The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situations involving a finite number of measurements.
The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situations involving a finite number of measurements.
The fact that certain “extraordinary” probabilistic phenomena — in particular, macroscopic violations of the second law of thermodynamics — have never been observed to occur can be accounted for by taking hard preclusion as a basic physical law, i.e. precluding from existence events corresponding to very small but nonzero values of quantum-mechanical weight. This approach is not consistent with the usual ontology of the Everett interpretation, in which outcomes correspond to branches of the state vector, but can be successfully implemented using a Heisenberg-picture-based ontology in which outcomes are encoded in transformations of operators. Hard preclusion can provide an explanation for biological evolution, which can in turn explain our subjective experiences of, and reactions to, “ordinary” probabilistic phenomena, and the compatibility of those experiences and reactions with what we conventionally take to be objective probabilities arising from physical laws.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is, inter alia, an interpretation of objective probability: an account of what probability really is. Everett called his work “wave mechanics without probability” for good reason: it provides a non-chancy base level of categorical properties and relations. The objection may concern justification rather than understanding, particularly if decoherence theory is used to derive the Born rule. The branch-counting rule makes nonsense of quantum mechanics but it appears to be suggested by the picture of branching. Branch counting is hardly a rival to the branch-weight rule as an interpretation of branching structure, if it brings that branching structure crashing down. Denizens of anomalous branches, or of anomalous stretches of history in one-world theories, will be misled by the observed statistics of measurements.
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths.
Objective probability in quantum mechanics is often thought to involve a stochastic process whereby an actual future is selected from a range of possibilities. Everett's seminal idea is that all possible definite futures on the pointer basis exist as components of a macroscopic linear superposition. I demonstrate that these two conceptions of what is involved in quantum processes are linked by two alternative interpretation of the mind-body relation. This leads to a fission, rather than divergence, interpretation of Everettian theory and to a novel explanation of why a principle of indifference does not apply to self-location uncertainty for a post-measurement, pre-observation subject, just as Sebens and Carroll claim. Their Epistemic Separability Principle is shown to arise out of this explanation and the derivation of the Born rule for Everettian theory is thereby put on a firmer footing.
There are currently several versions of Everett's relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics, responding to a number of perceived problems for the original proposal. One of those problems is whether Everett's idea is in accord with the standard 'probabilistic' interpretation implicit in the Born rule. I argue in defence of what appears to be Everett's original view on this. The contribution I aim to make is a more complete discussion of the central issues of the identity of objects and observers over time and how the concept of expectation can be applied when all 'possible' outcomes of a measurement process are regarded as actually occurring.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.