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arXiv:2409.15248 · ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

Founding Quantum Cryptography on Quantum Advantage, or, Towards Cryptography from #P Hardness

Dakshita Khurana, Kabir Tomer

Published Jun 15, 2025• 20 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recent oracle separations [Kretschmer, TQC'21, Kretschmer et. al., STOC'23] have raised the tantalizing possibility of building quantum cryptography from sources of hardness that persist even if the polynomial hierarchy collapses. We realize this possibility by building quantum bit commitments and secure computation from unrelativized, well-studied mathematical problems that are conjectured to be hard for $\mathsf{P^{\#P}}$ -- such as approximating the permanents of complex Gaussian matrices, or approximating the output probabilities of random quantum circuits. Indeed, we show that as long as any one of the conjectures underlying sampling-based quantum advantage (e.g., BosonSampling, Random Circuit Sampling, IQP, etc.) is true, quantum cryptography can be based on the extremely mild assumption that $\mathsf{P^{\#P}} \not\subseteq \mathsf{(io)BQP/qpoly}$. We prove that the following hardness assumptions are equivalent. (1) The hardness of approximating the probability assigned to a randomly chosen string in the support of certain efficiently sampleable distributions (upto inverse polynomial multiplicative error).(2) The existence of one-way puzzles, where a quantum sampler outputs a pair of classical strings -- a puzzle and its key -- and where the hardness lies in finding the key corresponding to a random puzzle. These are known to imply quantum bit commitments [Khurana and Tomer, STOC'24]. (3) The existence of state puzzles, or one-way state synthesis, where it is hard to synthesize a secret quantum state given a public classical identifier. These capture the hardness of search problems with quantum inputs (secrets) and classical outputs (challenges). These are the first constructions of quantum cryptographic primitives (one-way puzzles, quantum bit commitments, state puzzles) from concrete, well-founded mathematical assumptions that do not imply the existence of classical cryptography.

