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arXiv:1610.01907 · New Journal of Physics

Entanglement generation secure against general attacks

Alexander Pirker, Vedran Dunjko, Wolfgang Dür, Hans J. Briegel

Published Nov 10, 2017• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We present a security proof for establishing private entanglement by means of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols over noisy quantum channels. We consider protocols where the local devices are imperfect, and show that nonetheless a confidential quantum channel can be established, and used to e.g. perform distributed quantum computation in a secure manner. While our results are not fully device independent (which we argue to be unachievable in settings with quantum outputs), our proof holds for arbitrary channel noise and noisy local operations, and even in the case where the eavesdropper learns the noise. Our approach relies on non-trivial properties of distillation protocols which are used in conjunction with de-Finetti and post-selection-type techniques to reduce a general quantum attack in a non-asymptotic scenario to an i.i.d. setting. As a side result, we also provide entanglement distillation protocols for non-i.i.d. input states.

DOI
10.1088/1367-2630/aa8086

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We present a security proof for establishing private entanglement by means of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols over noisy quantum channels. We consider protocols where the local devices are imperfect, and show that nonetheless a confidential quantum channel can be established, and used to e.g. perform distributed quantum computation in a secure manner. While our results are not fully device independent (which we argue to be unachievable in settings with quantum outputs), our proof holds for arbitrary channel noise and noisy local operations, and even in the case where the eavesdropper learns the noise. Our approach relies on non-trivial properties of distillation protocols which are used in conjunction with de-Finetti and post-selection-type techniques to reduce a general quantum attack in a non-asymptotic scenario to an i.i.d. setting. As a side result, we also provide entanglement distillation protocols for non-i.i.d. input states.
Complete security proofs for quantum communication protocols can be notoriously involved, which convolutes their verification, and obfuscates the key physical insights the security finally relies on. In such cases, for the majority of the community, the utility of such proofs may be restricted. Here, we provide a simple proof of confidentiality for parallel quantum channels established via entanglement distillation based on hashing, in the presence of noise, and a malicious eavesdropper who is restricted only by the laws of quantum mechanics. The direct contribution lies in improving the linear confidentiality levels of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols to exponential levels for hashing protocols. The proof directly exploits the security relevant physical properties: measurement-based quantum computation with resource states and the separation of Bell-pairs from an eavesdropper. The proof also holds for situations where Eve has full control over the input states, and obtains all information about the operations and noise applied by the parties. The resulting state after hashing is private, i.e. disentangled from the eavesdropper. Moreover, the noise regimes for entanglement distillation and confidentiality do not coincide: confidentiality can be guaranteed even in situations where entanglement distillation fails. We extend our results to multiparty situations which are of special interest for secure quantum networks.
We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is sufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel. In the security regime, the purification process factorizes the overall initial state into a tensor-product state of Alice and Bob, on one side, and Eve on the other side, thus establishing a completely private, albeit noisy, quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob. The security regime is found to coincide for all practical purposes with the purification regime of a two-way recurrence protocol. This makes two-way entanglement purification protocols, which constitute an important element in the quantum repeater, an efficient tool for secure long-distance quantum cryptography.
We provide a simple security proof for prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocols employing noisy processing and one-way postprocessing of the key. This is achieved by showing that the security of such a protocol is equivalent to that of an associated key distribution protocol in which, instead of the usual maximally entangled states, a more general private state is distilled. In addition to a more general target state, the usual entanglement distillation tools are employed (in particular, Calderbank-Shor-Steane-like codes), with the crucial difference that noisy processing allows some phase errors to be left uncorrected without compromising the privacy of the key.
Entanglement distillation is a fundamental task in quantum information processing. It not only extracts entanglement out of corrupted systems but also leads to protecting systems of interest against intervention with environment. In this work, we consider a realistic scenario of entanglement distillation where noisy quantum operations are applied. In particular, the two-way distillation protocol that tolerates the highest error rate is considered. We show that among all types of noise there are only four equivalence classes according to the distillability condition. Since the four classes are connected by local unitary transformations, our results can be used to improve entanglement distillability in practice when entanglement distillation is performed in a realistic setting.
Abstract We consider entanglement distillation with noisy operations in which quantum measurements that constitute a general quantum operation are particularly noisy. We present a protocol for purifying noisy measurements and show that imperfect local operations can distill entanglement. The protocol works for arbitrary noisy measurements in general and is cost-effective and resource-efficient with single additional qubit per party to resolve the distillation of entanglement. The purification protocol is feasible with currently available quantum technologies and readily applied to entanglement applications.
The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. We show that---for protocols that use quantum channels of any dimension and completely characterize them by state tomography---the noise threshold for classical advantage distillation of a specific kind is substantially lower than the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation if the eavesdropper can perform powerful coherent attacks. In marked contrast, earlier investigations had shown that the thresholds are identical for incoherent attacks on the same classical distillation scheme. It remains an open question whether other schemes for classical advantage distillation have higher thresholds for coherent eavesdropping attacks.