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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Is it a matter of size?

Alastair I. M. Rae

Published Mar 26, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781107295605.010

Related papers

Is it a matter of size?

Alastair I. M. Rae

The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 7, 2004•0 citations

Many worlds

Alastair I. M. Rae

A completely different interpretation of the measurement problem, one which many professional scientists have found attractive if only because of its mathematical elegance, was first suggested by Hugh Everett III in 1957 and is known variously as the ‘relative state’, ‘many-worlds’ or ‘branching-universe’ interpretation. This viewpoint gives no special role to the conscious mind and to this extent the theory is completely objective, but we shall see that many of its other consequences are in their own way just as revolutionary as those discussed in the previous chapter. The essence of the many-worlds interpretation can be illustrated by again considering the example of the 45° polarised photon approaching the H/V detector. Remember what we demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4: from the wave point of view a 45° polarised light wave is equivalent to a superposition of a horizontally polarised wave and a vertically polarised wave. If we were able to think purely in terms of waves, the effect of the H/V polariser on the 45° polarised wave would be simply to split the wave into these two components. These would then travel through the H and V channels respectively, half the original intensity being detected in each. Photons, however, cannot be split but can be considered to be in a superposition state until a measurement ‘collapses’ the system into one or other of its possible outcomes. Up to now, we have argued that collapse must inevitably happen somewhere in the measurement chain – even if only when the information reaches a conscious mind.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 7, 2004•0 citations

Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Simon W. Saunders

Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.

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- Many-Worlds or Collapse of the Wave-Function? -

Tejinder P. Singh

At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wave-function collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes non-linear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this non-linear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative | >=

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Quantum measurement and quantum gravity: many-worlds or collapse of the wavefunction?

T. P. Singh

At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wavefunction collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes nonlinear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this nonlinear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative differential geometry, we develop such a reformulation and derive a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, which can explain collapse of the wavefunction. We also obtain an expression for the lifetime of a quantum superposition. We suggest ideas for an experimental test of this model.

arXiv:0711.3773•Journal of Physics Conference Series•Jun 1, 2009•16 citations

Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality?

Alastair I. M. Rae

Quantum physics is believed to be the fundamental theory underlying our understanding of the physical universe. However, it is based on concepts and principles that have always been difficult to understand and controversial in their interpretation. This book aims to explain these issues using a minimum of technical language and mathematics. After a brief introduction to the ideas of quantum physics, the problems of interpretation are identified and explained. The rest of the book surveys, describes and criticises a range of suggestions that have been made with the aim of resolving these problems; these include the traditional, or 'Copenhagen' interpretation, the possible role of the conscious mind in measurement and the postulate of parallel universes. This new edition has been revised throughout to take into account developments in this field over the past fifteen years, including the idea of 'consistent histories' to which a completely new chapter is devoted.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Mar 26, 2012•3 citations
The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.
The last two chapters have described two extreme views of the quantum measurement problem. On the one hand it was suggested that the laws of quantum physics are valid for all physical systems, but break down in the assumed non-physical conscious mind. On the other hand the many-worlds approach assumes that the laws of physics apply universally and that a branching of the universe occurs at every measurement or measurement-like event. However, although in one sense these represent opposite extremes, what both approaches have in common is a desire to preserve quantum theory as the one fundamental universal theory of the physical universe, able to explain equally well the properties of atoms and subatomic particles on the one hand and detectors, counters and cats on the other. In this chapter we explore an alternative possibility, that quantum theory may have to be modified before it can explain the behaviour of large-scale macroscopic objects as well as microscopic systems. We will require that any such modification preserves the principle of weak reductionism discussed towards the end of Chapter 5.
A completely different interpretation of the measurement problem, one which many professional scientists have found attractive if only because of its mathematical elegance, was first suggested by Hugh Everett III in 1957 and is known variously as the ‘relative state’, ‘many-worlds’ or ‘branching-universe’ interpretation. This viewpoint gives no special role to the conscious mind and to this extent the theory is completely objective, but we shall see that many of its other consequences are in their own way just as revolutionary as those discussed in the previous chapter. The essence of the many-worlds interpretation can be illustrated by again considering the example of the 45° polarised photon approaching the H/V detector. Remember what we demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4: from the wave point of view a 45° polarised light wave is equivalent to a superposition of a horizontally polarised wave and a vertically polarised wave. If we were able to think purely in terms of waves, the effect of the H/V polariser on the 45° polarised wave would be simply to split the wave into these two components. These would then travel through the H and V channels respectively, half the original intensity being detected in each. Photons, however, cannot be split but can be considered to be in a superposition state until a measurement ‘collapses’ the system into one or other of its possible outcomes. Up to now, we have argued that collapse must inevitably happen somewhere in the measurement chain – even if only when the information reaches a conscious mind.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wave-function collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes non-linear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this non-linear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative | >=
At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wavefunction collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes nonlinear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this nonlinear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative differential geometry, we develop such a reformulation and derive a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, which can explain collapse of the wavefunction. We also obtain an expression for the lifetime of a quantum superposition. We suggest ideas for an experimental test of this model.
Quantum physics is believed to be the fundamental theory underlying our understanding of the physical universe. However, it is based on concepts and principles that have always been difficult to understand and controversial in their interpretation. This book aims to explain these issues using a minimum of technical language and mathematics. After a brief introduction to the ideas of quantum physics, the problems of interpretation are identified and explained. The rest of the book surveys, describes and criticises a range of suggestions that have been made with the aim of resolving these problems; these include the traditional, or 'Copenhagen' interpretation, the possible role of the conscious mind in measurement and the postulate of parallel universes. This new edition has been revised throughout to take into account developments in this field over the past fifteen years, including the idea of 'consistent histories' to which a completely new chapter is devoted.