Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1709.02595 · Journal of Mathematical Economics

Targeting in quantum persuasion problem

V. I. Danilov, Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky

Published May 3, 2018• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.005

Related papers

The Power of Distraction: An Experimental Test of Quantum Persuasion

Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky, Adrian Calmettes, Hervé Gonay

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations

"Phishing For (quantum-like) Phools" Theory and experimental evidence "Phishing For (quantum-like) Phools" * Theory and experimental evidence †

Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky, André Calmettes

Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov et al. 2018A). We here test the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first provide a quantum decision model for a choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we conduct an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We test the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involves 900 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people's decision-making can be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representations of reality.

•Jun 1, 2019•0 citations

Quantum Decision Making by Social Agents

Vyacheslav I. Yukalov, Didier Sornette

•Jan 1, 2012•12 citations

Truth Revelation, Information Hiding, or Misinformation: Characterization of Equilibrium Outcomes in Signaling Games

Ertan Kazıklı, Sinan Gezici, Serdar Yüksel

In signaling games where a sender and a receiver have misaligned criteria, equilibrium behavior may lead to fully revealing, quantized, or randomized policies. Notably, the first arises in statistical decision theory and classical communication theoretic problems involving a fully aligned sensor and receiver, the second arises in Nash theoretic simultaneous signaling games, and the last may appear in Stackelberg type (leader-follower) Bayesian signaling games. In this paper, we investigate the Bayesian persuasion problem involving a receiver that tries to estimate the source. We show that for certain payoff structures, the equilibrium solution is such that a source observation is mapped to distinct messages with nonzero probabilities. More specifically, we completely characterize conditions under which the sender requires randomization for the Bayesian persuasion problem involving general sources with finite cardinality. In particular, regardless of whether the equilibrium solution under a deterministic policy restriction is fully revealing, quantized or noninformative, there exists a randomized sender policy that improves the sender's payoff under certain conditions characterized in the paper. Moreover, we provide an algorithmic procedure to obtain the Bayesian persuasion solution, where the algorithm compares the payoffs with finitely many posterior probability combinations. We also consider fully aligned and completely misaligned payoff structures, where the solutions respectively involve a fully revealing sender and a noninformative sender. Then, we unify these results by proving that if the sender's expected payoff with respect to posterior distributions is continuous, then the equilibrium solution involves either a fully revealing sender or a noninformative sender.

arXiv:2609.05489•Aug 25, 2026•0 citations

Quantum Bayesian Decision-Making

Michael de Oliveira, Luís Soares Barbosa

arXiv:2010.02088•Foundations of Science•Mar 20, 2021•10 citations

Phishing for (Quantum-Like) Phools—Theory and Experimental Evidence

Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky, Adrian Calmettes

Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov, Lambert-Mogiliansky & Vergopoulos, 2018). We provide a first test of the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that, in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first develop a quantum decision model of choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we provide the results from a first test of the theory. We conducted an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We tested the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involved 1253 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people’s decision-making can to some extent be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representation of reality.

Symmetry•Jan 21, 2021•3 citations
Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov et al. 2018A). We here test the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first provide a quantum decision model for a choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we conduct an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We test the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involves 900 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people's decision-making can be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representations of reality.
In signaling games where a sender and a receiver have misaligned criteria, equilibrium behavior may lead to fully revealing, quantized, or randomized policies. Notably, the first arises in statistical decision theory and classical communication theoretic problems involving a fully aligned sensor and receiver, the second arises in Nash theoretic simultaneous signaling games, and the last may appear in Stackelberg type (leader-follower) Bayesian signaling games. In this paper, we investigate the Bayesian persuasion problem involving a receiver that tries to estimate the source. We show that for certain payoff structures, the equilibrium solution is such that a source observation is mapped to distinct messages with nonzero probabilities. More specifically, we completely characterize conditions under which the sender requires randomization for the Bayesian persuasion problem involving general sources with finite cardinality. In particular, regardless of whether the equilibrium solution under a deterministic policy restriction is fully revealing, quantized or noninformative, there exists a randomized sender policy that improves the sender's payoff under certain conditions characterized in the paper. Moreover, we provide an algorithmic procedure to obtain the Bayesian persuasion solution, where the algorithm compares the payoffs with finitely many posterior probability combinations. We also consider fully aligned and completely misaligned payoff structures, where the solutions respectively involve a fully revealing sender and a noninformative sender. Then, we unify these results by proving that if the sender's expected payoff with respect to posterior distributions is continuous, then the equilibrium solution involves either a fully revealing sender or a noninformative sender.
Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov, Lambert-Mogiliansky & Vergopoulos, 2018). We provide a first test of the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that, in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first develop a quantum decision model of choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we provide the results from a first test of the theory. We conducted an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We tested the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involved 1253 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people’s decision-making can to some extent be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representation of reality.