Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1604.07422 · Nature Communications

Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself

Daniela Frauchiger, Renato Renner

Published Sep 7, 2018• 544 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum theory provides an extremely accurate description of fundamental processes in physics. It thus seems likely that the theory is applicable beyond the, mostly microscopic, domain in which it has been tested experimentally. Here, we propose a Gedankenexperiment to investigate the question whether quantum theory can, in principle, have universal validity. The idea is that, if the answer was yes, it must be possible to employ quantum theory to model complex systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory. Analysing the experiment under this presumption, we find that one agent, upon observing a particular measurement outcome, must conclude that another agent has predicted the opposite outcome with certainty. The agents' conclusions, although all derived within quantum theory, are thus inconsistent. This indicates that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner.

DOI
10.1038/s41467-018-05739-8

Related papers

How to Ensure Logical Consistency of Quantum Theory

Jindřich Krčmář

Predictions of quantum theory have been confirmed experimentally in the microscopic domain with no known exceptions. This success motivates physicists to assume universal validity of the theory. To put the predictions of the quantum theory to the test in the domain of more complex systems researchers like e.g. Eugene Wigner have proposed carefully designed Gedankenexperiments revealing unexpected difficulties of the theory. Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner have recently suggested an extension of the Gedankenexperiment commonly known as Wigner's friend and arrived at a conclusion that one agent, upon observing a particular measurement outcome, must conclude that another agent has predicted the opposite outcome with certainty. Their analysis shows that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Here, we will study the mentioned Gedankenexperiments and introduce an approach leading to consistent predictions of quantum theory, independent of observer using the theory.

arXiv:1904.07437•Apr 15, 2019•0 citations

Testing quantum theory with thought experiments

Nuriya Nurgalieva, Renato Renner

Quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories; its predictions agree with experimental observations to an extremely high accuracy. However, the bare formalism of quantum theory does not provide straightforward answers to seemingly simple questions: for example, how should one model systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory? These foundational questions may be investigated with a theorist's tool – the thought experiment. Its purpose is to turn debates about the interpretation of quantum theory into actual physics questions. In this article, we give a state-of-the-art overview on quantum thought experiments involving observers, from the basic Wigner's friend to the recent Frauchiger-Renner setup, clarifying their interpretational significance and responding to objections and criticism on the way.

arXiv:2106.05314•Contemporary Physics•Jul 2, 2020•26 citations

Is it a matter of size?

Alastair I. M. Rae

The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 7, 2004•0 citations

Is it a matter of size?

Alastair I. M. Rae

The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Mar 26, 2012•0 citations

Comments on "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself"

Chen, Liang, Ye-Qi Zhang

Recently, a delicately designed Gedankenexperiment was proposed to check the self-consistence of quantum theory in the description of the agents who are using this theory. It was demonstrated that the quantum theory is inconsistent. Here a critical improvement is presented, which can lead to a consistent explanation of the Gedankenexperiment by using quantum theory.

arXiv:1810.01080•Oct 2, 2018•2 citations

Quantum theory has no problem consistently describing the use of itself

Guang Ping He

In a recent publication in Nature Communications by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)), a Gedankenexperiment was proposed, which was claimed to be able to lead to inconsistent conclusions with a self-referential use of quantum theory. Thus it seems to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Shortly after, Chen and Zhang suggested an improvement (arXiv:1810.01080) which can made the explanation of the Gedankenexperiment become consistent. Here we show that from the viewpoint of any quantum interpretation theory which agrees that there is collapse of the wavefunction when being measured (e.g., the Copenhagen interpretation), the original conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from an incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, even without modifying the original Gedankenexperiment.

•Oct 16, 2018•2 citations
Quantum theory provides an extremely accurate description of fundamental processes in physics. It thus seems likely that the theory is applicable beyond the, mostly microscopic, domain in which it has been tested experimentally. Here, we propose a Gedankenexperiment to investigate the question whether quantum theory can, in principle, have universal validity. The idea is that, if the answer was yes, it must be possible to employ quantum theory to model complex systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory. Analysing the experiment under this presumption, we find that one agent, upon observing a particular measurement outcome, must conclude that another agent has predicted the opposite outcome with certainty. The agents' conclusions, although all derived within quantum theory, are thus inconsistent. This indicates that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner.
Predictions of quantum theory have been confirmed experimentally in the microscopic domain with no known exceptions. This success motivates physicists to assume universal validity of the theory. To put the predictions of the quantum theory to the test in the domain of more complex systems researchers like e.g. Eugene Wigner have proposed carefully designed Gedankenexperiments revealing unexpected difficulties of the theory. Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner have recently suggested an extension of the Gedankenexperiment commonly known as Wigner's friend and arrived at a conclusion that one agent, upon observing a particular measurement outcome, must conclude that another agent has predicted the opposite outcome with certainty. Their analysis shows that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Here, we will study the mentioned Gedankenexperiments and introduce an approach leading to consistent predictions of quantum theory, independent of observer using the theory.
Quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories; its predictions agree with experimental observations to an extremely high accuracy. However, the bare formalism of quantum theory does not provide straightforward answers to seemingly simple questions: for example, how should one model systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory? These foundational questions may be investigated with a theorist's tool – the thought experiment. Its purpose is to turn debates about the interpretation of quantum theory into actual physics questions. In this article, we give a state-of-the-art overview on quantum thought experiments involving observers, from the basic Wigner's friend to the recent Frauchiger-Renner setup, clarifying their interpretational significance and responding to objections and criticism on the way.
The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.
The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.
In a recent publication in Nature Communications by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)), a Gedankenexperiment was proposed, which was claimed to be able to lead to inconsistent conclusions with a self-referential use of quantum theory. Thus it seems to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Shortly after, Chen and Zhang suggested an improvement (arXiv:1810.01080) which can made the explanation of the Gedankenexperiment become consistent. Here we show that from the viewpoint of any quantum interpretation theory which agrees that there is collapse of the wavefunction when being measured (e.g., the Copenhagen interpretation), the original conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from an incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, even without modifying the original Gedankenexperiment.