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arXiv:1607.06080

An Epistemic View of Quantum Communication

Subhash C. Kak

Published Jul 20, 2016• 1 citation
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Abstract

This paper presents an epistemological perspective on quantum communication between parties that highlights the choices that must be made in order to send and obtain information. The notion of information obtained in such a communication is a property associated with the observers and while dependent on the nature of the physical system its fundamental basis is epistemic. We argue that the observation process is in accord with the principle of psychophysical parallelism that was used by Bohr, von Neumann, Schrodinger and others to establish the philosophical basis of complementarity but has since fallen out of fashion. This principle gave coherence to the original Copenhagen Interpretation without which the latter has come to have some sort of an ad hoc character.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1607.06080

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This paper presents an epistemological perspective on quantum communication between parties that highlights the choices that must be made in order to send and obtain information. The notion of information obtained in such a communication is a property associated with the observers and while dependent on the nature of the physical system its fundamental basis is epistemic. We argue that the observation process is in accord with the principle of psychophysical parallelism that was used by Bohr, von Neumann, Schrodinger and others to establish the philosophical basis of complementarity but has since fallen out of fashion. This principle gave coherence to the original Copenhagen Interpretation without which the latter has come to have some sort of an ad hoc character.
Quantum mechanics in the Wigner-von Neumann interpretation is presented. This is characterized by 1) a quantum dualism between matter and consciousness unified within an informational neutral monism, 2) a quantum perspectivism which is extended to a complementarity between the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds formalism, 3) a psychophysical causal closure akin to Leibniz parallelism and 4) a quantum solipsism, i.e. a reality in which classical states are only potentially-existing until a conscious observation is made.
It is usually asserted that physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, support a certain view of what the world really is. To such claims I oppose an attitude of epistemological modesty. Ontological statements on the nature of reality, when made on the basis of quantum mechanics, appear unwarranted. I suggest that an epistemic loop connects physical theory grounded in informational notions, and a theory of information developed through a theoretical account of the physical support of information.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
Under the assumption of the materialistic-mechanistic ontology implicit in classical physics, quantum theory as interpreted through Niels Bohr's epistemology of complementarity is not formally objective; i. e., it is not informative of the state of physical systems independent of particular phenomenal manifestations of them. However, an analysis of the notion of the “physical system”, in theory, as experienced, and as existing “in-itself”, reveals that if the older ontology is replaced, quantum mechanics through complementarity becomes formally objective, points the way toward a new ontology based on the notion of the power to structure interaction between systems, and provides new insights into the relations between theory, observation, and the natural world.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state SSS with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains many elements ZZZ. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time nnn can be separated from relational time ttt, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each nnn, in which ttt represents the knowledge at sequential time nnn about the temporal relations between present and past events.