Two recent papers (Renou et al., arXiv:2101.10873, and Chen et al., arXiv:2103.08123) have indicated that complex numbers are necessary for quantum theory. This short note is a comment on their result.
In our previous paper on the matter, we proved that real quantum theory (RQT) cannot be experimentally falsified without the experiment falsifying quantum theory (QT) as well. Our result is in direct contradiction to the central claim of an article by Renou et al., published in Nature [600, 625--629 (2021)], reporting a bilocal network experiment that could falsify real quantum theory without falsifying quantum theory.
The purpose of this note is to address several seemingly natural attempts to recover the experimental conclusion of Renou et al. We first explain how these results, although based on nonlocality experiments, are far from a Bell-like level of proof. Then we explain why the proposed experiment requires an experimentally untestable premise about independent preparations necessarily being represented as product states. Finally, we discuss some concerns that lie outside the scope of both results.
The role of complex quantities in quantum theory has been puzzling physicists since the beginnings. It is, thus, natural to ask whether, in order to describe our experiments, the mathematical structure of the complex Hilbert spaces it is built on is really necessary. Recently, it was shown that this structure is inevitable in network scenarios with independent sources. More precisely, Real Quantum Theory cannot explain the predictions of (Complex) Quantum Theory [Renou et al., Nature (London) 600, 625 (2021).NATUAS0028-083610.1038/s41586-021-04160-4]. Here, we revisit the independence assumption underlying this work. We show that assuming partial independence is sufficient for showing the inadequacy of Real Quantum Theory. We derive a tradeoff between source independence and the Bell value achievable in Real Quantum Theory, which also lower bounds the source correlations required to explain previous experiments by means of real quantum systems. We further show that 1 bit of entanglement is necessary and sufficient for recovering the complex quantum correlations by means of Real Quantum Theory in the scenario from [Renou et al., Nature (London) 600, 625 (2021).NATUAS0028-083610.1038/s41586-021-04160-4]. Finally, building on [McKague et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 2009PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.102.020505], we provide a construction to simulate any complex quantum setup with m independent sources by means of Real Quantum Theory by allowing the sources to share an m real-qubit entangled state in the first round of the experiment.
Recent work by Renou et al. (2021) has led to some controversy concerning the question of whether quantum theory requires complex numbers for its formulation. We promote the view that the main result of that work is best understood not as a claim about the relative merits of different representations of quantum theory, but rather as a claim about the possibility of experimentally adjudicating between standard quantum theory and an alternative theory -- a foil theory -- known as real-amplitude quantum theory (RQT). In particular, the claim is that this adjudication can be achieved given only an assumption about the causal structure of the experiment. Here, we aim to shed some light on why this is possible, by reconceptualizing the comparison of the two theories as an instance of a broader class of such theory comparisons. By recasting RQT as the subtheory of quantum theory that arises by symmetrizing with respect to the collective action of a time-reversal symmetry, we can compare it to other subtheories that arise by symmetrization, but for different symmetries. If the symmetry has a unitary representation, the resulting foil theory is termed a twirled quantum world, and if it does not (as is the case in RQT), the resulting foil theory is termed a swirled quantum world. We show that, in contrast to RQT, there is no possibility of distinguishing any twirled quantum world from quantum theory given only an assumption about causal structure. We also define analogues of twirling and swirling for an arbitrary generalized probabilistic theory and identify certain necessary conditions on a causal structure for it to be able to support a causal compatibility gap between the theory and its symmetrized version. We draw out the implications of these analyses for the question of how a lack of a shared reference frame state features into the possibility of such a gap.