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arXiv:1810.13346 · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

A Framework for Quantum-Secure Device-Independent Randomness Expansion

Peter J. Brown, Sammy Ragy, Roger Colbeck

Published Dec 17, 2019• 53 citations
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Abstract

A device-independent randomness expansion protocol aims to take an initial random seed and generate a longer one without relying on details of how the devices operate for security. A large amount of work to date has focussed on a particular protocol based on spot-checking devices using the CHSH inequality. Here we show how to derive randomness expansion rates for a wide range of protocols, with security against a quantum adversary. Our technique uses semidefinite programming and a recent improvement of the entropy accumulation theorem. To support the work and facilitate its use, we provide code that can generate lower bounds on the amount of randomness that can be output based on the measured quantities in the protocol. As an application, we give a protocol that robustly generates up to two bits of randomness per entangled qubit pair, which is twice that established in existing analyses of the spot-checking CHSH protocol in the low noise regime.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2019.2960252

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A device-independent randomness expansion protocol aims to take an initial random seed and generate a longer one without relying on details of how the devices operate for security. A large amount of work to date has focussed on a particular protocol based on spot-checking devices using the CHSH inequality. Here we show how to derive randomness expansion rates for a wide range of protocols, with security against a quantum adversary. Our technique uses semidefinite programming and a recent improvement of the entropy accumulation theorem. To support the work and facilitate its use, we provide code that can generate lower bounds on the amount of randomness that can be output based on the measured quantities in the protocol. As an application, we give a protocol that robustly generates up to two bits of randomness per entangled qubit pair, which is twice that established in existing analyses of the spot-checking CHSH protocol in the low noise regime.
A device-independent randomness expansion protocol aims to take an initial random string and generate a longer one, where the security of the protocol does not rely on knowing the inner workings of the devices used to run it. In order to do so, the protocol tests that the devices violate a Bell inequality and one then needs to bound the amount of extractable randomness in terms of the observed violation. The entropy accumulation theorem gives a bound in terms of the single-round von Neumann entropy of any strategy achieving the observed score. Tight bounds on this are known for the one-sided randomness when using the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game. Here we find the minimum von Neumann entropies for a given CHSH score relevant for one and two sided randomness that can be applied to various protocols. In particular, we show the gain that can be made by using the two-sided randomness and by using a protocol without spot-checking where the input randomness is recycled. We also discuss protocols that fully close the locality loophole while expanding randomness. Although our bounds are mostly numerical, we conjecture analytic formulae for the curves in two cases.
Device-independent security is the gold standard for quantum cryptography: not only is security based entirely on the laws of quantum mechanics, but it holds irrespective of any a priori assumptions on the quantum devices used in a protocol, making it particularly applicable in a quantum-wary environment. While the existence of device-independent protocols for tasks such as randomness expansion and quantum key distribution has recently been established, the underlying proofs of security remain very challenging, yield rather poor key rates, and demand very high quality quantum devices, thus making them all but impossible to implement in practice. We introduce a technique for the analysis of device-independent cryptographic protocols. We provide a flexible protocol and give a security proof that provides quantitative bounds that are asymptotically tight, even in the presence of general quantum adversaries. At a high level our approach amounts to establishing a reduction to the scenario in which the untrusted device operates in an identical and independent way in each round of the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the sequential nature of the protocol and makes use of a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” of Dupuis, Fawzi, and Renner [ Entropy Accumulation, preprint, 2016]. As concrete applications we give simple and modular security proofs for device-independent quantum key distribution and randomness expansion protocols based on the CHSH inequality. For both tasks, we establish essentially optimal asymptotic key rates and noise tolerance. In view of recent experimental progress, which has culminated in loophole-free Bell tests, it is likely that these protocols can be practically implemented in the near future.
