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arXiv:2011.10029 · International Journal of Modern Physics A

Probability, preclusion and biological evolution in Heisenberg-picture Everett quantum mechanics

Mark A. Rubin

Published Jun 18, 2021• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The fact that certain “extraordinary” probabilistic phenomena — in particular, macroscopic violations of the second law of thermodynamics — have never been observed to occur can be accounted for by taking hard preclusion as a basic physical law, i.e. precluding from existence events corresponding to very small but nonzero values of quantum-mechanical weight. This approach is not consistent with the usual ontology of the Everett interpretation, in which outcomes correspond to branches of the state vector, but can be successfully implemented using a Heisenberg-picture-based ontology in which outcomes are encoded in transformations of operators. Hard preclusion can provide an explanation for biological evolution, which can in turn explain our subjective experiences of, and reactions to, “ordinary” probabilistic phenomena, and the compatibility of those experiences and reactions with what we conventionally take to be objective probabilities arising from physical laws.

DOI
10.1142/s0217751x21501177

Related papers

Explanation, Evolution and Subjective Probability in Everett Quantum Mechanics with Positive Preclusion

Mark A. Rubin

The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situations involving a finite number of measurements.

arXiv:0912.4239•Dec 21, 2009•1 citation

Everett and Evidence

Hilary Greaves, Wayne C. Myrvold

Abstract Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jun 24, 2010•62 citations

The Everett Interpretation: Probability 1

Simon W. Saunders

The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is, inter alia, an interpretation of objective probability: an account of what probability really is. Everett called his work “wave mechanics without probability” for good reason: it provides a non-chancy base level of categorical properties and relations. The objection may concern justification rather than understanding, particularly if decoherence theory is used to derive the Born rule. The branch-counting rule makes nonsense of quantum mechanics but it appears to be suggested by the picture of branching. Branch counting is hardly a rival to the branch-weight rule as an interpretation of branching structure, if it brings that branching structure crashing down. Denizens of anomalous branches, or of anomalous stretches of history in one-world theories, will be misled by the observed statistics of measurements.

arXiv:2103.03966•Routledge eBooks•Aug 11, 2021•28 citations

Chance and time : cutting the Gordian Knot

Amit Hagar

One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous approach away from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schrodinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. A well-known explanatory framework due to Ludwig Boltzmann traces the rarity of " abnormal" thermodynamic phenomena to the scarcity of the initial conditions that lead to it. After all, physical laws are no more than algorithms and these are expected to generate different results according to different initial conditions, hence Boltzmann's insight that violations of thermodynamic laws are possible but highly improbable. Yet Boltzmann introduces probabilities into this explanatory scheme, and since the latter is couched in terms of classical mechanics, these probabilities must be interpreted as a result of ignorance of the exact state the system is in. Quantum mechanics has taught us otherwise. Here the attempts to explain why we never observe macroscopic superpositions have led to different interpretations of the formalism and to different solutions to the quantum measurement problem. These solutions introduce additional interpretations to the meaning of probability over and above ignorance of the definite state of the physical system: quantum probabilities may result from pure chance. Notwithstanding the success of the Boltzmannian framework in explaining the thermodynamic arrow in time it leaves us with a foundational puzzle: how can ignorance play a role in scientific explanation of objective reality? In turns out that two opposing solutions to the quantum measurement problem in which probabilities arise from the stochastic character of the underlying dynamics may scratch this explanatory itch. By offering a dynamical justification to the probabilities employed in classical statistical mechanics these two interpretations complete the Boltzmannian explanatory scheme and allow us to exorcize ignorance from scientific explanations of unobserved phenomena. In this thesis I argue that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow in time is closely related to the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, i.e., to the measurement problem. We may solve one by fiat and thus solve the other, but it seems unwise to try solving them independently. I substantiate this claim by presenting two possible interpretations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Differing as they do on the meaning of the probabilities they introduce into the otherwise deterministic dynamics, these interpretations offer alternative explanatory schemes to the standard Boltzmannian statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic approach to equilibrium. I then show how notwithstanding their current empirical equivalence, the two approaches diverge at the continental divide between scientific realism and anti-realism.

•Jan 1, 2009•1 citation

Micro-anthropic principle for quantum theory

Brandon Carter

Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 21, 2007•6 citations

Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations
The fact that certain “extraordinary” probabilistic phenomena — in particular, macroscopic violations of the second law of thermodynamics — have never been observed to occur can be accounted for by taking hard preclusion as a basic physical law, i.e. precluding from existence events corresponding to very small but nonzero values of quantum-mechanical weight. This approach is not consistent with the usual ontology of the Everett interpretation, in which outcomes correspond to branches of the state vector, but can be successfully implemented using a Heisenberg-picture-based ontology in which outcomes are encoded in transformations of operators. Hard preclusion can provide an explanation for biological evolution, which can in turn explain our subjective experiences of, and reactions to, “ordinary” probabilistic phenomena, and the compatibility of those experiences and reactions with what we conventionally take to be objective probabilities arising from physical laws.
The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situations involving a finite number of measurements.
Abstract Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is, inter alia, an interpretation of objective probability: an account of what probability really is. Everett called his work “wave mechanics without probability” for good reason: it provides a non-chancy base level of categorical properties and relations. The objection may concern justification rather than understanding, particularly if decoherence theory is used to derive the Born rule. The branch-counting rule makes nonsense of quantum mechanics but it appears to be suggested by the picture of branching. Branch counting is hardly a rival to the branch-weight rule as an interpretation of branching structure, if it brings that branching structure crashing down. Denizens of anomalous branches, or of anomalous stretches of history in one-world theories, will be misled by the observed statistics of measurements.
One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous approach away from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schrodinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. A well-known explanatory framework due to Ludwig Boltzmann traces the rarity of " abnormal" thermodynamic phenomena to the scarcity of the initial conditions that lead to it. After all, physical laws are no more than algorithms and these are expected to generate different results according to different initial conditions, hence Boltzmann's insight that violations of thermodynamic laws are possible but highly improbable. Yet Boltzmann introduces probabilities into this explanatory scheme, and since the latter is couched in terms of classical mechanics, these probabilities must be interpreted as a result of ignorance of the exact state the system is in. Quantum mechanics has taught us otherwise. Here the attempts to explain why we never observe macroscopic superpositions have led to different interpretations of the formalism and to different solutions to the quantum measurement problem. These solutions introduce additional interpretations to the meaning of probability over and above ignorance of the definite state of the physical system: quantum probabilities may result from pure chance. Notwithstanding the success of the Boltzmannian framework in explaining the thermodynamic arrow in time it leaves us with a foundational puzzle: how can ignorance play a role in scientific explanation of objective reality? In turns out that two opposing solutions to the quantum measurement problem in which probabilities arise from the stochastic character of the underlying dynamics may scratch this explanatory itch. By offering a dynamical justification to the probabilities employed in classical statistical mechanics these two interpretations complete the Boltzmannian explanatory scheme and allow us to exorcize ignorance from scientific explanations of unobserved phenomena. In this thesis I argue that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow in time is closely related to the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, i.e., to the measurement problem. We may solve one by fiat and thus solve the other, but it seems unwise to try solving them independently. I substantiate this claim by presenting two possible interpretations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Differing as they do on the meaning of the probabilities they introduce into the otherwise deterministic dynamics, these interpretations offer alternative explanatory schemes to the standard Boltzmannian statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic approach to equilibrium. I then show how notwithstanding their current empirical equivalence, the two approaches diverge at the continental divide between scientific realism and anti-realism.
Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.