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arXiv:quant-ph/0111066 · Physical Review A

Security proof of quantum cryptography based entirely on entanglement purification

Hans Aschauer, Hans J. Briegel

Published Sep 4, 2002• 22 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is sufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel. In the security regime, the purification process factorizes the overall initial state into a tensor-product state of Alice and Bob, on one side, and Eve on the other side, thus establishing a completely private, albeit noisy, quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob. The security regime is found to coincide for all practical purposes with the purification regime of a two-way recurrence protocol. This makes two-way entanglement purification protocols, which constitute an important element in the quantum repeater, an efficient tool for secure long-distance quantum cryptography.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.66.032302

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•Jan 1, 2005•20 citations
We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is sufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel. In the security regime, the purification process factorizes the overall initial state into a tensor-product state of Alice and Bob, on one side, and Eve on the other side, thus establishing a completely private, albeit noisy, quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob. The security regime is found to coincide for all practical purposes with the purification regime of a two-way recurrence protocol. This makes two-way entanglement purification protocols, which constitute an important element in the quantum repeater, an efficient tool for secure long-distance quantum cryptography.
Complete security proofs for quantum communication protocols can be notoriously involved, which convolutes their verification, and obfuscates the key physical insights the security finally relies on. In such cases, for the majority of the community, the utility of such proofs may be restricted. Here, we provide a simple proof of confidentiality for parallel quantum channels established via entanglement distillation based on hashing, in the presence of noise, and a malicious eavesdropper who is restricted only by the laws of quantum mechanics. The direct contribution lies in improving the linear confidentiality levels of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols to exponential levels for hashing protocols. The proof directly exploits the security relevant physical properties: measurement-based quantum computation with resource states and the separation of Bell-pairs from an eavesdropper. The proof also holds for situations where Eve has full control over the input states, and obtains all information about the operations and noise applied by the parties. The resulting state after hashing is private, i.e. disentangled from the eavesdropper. Moreover, the noise regimes for entanglement distillation and confidentiality do not coincide: confidentiality can be guaranteed even in situations where entanglement distillation fails. We extend our results to multiparty situations which are of special interest for secure quantum networks.
We study the use of entanglement purification for quantum communication over long distances. For distances much longer than the coherence length of a corresponding noisy quantum channel, the fidelity of transmission is usually so low that standard purification methods are not applicable. It is possible, however, to divide the channel into shorter segments that are purified separately and then connected by the method of entanglement swapping. This method can be much more efficient than schemes based on quantum error correction, as it makes explicit use of two-way classical communication. An important question is how the noise, introduced by imperfect local operations (that constitute the protocols of purification and the entanglement swapping), accumulates in such a compound channel, and how it can be kept below a certain noise level. To treat this problem, we first study the applicability and the efficiency of entanglement purification protocols in the situation of imperfect local operations. We then present a scheme that allows entanglement purification over arbitrary long channels and tolerates errors on the percent level. It requires a polynomial overhead in time, and an overhead in local resources that grows only logarithmically with the length of the channel.
Entanglement purification protocols promise to play a critical role in the future of quantum networks by distributing entanglement across noisy channels. However, only the security of two-way purification protocols have been closely studied. To address this, we propose a one-way entanglement purification protocol which utilizes quantum sampling and prove its security against an adversary restricted to single qubit Pauli gates. This is done through leveraging the equivalence of one-way entanglement purification protocols with error-correcting codes. To prove the security of this protocol, we first use the quantum sampling framework introduced by Bouman and Fehr to estimate the Hamming weight of the qubits which passed through the channel and then use the estimated relative Hamming weight ωωω to determine the amount of interference that Eve has subjected to the quantum channel. Since Eve is restricted to single qubit Pauli gates, the number of applied gates can be directly estimated using the Hamming weight. Estimating the number of adversarial single qubit gates, allows us to perform error correction and disentangle the logical qubit from Eve with probability 1−εquδ1-ε_{qu}^δ1−εquδ​. Since this protocol allows communication only in one direction, the distance of the code must be decided before transmission, and therefore Bob will be forced to abort the protocol if he finds that Eve has applied more gates than the code can correct. One-way protocols may find use when communication is limited, or when we desire to decrease latency compared to the multiple rounds of communication needed in two-way protocols. Further research may investigate the security of this protocol against arbitrary single or multi-qubit gates to obtain security guarantees against a more general adversary.
Quantum cryptography shows that one can guarantee the secrecy of correlation on the sole basis of the laws of physics, that is, without limiting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The usual security proofs suppose that the authorized partners, Alice and Bob, have a perfect knowledge and control of their quantum systems and devices; for instance, they must be sure that the logical bits have been encoded in true qubits and not in higher dimensional systems. In this paper, we present an approach that circumvents this strong assumption. We define protocols, both for the case of bits and for generic ddd-dimensional outcomes, in which the security is guaranteed by the very structure of the Alice-Bob correlations, under the no-signaling condition. The idea is that if the correlations cannot be produced by shared randomness, then Eve has poor knowledge of Alice's and Bob's symbols. The present study assumes on the one hand that the eavesdropper Eve performs only individual attacks (this is a limitation to be removed in further work), and on the other hand that Eve can distribute any correlation compatible with the no-signaling condition (in this sense her power is greater than what quantum physics allows). Under these assumptions, we prove that the protocols defined here allow extracting secrecy from noisy correlations, when these correlations violate a Bell-type inequality by a sufficiently large amount. The region in which secrecy extraction is possible extends within the region of correlations achievable by measurements on entangled quantum states.
In this thesis, we investigate how protocols in quantum communication theory are influenced by noise. Specifically, we take into account noise during the transmission of quantum information and noise during the processing of quantum information. We describe three novel quantum communication protocols which can be accomplished efficiently in a noisy environment: (1) Factorization of Eve: We show that it is possible to disentangle transmitted qubits a posteriori from the quantum channel's degrees of freedom. (2) Cluster state purification: We give multi-partite entanglement purification protocols for a large class of entangled quantum states. (3) Entanglement purification protocols from quantum codes: We describe a constructive method to create bipartite entanglement purification protocols form quantum error correcting codes, and investigate the properties of these protocols, which can be operated in two different modes, which are related to quantum communication and quantum computation protocols, respectively.