-theoretic notions of quantum one-wayness, emphasizing the different adversarial models and security assumptions that underlie these constructions. We compare and contrast the various proposed primitives, and clarify their conceptual relationships. Particular emphasis is placed on questions of physical realizability, experimental feasibility, and robustness to noise. Finally, we outline open problems and future directions toward the development of practical quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution, and the emergence of a broader quantum-cryptographic ecosystem.
Most interesting cryptography happens in the computational realm where all parties can only perform efficient computations. On one hand, without this constraint many practically relevant cryptographic tasks are infeasible; on the other, this constraint still captures the power of any physical attacker with limited resources. Classically, if the task of attacking almost any interesting computational cryptography is provably hard, then we would also derive from it the existence of one-way functions, and thus P ≠ NP as well. Quantum mechanics offers a more complete model of physical information in the real world. Recent works have proved oracle separations (Kretschmer’21; Kretschmer, Qian, Sinha, Tal’23; Lombardi, Ma, Wright’23) suggesting that computationally secure quantum cryptography could exist even if P = NP, or in other words, that classical cryptography is infeasible. This hints at the possibility of constructing a quantum cryptosystem and establishing its security without unproven assumptions, liberating cryptographers from the perpetual cat-and-mousegame. In this dissertation, we make initial progress towards this goal by developing a theory of quantum computational cryptography without assuming the existence ofone-way functions. More specifically, we establish the following results: • We introduce a simple and natural quantum cryptographic primitive called EFI pairs, and prove its existential equivalence to various other quantum cryptographic primitives, including commitment schemes, oblivious transfer, and zero knowledge.• We establish the “minimality” of EFI pairs by showing that their existence is implied by many natural cryptographic primitives. EFI pairs thus appear easier to construct than other primitives. • We show that the existence of EFI pairs (and the existentially equivalent primitives) is robust by showing how to upgrade various notions of “weak” security to standard security without any additional assumption. • We finally construct commitment schemes, oblivious transfer, and zero knowledge unconditionally if a piece of quantum advice is allowed. In contrast, classical analogues of these are impossible without first settling P ≠ NP even if we allow randomized advice.