Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2008.05833 · Scientific Reports

Experimental demonstrations of unconditional security in a purely classical regime

Byoung Seung HAM

Published Feb 18, 2021• 8 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

So far, unconditional security in key distribution processes has been confined to quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on the no-cloning theorem of nonorthogonal bases. Recently, a completely different approach, the unconditionally secured classical key distribution (USCKD), has been proposed for unconditional security in the purely classical regime. Unlike QKD, both classical channels and orthogonal bases are key ingredients in USCKD, where unconditional security is provided by deterministic randomness via path superposition-based reversible unitary transformations in a coupled Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Here, the first experimental demonstration of the USCKD protocol is presented.

DOI
10.1038/s41598-021-83724-w

Related papers

Unconditionally secured classical cryptography using quantum superposition and unitary transformation

Byoung Seung HAM

Over decades quantum cryptography has been intensively studied for unconditionally secured key distribution in a quantum regime. Due to the quantum loopholes caused by imperfect single photon detectors and/or lossy quantum channels, however, the quantum cryptography is practically inefficient and even vulnerable to eavesdropping. Here, a method of unconditionally secured key distribution potentially compatible with current fiber-optic communications networks is proposed in a classical regime for high-speed optical backbone networks. The unconditional security is due to the quantum superposition-caused measurement indistinguishability between paired transmission channels and its unitary transformation resulting in deterministic randomness corresponding to the no-cloning theorem in a quantum key distribution protocol.

arXiv:1807.04233•Scientific Reports•Jul 15, 2020•21 citations

Unconditionally secure key distillation from multi-photons in a single-photon polarization based quantum key distribution

Kiyoshi Tamaki, Hoi‐Kwong Lo

In this presentation, we show some counter-examples to a naive belief that the security of QKD is based on no-cloning theorem. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice's two-photon emission part in "SARG04 protocol" proposed by V. Scarani et al, in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004). This protocol differs from BB84 only in the classical communication. It is, thus, interesting to see how only the classical communication of QKD protocol might qualitatively change its security. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing channel

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jan 1, 2005•2 citations

Security of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

Rotem Liss

The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.

•Aug 31, 2022•0 citations

Secure quantum communication with orthogonal states

Chitra Shukla, Anindita Banerjee, Anirban Pathak +1 more

In majority of protocols of secure quantum communication (such as, BB84, B92, etc.), the unconditional security of the protocols are obtained by using conjugate coding (two or more mutually unbiased bases (MUBs)). Initially, all the conjugate-coding-based protocols of secure quantum communication were restricted to quantum key distribution (QKD), but later on they were extended to other cryptographic tasks (such as, secure direct quantum communication and quantum key agreement). In contrast to the conjugate-coding-based protocols, a few completely orthogonal-state-based protocols of unconditionally secure QKD (such as, Goldenberg–Vaidman and N09) were also proposed. However, till the recent past, orthogonal-state-based protocols were only a theoretical concept and were limited to QKD. Only recently, orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKD are experimentally realized and extended to cryptographic tasks beyond QKD. This paper aims to briefly review the orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum communication that are recently introduced by our group and other researchers.

arXiv:1407.3412•International Journal of Quantum Information•Aug 4, 2016•12 citations

A Novel Quantum Key Distribution Protocol on 4-dimensional Hilbert Space

Li Shu, Yumin Wang

A novel quantum key distribution protocol is proposed in this paper,by constructing three different types of measurement bases.Such unusual construction guarantees that all possible errors occurred on two qubits can be detected,and provides the unconditional security proof.The most distinguishable advantage of the QKD protocol is saving a great amount of quantum and classical communications.

Jisuanji Kexue•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Unconditional security proof of a deterministic quantum key distribution with a two-way quantum channel

Hua Lu, Chi‐Hang Fred Fung, Xiongfeng Ma +1 more

In a deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol with a two-way quantum channel, Bob sends a qubit to Alice who then encodes a key bit onto the qubit and sends it back to Bob. After measuring the returned qubit, Bob can obtain Alice's key bit immediately, without basis reconciliation. Since an eavesdropper may attack the qubits traveling on either the Bob-Alice channel or the Alice-Bob channel, the security analysis of DQKD protocol with a two-way quantum channel is complicated and its unconditional security has been controversial. This paper presents a security proof of a single-photon four-state DQKD protocol against general attacks.

arXiv:1111.0109•Physical Review A•Oct 31, 2011•71 citations
So far, unconditional security in key distribution processes has been confined to quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on the no-cloning theorem of nonorthogonal bases. Recently, a completely different approach, the unconditionally secured classical key distribution (USCKD), has been proposed for unconditional security in the purely classical regime. Unlike QKD, both classical channels and orthogonal bases are key ingredients in USCKD, where unconditional security is provided by deterministic randomness via path superposition-based reversible unitary transformations in a coupled Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Here, the first experimental demonstration of the USCKD protocol is presented.
Over decades quantum cryptography has been intensively studied for unconditionally secured key distribution in a quantum regime. Due to the quantum loopholes caused by imperfect single photon detectors and/or lossy quantum channels, however, the quantum cryptography is practically inefficient and even vulnerable to eavesdropping. Here, a method of unconditionally secured key distribution potentially compatible with current fiber-optic communications networks is proposed in a classical regime for high-speed optical backbone networks. The unconditional security is due to the quantum superposition-caused measurement indistinguishability between paired transmission channels and its unitary transformation resulting in deterministic randomness corresponding to the no-cloning theorem in a quantum key distribution protocol.
In this presentation, we show some counter-examples to a naive belief that the security of QKD is based on no-cloning theorem. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice's two-photon emission part in "SARG04 protocol" proposed by V. Scarani et al, in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004). This protocol differs from BB84 only in the classical communication. It is, thus, interesting to see how only the classical communication of QKD protocol might qualitatively change its security. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing channel
The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.
In majority of protocols of secure quantum communication (such as, BB84, B92, etc.), the unconditional security of the protocols are obtained by using conjugate coding (two or more mutually unbiased bases (MUBs)). Initially, all the conjugate-coding-based protocols of secure quantum communication were restricted to quantum key distribution (QKD), but later on they were extended to other cryptographic tasks (such as, secure direct quantum communication and quantum key agreement). In contrast to the conjugate-coding-based protocols, a few completely orthogonal-state-based protocols of unconditionally secure QKD (such as, Goldenberg–Vaidman and N09) were also proposed. However, till the recent past, orthogonal-state-based protocols were only a theoretical concept and were limited to QKD. Only recently, orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKD are experimentally realized and extended to cryptographic tasks beyond QKD. This paper aims to briefly review the orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum communication that are recently introduced by our group and other researchers.
In a deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol with a two-way quantum channel, Bob sends a qubit to Alice who then encodes a key bit onto the qubit and sends it back to Bob. After measuring the returned qubit, Bob can obtain Alice's key bit immediately, without basis reconciliation. Since an eavesdropper may attack the qubits traveling on either the Bob-Alice channel or the Alice-Bob channel, the security analysis of DQKD protocol with a two-way quantum channel is complicated and its unconditional security has been controversial. This paper presents a security proof of a single-photon four-state DQKD protocol against general attacks.