It is usually asserted that physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, support a certain view of what the world really is. To such claims I oppose an attitude of epistemological modesty. Ontological statements on the nature of reality, when made on the basis of quantum mechanics, appear unwarranted. I suggest that an epistemic loop connects physical theory grounded in informational notions, and a theory of information developed through a theoretical account of the physical support of information.
It is usually asserted that physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, support a certain view of what the world really is. To such claims I oppose an attitude of epistemological modesty. Ontological statements on the nature of reality, when made on the basis of quantum mechanics, appear unwarranted. I suggest that an epistemic loop connects physical theory grounded in informational notions, and a theory of information developed through a theoretical account of the physical support of information.
This study examines the epistemological implications of competinginterpretations of quantum states, focusing on the distinction between epistemicand ontological accounts of the wave function (Harrigan & Spekkens, 2010).Rather than treating interpretative disputes as purely metaphysical, this studyanalyses the extent to which quantum theory constrains, enables or underminesclaims to knowledge about physical reality (van Fraassen, 2008). By situatingthe epistemic–ontological debate within broader discussions of realism,objectivity and scientific explanation, this study argues that quantum theorynecessitates a reconceptualisation of epistemic access to reality (O’Neill,1997). Particular attention is given to the roles of uncertainty, contextuality andobserver-dependence in shaping the epistemic limits of quantum physics (Bohr,1935). The article concludes by proposing a moderate epistemic realism thatpreserves empirical objectivity while acknowledging principled limits onontological transparency (Healey, 2017).
Quantum mechanics was reformulated as an information theory involving a generalized kind of information, namely quantum information, in the end of the last century. Quantum mechanics is the most fundamental physical theory referring to all claiming to be physical. Any physical entity turns out to be quantum information in the final analysis. A quantum bit is the unit of quantum information, and it is a generalization of the unit of classical information, a bit, as well as the quantum information itself is a generalization of classical information. Classical information refers to finite series or sets while quantum information, to infinite ones. Quantum information as well as classical information is a dimensionless quantity. Quantum information can be considered as a “bridge” between the mathematical and physical. The standard and common scientific epistemology grants the gap between the mathematical models and physical reality. The conception of truth as adequacy is what is able to transfer “over” that gap. One should explain how quantum information being a continuous transition between the physical and mathematical may refer to truth as adequacy and thus to the usual scientific epistemology and methodology. If it is the overall substance of anything claiming to be physical, one can question how different and dimensional physical quantities appear. Quantum information can be discussed as the counterpart of action. Quantum information is what is conserved, action is what is changed in virtue of the fundamental theorems of Emmy Noether (1918). The gap between mathematical models and physical reality, needing truth as adequacy to be overcome, is substituted by the openness of choice. That openness in turn can be interpreted as the openness of the present as a different concept of truth recollecting Heidegger’s one as “unconcealment” (ἀλήθεια). Quantum information as what is conserved can be thought as the conservation of that openness
In recent years, many scholars (Ladyman & Ross [39]; Floridi [25]; Bynum [9]) have been discussing the possibility of an ‘informational’ realism. The common idea behind these projects is that of taking the notion of ‘information’ as the central concept of both our scientific practice and our ontology. At the same time, many experts in Quantum Information Theory (Lloyd [40]; Vedral [53]; Chiribella, D’Ariano & Perinotti [14]) have developed the idea that it is possible to ground all our physical theories by following an information-theoretic approach. In what follows, I aim at showing that it is still not at all clear what does it mean to be an ‘informational realist’. Consequently, I show the reasons why I believe is misleading to talk about informational realism as something that could actually supersede the most common forms of realism, namely the standard ‘object oriented’ and the structural ones. Finally, I suggest that the only plausible way to define informational realism, and thus, more generally, to take a realist attitudine towards Quantum Information Theory, is that of assuming an epistemic and moderate structural position.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
What is real and how does the world function? Humanity has been fascinated by this subject from the beginning of time. The prevalent worldview has needed to be regularly revised since the 16th century, but with the introduction of relativity theory and quantum physics at the start of the 20th century, things became really odd. The function of information is currently the main emphasis, and there is disagreement about whether this is ontological or epistemological. Recently, a hypothesis has been developed according to which microscopic quantum information-more precisely, quantum entanglement via entanglement entropy-is the source of spacetime and gravity. A contemporary idea uses algorithmic information theory and first-person viewpoint experiences to explain how reality itself emerges. Perception and observation are key concepts in quantum physics. Information must be shared in order to see and interact with the world. Information is provided the interpretation required to enable life and consciousness by biological projection.
The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance (PI) — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’ (MA). The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR). The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism (it would be a miracle if a scientific theory were predictively successful unless it were also approximately true with regard to its description of reality) while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction (most predictively successful theories along with their associated ontologies have been overturned, so we should expect the same of our current theories). I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist.