Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov, Lambert-Mogiliansky & Vergopoulos, 2018). We provide a first test of the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that, in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first develop a quantum decision model of choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we provide the results from a first test of the theory. We conducted an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We tested the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involved 1253 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people’s decision-making can to some extent be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representation of reality.
Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov, Lambert-Mogiliansky & Vergopoulos, 2018). We provide a first test of the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that, in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first develop a quantum decision model of choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we provide the results from a first test of the theory. We conducted an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We tested the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involved 1253 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people’s decision-making can to some extent be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representation of reality.
Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov et al. 2018A). We here test the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first provide a quantum decision model for a choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we conduct an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We test the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involves 900 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people's decision-making can be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representations of reality.
The core assumptions of modern economic utility theories such as rationality have been placed under scrutiny by recent studies in decision theory and behavioural economics and fi?nance. The main questions that were explored in these studies could be expressed as follows: do people always make rational choices? Do they make use of the normative rules of traditional logic and probability when dealing with risk and uncertainty? Are there any alternative methods to capture choices and reasoning when individuals are faced with uncertainty and risk? In this thesis I will elaborate on an interdisciplinary application of so-called QL (quantum-like) models to decision-making problems in ?finance and other socio-economic contexts. The core inquiry of this work is related to experimental tests of decision making with the help of investment related questions. Calculus and logic borrowed from quantum physics will be used to develop probabilistic models for the formation and evolution of decisions in ?finance context with the potential to generalize to other social decision- making settings. The main fi?ndings of this thesis can be summarized as follows: individuals exhibit preference reversals and context-dependent behaviour in different informational contexts. In particular, in condition of risk individuals exhibit uncertainty aversion and thus aversion to participating in other investment task, violating the postulates of classical probability theory. The core principle of rational (consequential) behaviour conceived by Savage (1954) [207], that is the "Savage Sure Thing" principle, was shown to be violated. In mathematical language, this violation is equivalent to the violation of the "Law of total probability". Implying contextuality of human judgement, different events cannot be jointly evaluated in a single probability space. Moreover, additional experimental fi?ndings showed that participants exhibited reference dependence in their risk attitudes depending on the preceding gain respective loss. These fi?ndings were statistically signi?cant and a quantum model for accommodating the above effects of contextual behaviour is introduced. A geometric depiction of the experimental fi?ndings was proposed. A so-called `state reconstruction' procedure from statistical data was performed via the inverse Born's rule (1926) [47], allowing the construction of a complete representation of agents' resolution from indeterminacy.
We present the mathematical model of decision-making (DM) of agents acting in a complex and uncertain environment (combining huge variety of economical, financial, behavioural and geopolitical factors). To describe interaction of agents with it, we apply the formalism of quantum field theory (QTF). Quantum fields are a purely informational nature. The QFT model can be treated as a far relative of the expected utility theory, where the role of utility is played by adaptivity to an environment (bath). However, this sort of utility-adaptivity cannot be represented simply as a numerical function. The operator representation in Hilbert space is used and adaptivity is described as in quantum dynamics. We are especially interested in stabilization of solutions for sufficiently large time. The outputs of this stabilization process, probabilities for possible choices, are treated in the framework of classical DM. To connect classical and quantum DM, we appeal to Quantum Bayesianism. We demonstrate the quantum-like interference effect in DM, which is exhibited as a violation of the formula of total probability, and hence the classical Bayesian inference scheme.This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
How can we use quantum theory to model other phenomena of interest to researchers in cognition and decision making? Quantum theory is not easy for researchers in cognition and decision making to accept. In fact, quantum mechanics was not easy for physicists to accept either, but it was forced on them by several paradoxical findings that could not be explained using classical physics. We have a similar problem in cognition and decision making – there are numerous paradoxical findings that just seem irrational according to classic probability theory. For example, under some conditions, people judge the probability of event A and B to be greater than the probability of event B , which is called the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Also, under the same conditions, they judge the probability of A or B to be less than the probability of event A (Carlson & Yates, 1989), which is called the disjunction fallacy. In this chapter we examine how quantum probability theory explains these and other puzzling results from human probability judgment research. This chapter has two main parts. In the first part, we use a quantum model to derive qualitative predictions for conjunction errors, disjunction errors, and other closely related findings. The first section provides a general set of predictions that do not depend on specific assumptions about the features used to represent events, and the predictions are parameter free. In the second part, we examine the quantitative predictions of the quantum model for a Bayesian inference task, which we use to explain order effects on inference.
Classical models of decision-making under uncertainty, grounded in expected utility theory and Bayesian probability, often fail to account for systematic cognitive anomalies such as preference reversals, order effects, ambiguity aversion, and context-dependent choices. Quantum cognition models offer a novel theoretical framework that applies the mathematical principles of quantum probability—such as superposition, interference, and non-commutativity—to cognitive processes without assuming physical quantum mechanisms in the brain. By representing cognitive states as probabilistic superpositions that collapse through decision “measurements,” these models provide parsimonious explanations for violations of classical rationality. This paper examines how quantum cognition frameworks capture contextual influence, belief updating, and interference effects in uncertain decision environments. Drawing on findings from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, the study highlights the relevance of quantum cognition for applications in economic choice modeling, legal decision analysis, and artificial intelligence. The analysis suggests that quantum probability offers a robust alternative to classical approaches when modeling human decision-making in complex, ambiguous, and context-sensitive situations.
Of the three faculties of subjectivity, the empirical case for quantum cognition is the strongest. In the past decade a rapidly growing body of scholarship has emerged at the intersection of mathematical psychology and physics that not only models cognition in explicitly quantum terms, but has rigorously tested these models as well. While it remains to be seen how mainstream psychologists will respond, “quantum decision theory” has clearly come of age. Moreover, at the same time an almost completely independent literature has emerged on quantum game theory as well. This work is more in a purely formal vein and thus less well tested against real data, although its predictions about how people should behave in quantum games appear to conform to what experimental game theorists have found. I briefly take up quantum game theory at the end of this chapter, but my main focus will be on its decision-theoretic cousin.