Quantum mechanics is a theory that is as effective as it is counterintuitive. While quantum practices operate impeccably, they compel us to embrace enigmatic phenomena like the collapse of the state vector and non-locality, thereby pushing us towards untenable "hypotheses non fingo" stances. However, a century after its inception, we are presented with a promising interpretive key, intimated by Wheeler as early as 1974. The interpretative paradoxes of this theory might be resolved if we discern the relationship between logical undecidability and quantum undecidability. It will be demonstrated how both are intricately linked to an observer/observed relational issue, and how the idiosyncratic behaviours of quantum physics can be reconciled with the normative, following this path.
Quantum mechanics is a theory that is as effective as it is counterintuitive. While quantum practices operate impeccably, they compel us to embrace enigmatic phenomena like the collapse of the state vector and non-locality, thereby pushing us towards untenable "hypotheses non fingo" stances. However, a century after its inception, we are presented with a promising interpretive key, intimated by Wheeler as early as 1974. The interpretative paradoxes of this theory might be resolved if we discern the relationship between logical undecidability and quantum undecidability. It will be demonstrated how both are intricately linked to an observer/observed relational issue, and how the idiosyncratic behaviours of quantum physics can be reconciled with the normative, following this path.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics in the context of measurements, and concepts such as state “collapse,” have troubled physicists since the inception of quantum theory. Pushed to their logical extreme, such issues become entangled (in the colloquial sense) with questions of consciousness, reality, etc. Bell’s theorem eliminated possible ways out of this tangle via any (halfway reasonable) classical underlying theory, and the success of quantum mechanics forces us to adopt it as a fundamental theory and face the logical consequences.
A brief philosophical inquiry into the foundations of quantum mechanics is presented here. In particular, the direct relationship between granularity, discontinuity, and the presence of quantum effects will be argued. Furthermore, an "interpretation of relational interpretation" will be supported, which, in combination with the problem of logical undecidability, produces a promising approach that places the apparent illogicality of QM within the realm of logic and effectively addresses its usual paradoxes.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
The thermocontextual interpretation (TCI) is an alternative to the existing interpretations of physical states and time. The prevailing interpretations are based on assumptions rooted in classical mechanics, the logical implications of which include determinism, time symmetry, and a paradox: determinism implies that effects follow causes and an arrow of causality, and this conflicts with time symmetry. The prevailing interpretations also fail to explain the empirical irreversibility of wavefunction collapse without invoking untestable and untenable metaphysical implications. They fail to reconcile nonlocality and relativistic causality without invoking superdeterminism or unexplained superluminal correlations. The TCI defines a system's state with respect to its actual surroundings at a positive ambient temperature. It recognizes the existing physical interpretations as special cases which either define a state with respect to an absolute zero reference (classical and relativistic states) or with respect to an equilibrium reference (quantum states). Between these special case extremes is where thermodynamic irreversibility and randomness exist. The TCI distinguishes between a system's internal time and the reference time of relativity and causality as measured by an external observer's clock. It defines system time as a complex property of state spanning both reversible mechanical time and irreversible thermodynamic time. Additionally, it provides a physical explanation for nonlocality that is consistent with relativistic causality without hidden variables, superdeterminism, or "spooky action".
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.