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arXiv:2201.10559

Many Worlds are irrelevant for the problem of the arrow of time

Veronika Baumann, Flavio Del Santo

Published Jan 25, 2022• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent paper, S. Gao has claimed that, under the assumption that the initial state of the universe is a pure quantum state, only the many worlds interpretation can account for the observed arrow of time. We show that his argument is untenable and that if endorsed it potentially leads to undermine the search for a scientific explanation of certain phenomena.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2201.10559

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In a recent paper, S. Gao has claimed that, under the assumption that the initial state of the universe is a pure quantum state, only the many worlds interpretation can account for the observed arrow of time. We show that his argument is untenable and that if endorsed it potentially leads to undermine the search for a scientific explanation of certain phenomena.
It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.
Establishing (or falsifying) the special state theory of quantum measurement is a program with both theoretical and experimental directions. The special state theory has only pure unitary time evolution, like the many worlds interpretation, but only has one world. How this can be accomplished requires both “special states” and significant modification of the usual assumptions about the arrow of time. All this is reviewed below. Experimentally, proposals for tests already exist and the problems are first the practical one of doing the experiment and second the suggesting of other experiments. On the theoretical level, many problems remain and among them are the impact of particle statistics on the availability of special states, finding a way to estimate their abundance and the possibility of using a computer for this purpose. Regarding the arrow of time, there is an early proposal of J. A. Wheeler that may be implementable with implications for cosmology.
I acknowledge a flaw in the paper "A quantum solution to the arrow of time dilemma": as pointed out by Jennings and Rudolph, (classical) mutual information is not an appropriate measure of information. This can be traced back to the quantum description underlying my analysis, where quantum mutual information is the appropriate measure of information. The core argument of my paper (summarized in its abstract) is not affected by this flaw. Nonetheless, I point out that such argument may not be adequate to account for all phenomena: it seems necessary to separately postulate a low entropy initial state.
We investigate three aspects of the supposed problem of time: The disagreement between the treatments of time in general relativity and quantum theory, the problem of recovering time from within an isolated Universe and the prevalence of a unidirectional time flow (i.e., the so-called arrow of time). Under our interpretation, general relativity and quantum theory have complementary time treatments given that they emerge from a theory of a more fundamental nature. To model an isolated Universe, we use the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and then apply the Page-Wootters method of recovering time. It is argued that, if the recovery of an experience of time is indeed viable in this framework, interactions and quantum entanglement are both essential features, even though the former is normally an afterthought or altogether dismissed. As for the one-way arrow of time, this is, from our perspective, a consequence of including the aforementioned interactions. But underlying our interpretation, and pretty much all others, is the necessity for causality. It is this fundamental tenet which accounts for our experience of time but yet can only be postulated. Our conclusion is that the `problem of causality' is what should be the focal point of future investigations.
In their article “On What It Takes To Be a World”, David Albert and Jeffrey Barrett raise “a rather urgent question about what the proponents of a many-worlds interpretation [of quantum mechanics] can possibly mean by the term ‘worlds’” (1995, 35). I argue that their considerations do not translate into an argument against the Many-Worlds conception of a world unless one requires that the dispositions that measurement devices display through the outcomes they record be explainable in terms of facts particular to the worlds in which those devices do their recording. Granting that their conception of a world takes away the possibility of such an explanation, a Many-Worlds proponent can claim that the Universal quantum state, which does not represent a fact about any world in particular, is enough to ground the dispositions of measurement devices.