A device-independent randomness expansion protocol aims to take an initial random string and generate a longer one, where the security of the protocol does not rely on knowing the inner workings of the devices used to run it. In order to do so, the protocol tests that the devices violate a Bell inequality and one then needs to bound the amount of extractable randomness in terms of the observed violation. The entropy accumulation theorem gives a bound in terms of the single-round von Neumann entropy of any strategy achieving the observed score. Tight bounds on this are known for the one-sided randomness when using the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game. Here we find the minimum von Neumann entropies for a given CHSH score relevant for one and two sided randomness that can be applied to various protocols. In particular, we show the gain that can be made by using the two-sided randomness and by using a protocol without spot-checking where the input randomness is recycled. We also discuss protocols that fully close the locality loophole while expanding randomness. Although our bounds are mostly numerical, we conjecture analytic formulae for the curves in two cases.
To generate genuine random numbers, random number generators based on quantum theory are essential. However, ensuring that the process used to produce randomness meets desired security standards can pose challenges for traditional quantum random number generators. This thesis delves into Device Independent (DI) and Semi-Device Independent (semi-DI) protocols of randomness expansion, based on a minimal set of experimentally verifiable security assumptions. The security in DI protocols relies on the violation of Bell inequalities, which certify the quantum behavior of devices. The semi-DI protocols discussed in this thesis require the characterization of only one device - a power meter. These protocols exploit the fact that quantum states can be prepared such that they cannot be distinguished with certainty, thereby creating a randomness resource. In this study, we introduce enhanced DI and semi-DI protocols that surpass existing ones in terms of output randomness rate, security, or in some instances, both. Our analysis employs the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) to determine the extractable randomness for finite rounds. A notable contribution is the introduction of randomness expansion protocols that recycle input randomness, significantly enhancing finite round randomness rates for DI protocols based on the CHSH inequality violation. In the final section of the thesis, we delve into Generalized Probability Theories (GPTs), with a focus on Boxworld, the largest GPT capable of producing correlations consistent with relativity. A tractable criterion for identifying a Boxworld channel is presented.
Abstract A device-independent randomness expansion (DIRE) protocol aims to take an initial random string and generate a longer one, where the security of the protocol does not rely on knowing the inner workings of the devices used to run it. In order to do so, the protocol tests that the devices violate a Bell inequality and one then needs to bound the amount of extractable randomness in terms of the observed violation. The entropy accumulation theorem lower bounds the extractable randomness of a protocol with many rounds in terms of the single-round von Neumann entropy of any strategy achieving the observed score. Tight bounds on the von Neumann entropy are known for the one-sided randomness (i.e. where the randomness from only one party is used) when using the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt game. Here we investigate the possible improvement that could be gained using the two-sided randomness. We generate upper bounds on this randomness by attempting to find the optimal eavesdropping strategy, providing analytic formulae in two cases. We additionally compute lower bounds that outperform previous ones and can be made arbitrarily tight (at the expense of more computation time). These bounds get close to our upper bounds, and hence we conjecture that our upper bounds are tight. We also consider a modified protocol in which the input randomness is recycled. This modified protocol shows the possibility of rate gains of several orders of magnitude based on recent experimental parameters, making DIRE significantly more practical. It also enables the locality loophole to be closed while expanding randomness in a way that typical spot-checking protocols do not.
Randomness is a vital resource for modern-day information processing, especially for cryptography. A wide range of applications critically rely on abundant, high-quality random numbers generated securely. Here, we show how to expand a random seed at an exponential rate without trusting the underlying quantum devices. Our approach is secure against the most general adversaries, and has the following new features: cryptographic level of security, tolerating a constant level of imprecision in devices, requiring only unit size quantum memory (for each device component) in an honest implementation, and allowing a large natural class of constructions for the protocol. In conjunction with a recent work by Chung et al. [2014], it also leads to robust unbounded expansion using just 2 multipart devices. When adapted for distributing cryptographic keys, our method achieves, for the first time, exponential expansion combined with cryptographic security and noise tolerance. The proof proceeds by showing that the Rényi divergence of the outputs of the protocol (for a specific bounding operator) decreases linearly as the protocol iterates. At the heart of the proof are a new uncertainty principle on quantum measurements and a method for simulating trusted measurements with untrusted devices.