Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1807.06374

Elements of reality in quantum mechanics

Geoff Beck

Published Jul 17, 2018• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The notion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) "element of reality" is much discussed in the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Recently, it has become particularly relevant due to a proposed criterion of the physical reality of a given quantum mechanical observable [A. L. O. Bilobran and R. M. Angelo, Europhys. Lett. 112, 40005 (2015)]. We examine this proposal and its consequently related measure of non-locality [V. S. Gomez and R. M. Angelo, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012123, (2018)] and argue that the criterion is ill-described as quantifying physical reality without introducing serious inconsistency with the basic notions of realism that under-gird enquiry. We agree that this reality criterion demonstrates, along with the famous GHZ results, that general quantum observable values make for poor elements of reality. However, we also argue that this does not mean no such elements of reality are to be found in quantum theory. By arguing for, and adopting, probability distributions as these elements of reality instead, we demonstrate that the criterion of physical reality is actually one of observable predictability. We then examine the relationship of realism-based non-locality to the Bell form and find that, despite the flawed premise, this measure does indeed codify non-locality that is not captured by Bell inequalities.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1807.06374

Related papers

Quantum violations of joint reality

R. A. Caetano, R. M. Angelo

Based on (i) the physical principle of local causality and (ii) a certain notion of elements of reality, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen put forward an argument showing that physical instances may exist in which two noncommuting observables can be joint elements of the physical reality. Here, we introduce a new criterion of joint reality. We demonstrate that according to this criterion, quantum mechanics generally prevents noncommuting observables from having joint elements of reality. In addition, we introduce a measure to quantify the extent to which the criterion is violated and explore the implications of such a measure in connection with incompatibility and correlations. Our findings suggest new manners of interpreting quantum phenomena.

arXiv:2405.17300•Physical Review A•Sep 17, 2024•4 citations

Alternative Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument based on premises not falsified by Bell's theorem: weak macroscopic realism and weak local realism

Jesse Fulton, Run Yan Teh, M. D. Reid

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time ${t}_{f}$---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system $B$. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system $A$ simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.

arXiv:2208.01225•Physical Review A•Aug 13, 2024•6 citations

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities

László E. Szabó

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.

arXiv:0712.1318•Dec 9, 2007•13 citations

EPR Elements of Physical Reality in Quantum Mechanics

V. K. Thankappan, Ravi K. Menon

The concept of elements of physical reality (e.p.r.) in quantum mechanics as defined by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) is discussed in the context of the EPR–Bohm and the EPR–Bell experiments on a pair of spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. It is argued that EPR's definition of e.p.r. is appropriate to the EPR–Bell experiment rather than to the EPR–Bohm experiment, and that Bohr's interpretation of e.p.r. is also consistent with such a viewpoint. It is shown that the observed correlation between the spins of the two particles in the EPR–Bell experiment is just a manifestation of the correlation that exists between the wave functions of the particles in the singlet state and a consequence of the fact that a Stern–Gerlach magnet does not change the state of a particle but only transforms its wave function into a representation defined by the axis of the magnet. As such, the correlation is suggested to be an affirmation of Einstein's concept of locality, and not an evidence for nonlocality.

International Journal of Modern Physics A•Nov 20, 1997•0 citations

Decoherence as a Local and Realistic Account of the EPR Paradox

Everett X. Wang

Quantum mechanics, despite its extraordinary success in describing microscopic phenomena, continues to raise foundational questions concerning measurement, nonlocality, and the nature of physical reality. These issues are exemplified by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Bell inequality, which contrast quantum correlations with classical notions of locality and realism. In this work, we critically examine the assumptions underlying Bell’s theorem in light of the incompatible and contextual nature of quantum observables. We show that Bell’s constraint on simultaneous definite values for incompatible observables, together with the assumption of hidden variables, is not applicable to quantum mechanics itself, which is inherently nonclassical and contextual. When measurement is modeled as a local system-environment interaction within the framework of quantum decoherence, the resulting dynamics remain entirely local and unitary in the EPR scenario. Decoherence naturally selects pointer states and suppresses interference, giving rise to the appearance of wavefunction collapse consistent with quantum predictions. Importantly, the Bell correlations obtained in this framework reproduce the standard quantum results and are independent of both system-bath and inter-bath interactions, which affect only the rate of decoherence. Our analysis suggests that, in the EPR scenario, quantum mechanics can be both local and realistic when the wavefunction is treated as an ontic description of reality within the decoherence framework, offering a potential route toward a locally realistic quantum theory aligned with Einstein’s vision. This work contributes to a more rigorous foundation for quantum mechanics, providing insights that can accelerate progress in quantum computing and nanoenergy harvesting.