DOI
10.1145/3717823.3718145

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We show that concrete hardness assumptions about learning or cloning the output state of a random quantum circuit can be used as the foundation for secure quantum cryptography. In particular, under these assumptions we construct secure one-way state generators (OWSGs), digital signature schemes, quantum bit commitments, and private key encryption schemes. We also discuss evidence for these hardness assumptions by analyzing the best-known quantum learning algorithms, as well as proving black-box lower bounds for cloning and learning given state preparation oracles. Our random circuit-based constructions provide concrete instantiations of quantum cryptographic primitives whose security do not depend on the existence of one-way functions. The use of random circuits in our constructions also opens the door to NISQ-friendly quantum cryptography. We discuss noise tolerant versions of our OWSG and digital signature constructions which can potentially be implementable on noisy quantum computers connected by a quantum network. On the other hand, they are still secure against noiseless quantum adversaries, raising the intriguing possibility of a useful implementation of an end-to-end cryptographic protocol on near-term quantum computers. Finally, our explorations suggest that the rich interconnections between learning theory and cryptography in classical theoretical computer science also extend to the quantum setting.
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Post-quantum cryptography currently rests on a small number of hardness assumptions, posing significant risks should any one of them be compromised. This vulnerability motivates the search for new and cryptographically versatile assumptions that make a convincing case for quantum hardness. In this work, we argue that decoding random quantum stabilizer codes---a quantum analog of the well-studied LPN problem---is an excellent candidate. This task occupies a unique middle ground: it is inherently native to quantum computation, yet admits an equivalent formulation with purely classical input and output, as recently shown by Khesin et al. (STOC '26). We prove that the average-case hardness of quantum stabilizer decoding implies the core primitives of classical Cryptomania, including public-key encryption (PKE) and oblivious transfer (OT), as well as one-way functions. Our constructions are moreover practically efficient: our PKE scheme achieves essentially the same efficiency as state-of-the-art LPN-based PKE. We also provide substantial evidence that stabilizer decoding does not reduce to LPN, suggesting that the former problem constitutes a genuinely new post-quantum assumption. Our primary technical contributions are twofold. First, we give a reduction from random quantum stabilizer decoding to an average-case problem closely resembling LPN, but which is equipped with additional symplectic algebraic structure. While this structure is essential to the quantum nature of the problem, it raises significant barriers to cryptographic security reductions. Second, we develop a new suite of scrambling techniques for such structured linear spaces, and use them to produce rigorous security proofs for all of our constructions.
There is a large body of work studying what forms of computational hardness are needed to realize classical cryptography. In particular, one-way functions and pseudorandom generators can be built from each other, and thus require equivalent computational assumptions to be realized. Furthermore, the existence of either of these primitives implies that P ≠ N P , which gives a lower bound on the necessary hardness.One can also define versions of each of these primitives with quantum output: respectively one-way state generators and pseudorandom state generators. Unlike in the classical setting, it is not known whether either primitive can be built from the other. Although it has been shown that pseudorandom state generators for certain parameter regimes can be used to build one-way state generators, the implication has not been previously known in full generality. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the existence of one-way state generators has no known implications in complexity theory.We show that pseudorandom states compressing n bits to log ⁡ n + 1 qubits can be used to build one-way state generators and pseudorandom states compressing n bits to ω ( log ⁡ n ) qubits are one-way state generators. This is a nearly optimal result since pseudorandom states with fewer than c log ⁡ n -qubit output can be shown to exist unconditionally. We also show that any one-way state generator can be broken by a quantum algorithm with classical access to a P P oracle.An interesting implication of our results is that a t ( n ) -copy one-way state generator exists unconditionally, for every t ( n ) = o ( n / log ⁡ n ) . This contrasts nicely with the previously known fact that O ( n ) -copy one-way state generators require computational hardness. We also outline a new route towards a black-box separation between one-way state generators and quantum bit commitments.
From Worst-Case Hardness of NP\mathsf{NP}NP to Quantum Cryptography via Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) has emerged as a powerful cryptographic primitive with many implications. While classical iO, combined with the infinitely-often worst-case hardness of NP\mathsf{NP}NP, is known to imply one-way functions (OWFs) and a range of advanced cryptographic primitives, the cryptographic implications of quantum iO remain poorly understood. In this work, we initiate a study of the power of quantum iO. We define several natural variants of quantum iO, distinguished by whether the obfuscation algorithm, evaluation algorithm, and description of obfuscated program are classical or quantum. For each variant, we identify quantum cryptographic primitives that can be constructed under the assumption of quantum iO and the infinitely-often quantum worst-case hardness of NP\mathsf{NP}NP (i.e., NP⊈i.o.BQP\mathsf{NP}\not\subseteq\mathsf{\text{i.o.} BQP}NP⊆i.o.BQP). In particular, we construct pseudorandom unitaries, QCCC quantum public-key encryption and (QCCC) quantum symmetric-key encryption, and several primitives implied by them such as one-way state generators, (efficiently-verifiable) one-way puzzles, and EFI pairs, etc. While our main focus is on quantum iO, even in the classical setting, our techniques yield a new and arguably simpler construction of OWFs from classical (imperfect) iO and the infinitely-often worst-case hardness of NP\mathsf{NP}NP.
EFI pairs (Brakerski, Canetti, and Qian, ITCS 2023) and one-way puzzles (Khurana and Tomer, STOC 2024) are the leading candidates for the minimal assumption of quantum cryptography. The first are efficiently preparable quantum states, statistically far yet computationally indistinguishable; the second are classical puzzles, easy to sample and hard to solve. One-way puzzles imply EFI pairs, and whether the converse holds is open. We construct a single classical oracle relative to which one-way puzzles do not exist, even with an unbounded verifier, while an EFI pair survives every distinguisher that queries the oracle classically throughout and holds advice about it, making its one superposition query at the end. The oracle answers every question about the output probabilities of quantum samplers, which removes the puzzles, and hides a Haar-random half-dimensional subspace. To prove security we reduce it to communication complexity. An adversary whose knowledge of the subspace arrives as classical query answers can be simulated inside a two-party protocol against the party holding it, so it does no better than the best classical protocol for Vector-in-Subspace (Klartag and Regev, STOC 2011), whatever the oracle computes. That argument does not cover the superposition query, which we bound instead using tools from random matrix theory. The same attack gives a classical simulation of any quantum party in a classical-message protocol with no entanglement shared in advance, so relative to the oracle there is no proof of quantumness either. Quantum polynomial time therefore offers no advantage on any task with classical inputs and outputs, while the two quantum states stay indistinguishable. We state conjectures on removing the restriction on superposition queries.