Nanoenergy Communications•Feb 3, 2026•0 citations

Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and EPR

Robert K. Clifton, Constantine Pagonis, Itamar Pitowsky

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association•Jan 1, 1992•29 citations
The notion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) "element of reality" is much discussed in the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Recently, it has become particularly relevant due to a proposed criterion of the physical reality of a given quantum mechanical observable [A. L. O. Bilobran and R. M. Angelo, Europhys. Lett. 112, 40005 (2015)]. We examine this proposal and its consequently related measure of non-locality [V. S. Gomez and R. M. Angelo, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012123, (2018)] and argue that the criterion is ill-described as quantifying physical reality without introducing serious inconsistency with the basic notions of realism that under-gird enquiry. We agree that this reality criterion demonstrates, along with the famous GHZ results, that general quantum observable values make for poor elements of reality. However, we also argue that this does not mean no such elements of reality are to be found in quantum theory. By arguing for, and adopting, probability distributions as these elements of reality instead, we demonstrate that the criterion of physical reality is actually one of observable predictability. We then examine the relationship of realism-based non-locality to the Bell form and find that, despite the flawed premise, this measure does indeed codify non-locality that is not captured by Bell inequalities.
Based on (i) the physical principle of local causality and (ii) a certain notion of elements of reality, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen put forward an argument showing that physical instances may exist in which two noncommuting observables can be joint elements of the physical reality. Here, we introduce a new criterion of joint reality. We demonstrate that according to this criterion, quantum mechanics generally prevents noncommuting observables from having joint elements of reality. In addition, we introduce a measure to quantify the extent to which the criterion is violated and explore the implications of such a measure in connection with incompatibility and correlations. Our findings suggest new manners of interpreting quantum phenomena.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time tf{t}_{f}tf​---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system BBB. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system AAA simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
The concept of elements of physical reality (e.p.r.) in quantum mechanics as defined by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) is discussed in the context of the EPR–Bohm and the EPR–Bell experiments on a pair of spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. It is argued that EPR's definition of e.p.r. is appropriate to the EPR–Bell experiment rather than to the EPR–Bohm experiment, and that Bohr's interpretation of e.p.r. is also consistent with such a viewpoint. It is shown that the observed correlation between the spins of the two particles in the EPR–Bell experiment is just a manifestation of the correlation that exists between the wave functions of the particles in the singlet state and a consequence of the fact that a Stern–Gerlach magnet does not change the state of a particle but only transforms its wave function into a representation defined by the axis of the magnet. As such, the correlation is suggested to be an affirmation of Einstein's concept of locality, and not an evidence for nonlocality.
Quantum mechanics, despite its extraordinary success in describing microscopic phenomena, continues to raise foundational questions concerning measurement, nonlocality, and the nature of physical reality. These issues are exemplified by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Bell inequality, which contrast quantum correlations with classical notions of locality and realism. In this work, we critically examine the assumptions underlying Bell’s theorem in light of the incompatible and contextual nature of quantum observables. We show that Bell’s constraint on simultaneous definite values for incompatible observables, together with the assumption of hidden variables, is not applicable to quantum mechanics itself, which is inherently nonclassical and contextual. When measurement is modeled as a local system-environment interaction within the framework of quantum decoherence, the resulting dynamics remain entirely local and unitary in the EPR scenario. Decoherence naturally selects pointer states and suppresses interference, giving rise to the appearance of wavefunction collapse consistent with quantum predictions. Importantly, the Bell correlations obtained in this framework reproduce the standard quantum results and are independent of both system-bath and inter-bath interactions, which affect only the rate of decoherence. Our analysis suggests that, in the EPR scenario, quantum mechanics can be both local and realistic when the wavefunction is treated as an ontic description of reality within the decoherence framework, offering a potential route toward a locally realistic quantum theory aligned with Einstein’s vision. This work contributes to a more rigorous foundation for quantum mechanics, providing insights that can accelerate progress in quantum computing and nanoenergy harvesting.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.